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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the intraday variation of option bid-ask spreads. We find an L-shaped 
spread pattern for options confirming the findings of Chan et al. (1995), a reverse U-shaped 
pattern for option depth, and a reverse S-shaped pattern for the underlying stock spread. In 
addition, we use regression analysis to analyze the determinants of the intraday spread of options. 
Our regression models are based on the findings of Cho and Engle (1999), De Fontnouvelle et al. 
(2003), Pinter (2003), Wei and Zheng (2010), and Verousis and Gwilym (2013). We extend this 
literature by considering the time-of-the-day effect. We divide each trading day into thirteen 30-
minute intervals and use dummy variables to represent the various intervals of the day. In 
addition, we consider how the spread varies depending on whether the option is out-of-the-
money, near-the-money, or deep in-of-the-money. 
This study uses intraday quote-level data obtained from the Option Pricing Reporting 
Authority (OPRA) for equity options listed on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) during 
January, February and March of 2010. Consistent with the propositions of previous studies, for 
example Wei and Zheng (2010) and Verousis and Gwilym (2013), we find that option bid-ask 
spreads and percentage option spreads are significantly related to the spreads of the underlying 
stocks, option depth, time to expiration, moneyness, the number of quote revisions, volatility of 
underlying stocks, and market volatility. In addition, this study is the first to incorporate the 
underlying stock price as a determinant of the option spread. We propose that the underlying 
stock price is a proxy for the hedging costs incurred by option writers. We also discover that option 
depth is driven by many of the same factors that affect option spread, but the effects are mostly 
opposite in direction and the collective explanatory power of them for option depth is not as 
strong as the explanatory power for option spread. As most of the previous studies were 
conducted with end-of-day data, we confirm their results at the intraday level. In addition, we 
find that the underlying stock prices have positive effect on option spreads in general. We 
attribute this relationship to the hedging activities of the suppliers of options. Another unique 
contribution of this study is finding that the CBOE SPX Volatility Index (VIX) has significant and 
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positive impact on option dollar spread, but it is insignificant with respect to percentage option 
spread. Also, it has a significant negative impact on put and call option depth. 
Although other factors may be important, we believe that information asymmetry theory 
can satisfactorily explain the intraday behaviors of option spreads in most cases. As market 
makers attempt to fulfil their responsibilities by providing liquidity to the market, they provide 
quotations based on their perception of risks, most critical of which is information asymmetry 
risk. To manage such risk, they use wide option spread as a cushion to compensate for taking the 
risk of trading with informed traders due to information disadvantage, and use low depth to lower 
the exposure to such risk.  
Regardless of the causes, we propose that option spreads are significant whether measured 
in dollar terms or as percentage of premiums, which suggests high transaction costs and high 
degree of inefficiency in the options market. The market is therefore most suitable for informed 
investors. Our L-shaped intraday pattern also suggests that timing of trades may be useful in this 
market, as during a typical trading day option spreads start relatively high in the morning and 
then drop to a more stable level after the first 90 minutes of trading. Moreover, we find that 
option spread and option depth are complementary in a sense that they both serve as tools for 
market makers to manage their inventories and risk exposure to limit potential loss. The spread 
and the depth are mostly negatively related. A notable exception is near the end of the day when 
market makers seem to maintain option spread but reduce the depth level, an action consistent 
with an attempt to avoid potential loss to informed traders. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Studies on intraday options spreads are very sparse compared to studies on intraday stock 
spreads. Previous studies, for example Mishra and Daigler (2014), attribute this phenomenon to 
several option characteristics. First, there are call options (calls) and put options (puts). Second, 
for each underlying stock there are many different classes of options attributed to different strike 
prices and different expiration dates. Third, all options expire and at the expiration date, option 
positions need to be closed. Therefore, unlike the underlying stock, it is not practical to retrieve 
a long time-series of data for each option series. 
We managed to identify only four intraday studies on stock option spreads: Chan, Chung, 
and Johnson (1995), Cho and Engle (1999), Kodippili (2004), and Mishra and Daigler (2014). 
Among the four, only Cho and Engle (1999) developed models for regression analysis, while the 
other three performed graphical analysis and made several proposals without testing them in a 
comprehensive model that controls for various interactions. Cho and Engle (1999) regressed 
option spreads on the spread of the underlying stock, option price, moneyness, time to expiry, 
and other control variables. One big difference between our study and their study is that we 
control for time-of-the-day effect by using interval dummy variables for thirteen 30-minute 
intervals of a trading day and we analyze the effect of moneyness closely by introducing 
interaction terms. A comparison between this study and Chan, Chung, and Johnson (1995), 
Kodippili (2004), and Mishra and Daigler (2014) is presented in Table 1-1 and discussed in greater 
detail in Section 2.4. 
Table 1-1: Previous Studies of Intraday Option Spreads 
 Chan et al. (1995) Kodippili (2004) 
Mishra and Daigler 
(2014) 
This Study 
Intraday Interval 
Length 
15 min 5 min 15 min 30 minutes 
Number of 
Underlyings 
32 stocks 
1 index and 2 
stocks 
2 indices 20 stocks 
Option Selection 
Most active call 
option and put 
option for each 
stock 
All series from 
10% in-the-
money to 10% 
out-of-the-money 
All series from 10% in-
the-money to 10% 
out-of-the-money 
All series from 30% 
in-the-money to 30% 
out-of-the-money 
Sample Period 
January to March 
of 1986 
Late May to mid-
August of 2003 
October to December 
in both 2007 and 2008 
January to March of 
2010 
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Option Spread 
Shape - Intraday 
L-shape 
Inconsistent 
results 
Inconsistent results L-shape 
Regression Model No  No  No  Yes 
 
Also, many intraday studies on stocks have reported that stock spreads demonstrate U-
shaped, reverse J-shaped, reverse S-shaped, or L-shaped patterns over the course of a trading day. 
However, we found only one paper, Chan et al. (1995), which did similar analysis and reported an 
L-shaped pattern for option spreads. Our comparisons indicate that the depth and scope of 
intraday option spread studies are still primitive relative to those on stocks, and call for more 
research. Furthermore, we are not aware of any studies that consider the intraday pattern or 
determinants of the depth. The only relevant study that we have identified is Verousis and Gwilym 
(2013), an end-of-day study, that discovered determinants of option spread and option depth 
affect these two liquidity measures oppositely. 
Despite the scarcity of related research, the use of options for speculation or hedging is 
becoming more popular especially around the period of financial crisis, as equity option total 
volume increased by 19.8% per annum from 2004 to a peak in 2009, according to data on CBOE 
website. This calls for better understanding of intraday behavior of options, because bid-ask 
spread in dollar value (dollar spread) and bid-ask spread as a percentage of option value 
(percentage spread1) for options are both substantial, compared to those for stocks. The higher 
spreads contribute to higher trading costs of options. An illustration of the magnitude of option 
spreads relative to the spreads of the underlying securities is provided in Appendix. Summary 
statistics conducted as part of this study show that options have a mean percentage spread of 
around 11.5%, while the percentage spread for stocks has a mean of only 0.052%. This implies 
that on average option traders require an 11.5% change in the option premium to recover the 
spread. The 11.5% average spread may also be interpreted as the average percentage loss option 
traders start with at the onset of the trade. Although options are leveraged and 11.5% premium 
change demands a smaller percentage change in the underlying security price, it still indicates 
significant market inefficiency. Thus, the options market does not seem to be a suitable 
                                                      
1 Percentage spread, also known as proportional spread in literature, is calculated as the bid-ask spread scaled 
by the average of best bid price and best ask price. 
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marketplace for uninformed investors, because they have no superior information of market 
directions and are charged a high spread. We believe that an improved understanding of option 
bid-ask spread is important for traders to better their trading performance, as the spread is 
significant in magnitude and constitutes a significant barrier for trading. 
This study aims to provide additional knowledge of intraday behaviors of options and 
educate traders on trade timing and other certain characteristics in the options market. We 
analyze the intraday behavior of options’ bid-ask spreads because we are interested in finding 
out the determinants of the spread, which is associated with liquidity in the options market. In 
addition, we analyze the intraday pattern of the option depth2 as another dimension of liquidity 
in the market. Furthermore, we analyze spreads in dollar value and spreads as a percentage of 
premium to examine the consistency of our findings.  
This study makes several contributions to the literature on intraday option spreads. First, we 
extend the work of Cho and Engle (1999) who developed a regression model to examine the 
determinants and pattern of the S&P 100 American call options spread at the intraday level. In 
comparison, our study examines spreads of options related to 20 different stocks and uses a 
regression model that extends their model by controlling for intraday effect, option depth, 
frequency of quote revisions (in substitution of option volume), underlying stock price, implied 
market volatility, moneyness and interaction of moneyness with other control variables. The 
construction of our models is also based on the findings of option studies that use end-of-day 
data. These studies and the variables used in their models are listed in Table 1-2. 
Table 1-2: Main Variables in Option Spread Studies that Use End-of-Day Data 
  
De Fontnouvelle 
et al. (2003) 
Pinter (2003) 
Wei and Zheng 
(2010) 
Verousis and 
Gwilym (2013) 
Underlying spread ✓  ✓  ✓ 
Time to expiry   ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Moneyness    ✓ ✓ 
Underlying volatility ✓  ✓ ✓ 
Option volatility    ✓ ✓ 
                                                      
2  Depth measures the ability of the current market quotation of an exchange-traded security to absorb buy and/or 
sell trades. A frequently used proxy is the average of best bid size (amount of this security the market offers to buy 
at best bid price) and best ask price (amount of this security the market offers to sell at best ask price). 
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Option price ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Option volume ✓  ✓   
Option Greeks ✓ ✓     
 
Second, this study provides a comprehensive model of the determinants of the intraday 
spread by integrating the findings of previous studies, many of which were obtained by simple 
descriptive statistics, and controlling for the intraday variations in options trading. Moreover, the 
models developed by some previous studies are vastly different and sometimes ignore some 
important control variables. For example, some models do not include the spread of the 
underlying stocks as a determinant of option spreads, while we believe that this factor is a very 
important factor. Lee, Mucklow and Ready (1993), Dupont (2000) and Tannous, Wang and Wilson 
(2013) all suggest that information asymmetry is a significant contributor to the spread in equity 
markets. We believe the information asymmetry is also a positive contributor to the spreads in 
the options market because information in the stock market is delivered to and absorbed by the 
option market. Thus, spread of underlying stocks should be included in the analysis. 
Third, this study proposes that the underlying stock price can be regarded as a measurement 
of the cost of hedging for options, and it positively correlates with option spreads and negatively 
correlates with option depth. 
Fourth, we propose that shifts in the overall market sentiment affects the spread and the 
depth of put and call options. We use the VIX as a proxy for the market sentiment and we find 
that it has a negative impact on the depth but its effects on spreads differs depending on whether 
the options are near-the-money, at-the-money, or out-of-the-money. 
Fifth, we find that a complementary relationship between option spread and option depth 
exists. They are two measures market makers use to lower their potential loss from market 
making for informed traders, but these two measures do not hold the same relationship 
consistently, as market makers seem to employ different risk management strategies with respect 
to the use of spread and depth in different scenarios. 
Overall, this study summarize previous research on the intraday behavior of option spreads, 
extends the existing intraday spread framework, and develops a more general intraday option 
spread model. In this regard, we extend the intraday study of Cho and Engle (1999) on option 
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spreads. We have found that the inclusion of moneyness interaction terms is very meaningful, 
evidenced by increased model fitness. In addition, we examine some of the propositions that 
were developed and tested by previous studies using end-of-day data (De Fontnouvelle, Fishe and 
Harris, 2003; Pinter, 2003; Wei and Zheng, 2010; Verousis and Gwilym, 2013). This research has 
theoretical implications as it complements the existing theoretical frameworks and improves our 
understanding of the factors that drive option spreads. In addition, it has practical implications 
for the industry to develop strategies to manage the spread which is considerable in option 
trading. We provide insights to option traders about how to time the market and place their 
option trades at a desirable time to avoid the relatively large trading costs associated with the 
wide bid-ask spreads. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Explanatory Factors for Intraday Behaviors of Option Spreads 
Based on existing literature, several factors could possibly explain the intraday behavior of 
option spread, including option depth, underlying stock spread, time to expiration (also known 
as time to maturity), moneyness, volatility of underlying securities, option delta, intensity of 
market activities and other factors, such as market making structure. 
2.1.1 Option Depth 
Lee et al. (1993), Chung and Van Ness (2001) and Li, Van Ness and Van Ness (2005) all observe 
a U-shaped spread daily pattern for stocks and a reverse U-shaped depth pattern. They all offered 
similar explanations for the relationships. Those studies were about stocks, but their explanations 
apply to options. For example, spread and depth are price dimension and quantity dimension of 
liquidity respectively (Lee et al., 1993), where high liquidity coincides with low spread and high 
depth, and low liquidity coincides with high spread and low depth. When planning to provide 
more/less liquidity, market makers can increase/decrease quoted depth or narrow/widen quoted 
spread or apply both collectively, which depends on their expectations and market conditions. 
The same logic can be applied to option spread and option depth as well. Verousis and Gwilym 
(2013) used intraday option dataset and found out a negative correlation between option spread 
and option depth. 
However, spread and depth (for both stocks and options) are not negatively correlated at all 
time. For stocks, Tannous et al. (2013) argued that spreads declined in the morning session while 
the depth held flat, but remained steady in the afternoon session while depth rose sharply. 
Tannous et al. (2013) attributed the inconsistent correlation between spread and depth to the 
dynamic strategy adopted by market makers to adjust liquidity at the open and at the close. They 
argue that market makers adjust liquidity using the spread in the morning, but using depth in the 
afternoon. Verousis and Gwilym (2013) recorded strong and negative correlation between option 
spread and option depth on different exchanges as -0.47 for Amsterdam, -0.25 for London and -
0.37 for Paris. After all, depth should still be one of the most influential explanatory variables for 
spread. In this study, the option depth should be incorporated to account for intraday variation 
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of option spread. 
2.1.2 Underlying Stock Spread 
As suggested by the “Derivative Hedge Theory” in Cho and Engle (1999), market makers set 
spread in order to transfer away the inventory risks and information risks of their positions in the 
underlying market. They argued that option spread is inversely related to the ability of option 
market makers to hedge in underlying stock market. Thus, high stock spreads lead to low liquidity 
in the stock market and weaken market makers’ ability to hedge in underlying market, which 
ultimately leads to high option spreads. Cho and Engle (1999) concluded that option spread and 
underlying stock spread are positively correlated. More recent studies, for example De 
Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) and Wei and Zheng (2010), also confirmed the positive relationship 
between the underlying spread and option spread. Verousis and Gwilym (2013) reinforced this 
proposition in their intraday study and reported that “underlying market liquidity is a strong 
determinant of option spread” and underlying spread is significantly positively related to option 
spread. Both studies referred to the Derivative Hedge Theory in explaining the positive 
relationship. 
As explained theoretically by Sheikh and Ronn (1994) and Chan et al. (1995), information 
about a company affects its stocks and options simultaneously, therefore, underlying stock 
spreads can capture the firm-specific information and risks that drive the option spread. This can 
be another justification for positive relationship between underlying stock spreads and option 
spreads, in addition to Derivative Hedge Theory. 
2.1.3 Time to Expiration 
Kodippili (2004) found option bid-ask spread to be positively correlated with time to 
expiration (or as he called it “term-to-maturity”), because market makers are inclined to set larger 
spread for options that expire in a relatively long time, given that longer-term options are more 
likely to end up in the money at expiration and longer-term options cost more to hedge against. 
Pinter (2003) indicated that this positive correlation may result from a negative relationship 
between time to expiration and the level of trading, along with a negative relationship between 
option dollar spread and the level of trading in the same option. The double negatives may lead 
to a positive relationship between option dollar spread and time to expiration. 
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2.1.4 Moneyness 
A positive relationship between moneyness and the spread was proposed by Kodippili (2004) 
and Verousis and Gwilym (2013), which suggests in-the-money options have higher dollar spread 
than near-the-money options and near-the-money options have higher spread than out-of-the-
money options 3 . The reasoning is that market makers require a higher bid-ask spread to 
compensate for the greater risks embedded in the in-the-money options. Their arguments are 
built on the basis that the greatest amount an option trader can lose is the premium and in-the-
money options have high premiums hence a larger amount to lose. 
However, in-the-money options do not behave in the exact opposite way as out-of-the-
money options. In particular, the price of deep in-the-money options is approximately linear with 
respect to the price of underlying securities, while the price of deep out-of-the-money options is 
close 0. The option spread should not be simply a linear function of moneyness. In this study, we 
introduce two dummy variables to represent in-the-money options and out-of-the-money 
options respectively to capture the asymmetry. 
2.1.5 Volatility of Underlying Stock and Option 
Hait (1999) contended that the short-term volatility of the underlying stock price is an 
important determinant for option spread. The author uses the annualized ten-day trailing 
standard deviation of stock price returns as a proxy for short-term volatility. Mayhew, Sarin and 
Shastri (1999) also contended that options would be more liquid if the underlying stocks were 
more volatile, because high volatility of stock returns imply greater interests in hedging 
instruments like options and thus higher liquidity of options. Wei and Zheng (2010) observe that 
option spread decreased with stock volatility and interpret this observation on the basis that high 
stock volatility usually led to high volume and thus low spread. However, they observe that the 
explanatory power of stock volatility is not as significant as other variables. Their result seems to 
be consistent with the findings of De Fontnouvelle et al. (2003), who concluded that the 
underlying volatility has a very minor and insignificant impact on option spread, and inconsistent 
                                                      
3 Among call options, in-the-money option is an option whose underlying spot price is higher than the strike 
price, and out-of-the-money option is an option whose underlying spot price is lower than the strike price. Among 
put options, in-the-money option is an option whose underlying spot price is lower than the strike price, and out-of-
the-money option is an option whose underlying spot price is higher than the strike price. 
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with the findings of Cho and Engle (1999) and Verousis and Gwilym (2013) who report that option 
spreads are strongly and significantly increasing with stock volatility. These seemingly inconsistent 
observations call for additional analysis of option spreads. 
As for option volatility, both Wei and Zheng (2010) and Verousis and Gwilym (2013) found a 
positive association between option volatility and option spread. Both papers attributed the 
positive relationship to the greater amount of inventory risks faced by the market makers. The 
two papers seem to agree that the volatility of the underlying asset is significant determinant of 
the spread. Wei and Zheng (2010) find that option volatility, defined as the volatility of the 
underlying asset multiplied by the hedge ratio, is the strongest determinant of option liquidity 
and spread while Verousis and Gwilym (2013) observe that their direct measure of option 
volatility is not as decisive as other factors, such as the volatility of the underlying stocks.  
2.1.6 Option Price 
Previous studies, for example De Fontnouvelle et al. (2003), propose that the bid-ask spreads 
of options are positively related to the prices of options. Mayhew (2002) observed that dollar bid-
ask spreads tend to increase with the price of the option while percentage spreads tend to 
decrease with the price of the option. The changes seem to diminish as the option price increases. 
Thus, there is no linear relationship between dollar spread and option price or between 
percentage spread and option price.   
2.1.7 Intensity of Market Activities 
Traditionally, trading volume has been used to gauge the level of market activities. Lee et al. 
(1993) reported that for stocks increased volume could drive down quoted depth and widen the 
spread. Similar findings are available for options as well. Mayhew (2002) and Pinter (2003) 
advocated that the spread should be negatively related to trading volume. Mayhew (2002) further 
observed that option bid-ask spreads are sensitive to total trading volume of all options with the 
same underlying stock and that the bid-ask spread appears to be a decreasing convex function of 
volume. In contrast, Cho and Engle (1999) and Wei and Zheng (2010) provide evidence suggesting 
that option market volume does not have a dominant impact on option spread. This study aims 
to provide some further empirical evidence about the impact of market activities on option 
spread, but we select the frequency of quote revision as the proxy. 
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2.1.8 Option Delta 
Option delta, also known as the hedge ratio, is believed to be another factor that contribute 
to option spread. De Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) and Pinter (2003) both found positive relationship 
between delta and option spread. Cho and Engle (1999) also used option delta to calculate the 
hedging costs for options, which suggests that option delta also influence option spread, since 
hedging cost is a major component of option spread. More recently, Wei and Zheng (2010) used 
the hedge ratio to determine the option volatility as the product of the hedge ratio and the 
volatility of the underlying security. In their model, the impact of the hedge ratio is mixed with 
the impact of the volatility of the underlying asset. 
2.1.9 Others 
Vijh (1990) and Chan et al. (1995) proposed that the market structure plays an important 
role in determining option spreads. More specifically, the multi-dealer structure of CBOE may lead 
to a different intraday spread pattern than the spread patterns observed on the NYSE which 
operates under a specialist market structure. In a single specialist market, only one market maker 
can see the order book in the market while in a multiple dealer market no single dealer has access 
to the total order book. The multiple dealer market gives rise to the differences in the decision-
making processes of dealers and leads to differences in the spread behavior. De Fontnouvelle et 
al. (2003) suggested that cross-listing is another characteristic that may affect the spread as 
competitive listing on multiple exchanges leads to greater liquidity and lower spread. Besides 
option delta, other option Greeks, such as Vega and Gamma, have been used in De Fontnouvelle 
et al. (2003). 
2.2 Theoretical Arguments for Microstructure 
2.2.1 Microstructure of Options 
We have discussed the major factors that contribute to the magnitude of option spreads or 
to the depth of options. In this section, we discuss the reasons why the intraday behaviors may 
exist.  
Hait (1999) explained the four factors that made up option spread: the cost of hedging, fixed 
costs of trading, inventory risk, and asymmetric information. The cost of hedging usually entails 
the transaction costs and the bid-ask spread in underlying stock market in order to hedge the 
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risks of options. Fixed costs are costs that market makers or dealers face when doing their 
business, which include clearing and processing fees, and amortized cost of exchange 
membership. They can pass those costs down to option traders through setting up the spread. 
Inventory risk is the risk market makers take when holding inventories, because they carry long 
or short balances of inventories in order to provide liquidity, and the value of their holdings may 
move in the undesirable direction. By setting a spread, the dealer can obtain a cushion against 
inventory price fluctuation. In this sense, the spreads should be dependent on the degree to 
which the dealer is risk-averse and whether the dealer is a monopolistic specialist or a competing 
market maker. Lastly, asymmetric information occurs when market makers, whose responsibility 
is to provide liquidity, are required to make trades with all traders. Some of the traders may 
possess superior information than market makers, so the trades those traders initiate put market 
makers in a disadvantageous situation and incur a loss for market makers. A bid-ask spread 
compensates the market makers and reduces their potential loss. In support of the theory, Engle 
and Cho (1999) also found that microstructure of options could be attributed to multiple factors 
in different scenarios, i.e. high option spreads result from large amount of new asymmetric 
information in a fast-moving market, while high option spreads result from high inventory risk in 
a slow-moving market. Overall, Hait (1999) and Cho and Engle (1999) laid out theoretical 
framework for the microstructure of options. 
2.2.2 Microstructure of Stocks 
In existing literature, there are greater abundance of theoretical arguments made about 
microstructure of stocks, compared to relevant arguments for options. Although arguments for 
stock microstructure are not very closely relevant the studies on option spread, they enable us to 
better understand our topic, because options and their underlying stocks are matching securities. 
Information in either of the two markets can flow to the other, so that some theories for stocks 
can be used to extend our understanding of options. 
Sheikh and Ronn (1994) and Chan et al. (1995) argue that daily information flow feed into 
stocks and options at the same time, thus the patterns for stocks and options should be similar, 
and there is no leading or lagging relationship between these two. Therefore, there are reasons 
to believe that the factors that determine intraday patterns for stocks can also influence the 
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intraday patterns for options, and that microstructure of options and microstructure of stocks are 
interrelated. This allows us to use studies on microstructure of stocks as a reference for our 
studies to gain insights and theoretical support, especially when there have been few studies on 
microstructure of options. 
There are several explanations for the microstructure of stocks, including behaviors of 
market makers (or specialist), behaviors of institutional investors, intensity of trading activities 
and supply-demand imbalance. 
Market makers’ behaviors have been one of the most acknowledged factors that lead to 
stock microstructure, because they are the party who determines and sets market quotes. 
Basically, the spreads that we can observe in the market are actually quoted spread decided by 
market makers, who are obliged to provide liquidity to other market participants. According to 
the definition on the CBOE website, “market makers are exchange members who provide liquidity 
in the marketplace by risking their own capital in making bids and offers for their own accounts 
in the absence of public buy or sell orders”. Hence, it makes sense that decisions of market makers 
have widely acknowledged impact on intraday behaviors of options. Madhavan (1992) and Levin 
and Wright (1999) found out that the spread falls in the opening hour because the inflow of 
private information that has accumulated overnight (after the closing of markets at the end of 
the previous trading day) reduces the degree of information asymmetry, which refers to the 
phenomenon where material information is known to some, but not known to all market 
participants (including market makers). In order to avoid huge loss due to lack of superior 
information, market makers widen the spread at the open. Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) 
pointed out that market makers enjoy information advantage and can therefore selectively 
participate in trades, which explains the pattern of spread in the last interval. Brock and Kleidon 
(1992) attributed the wide spread in opening and closing hours to the monopolistic power of 
market makers and inelastic demand during those hours. The market makers exploit the 
opportunities by setting a wide spread. Similarly, Chung and Van Ness (2001) observed more limit 
orders outstanding at midday and fewer at the open and the close, which makes it easier for 
market makers to manipulate the spread.  
Microstructure of stocks can also be ascribed to behaviors of institutional investors. Breen, 
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Hodrick, and Korajczyk (2002) argued that some institutional investors, for example mutual funds, 
actively participate in intraday transactions. Their trades can have a huge price impact. 
Additionally, institutional investors usually make the majority of their trades at some particular 
time of the day and follow some algorithm that results in a relatively stable trading pattern 
(Heston, Korajczyk, Sadka, and Thorson, 2011). For example, mutual funds usually adjust their 
holdings near the close of the market. For high-frequency institutional traders, a large portion of 
a sample of institutional orders are completed the same day that trading is initiated. All those 
facts support the notion that institutional investors act as one influential factor that results in 
intraday patterns. 
Intensity of trading activities also greatly affect the intraday variation of stock spreads. As 
concluded by McInish and Wood (1992), the spread is inversely related to trading activities, 
including the number of trades and the number of shares per trades, because trades can squeeze 
the spread to be narrow. With more evidence, Lee et al. (1993) reported the opposite arguing 
that increased volume can widen spread. Beyond that, Foster and Viswanathan (1993) suggests 
that trading volume is inversely related to information asymmetry, as high volume leads to low 
level of information asymmetry, which means narrow spread and large depth. The information 
asymmetry argument is backed up by Madhavan (1992) and Levin and Wright (1999), where they 
discovered that the high volume in the opening hour is accompanied by a drop of information 
asymmetry. The pattern of trading volume leads to varying levels of information asymmetry 
throughout the day. 
Another belief is that the demand for stock trading is associated with the market 
microstructure and that an inelastic demand for trades often coincides with wide spread. Brock 
and Kleidon (1992) and Harris and Panchapagesan (2005) argued that supply-demand imbalance 
as a key driver of daily intraday patterns. Further, Brock and Kleidon (1992) and Heston, Korajczyk 
and Sadka (2010) explain the wide spread at the open and close by the huge demand with the 
imbalance between supply and demand. The imbalance is often characterized by inelastic 
demand to make trades. Chung and Van Ness (2001) found that the competition between security 
suppliers and demanders are highest during the midday, which narrows the spread. Also, as 
quoted by Heston et al. (2010), “investors have a predictable demand for immediacy at certain 
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times of the day”. In all, the supply-demand dynamic follows a certain daily pattern, which 
probably gives rise to a certain pattern for spread and the depth. 
2.3 Observed Patterns for Spreads 
Previous studies suggest that option and stock spreads follow special patterns during regular 
trading hours. For option spread, we find Chan et al. (1995). For stock spread, there are Brock and 
Kleidon (1992), Chan et al. (1995), Lee et al. (1993), Heston et al. (2010) and Tannous et al. (2013). 
For stock depth, there are Lee et al. (1993), Dupont (2000) and Tannous et al. (2013). Other 
metrics include market execution speed by Garvey and Wu (2009) and trading volume by McInish 
and Wood (1992), Foster and Viswanathan (1993) and Hora (2006). Those intraday studies 
unanimously argue for the existence of microstructure. However, in this section, we limit the 
scope to only the patterns for spread, due to the focus of this research. Although our research 
concentrates on option spread, we believe options and stocks are closely related. Information can 
flow simultaneously into those two markets, so that option spread and stock spread should have 
a close relationship. Therefore, we intend to demonstrate, compare, and analyze stock spread 
patterns and option spread patterns altogether. 
As in the previous literature, the mainstream method to analyze different metrics of options 
or stocks on intraday basis is to divide a typical trading day into multiple equal-length intervals. 
The interval can be as long as 1 hour, 30 minutes, 15 minutes or even 1 minute. Among these 
choices, the most popularly used interval length is 30-minutes. Each trading day (9:30 a.m. to 
4:30 p.m. EST) is broken down into 13 consecutive 30-minute intervals, as in McInish and Wood 
(1992), Li et al. (2005), Heflin, Shaw and Wild (2007), Heston et al. (2010), and Tannous et al. 
(2013). As detailed in Section 4-5, the spread for each 30-minute interval is calculated as a time-
weighted spread. 
For option spread, Chan et al. (1995) is the only study that presents microstructure visually 
with graphs. They reported that option spread, on an average day, drops sharply after the open 
then levels off, resembling an L-shaped pattern. Chan et al. (1995) discovered an L-shaped option 
spread for CBOE options. Additionally, they found a U-shaped intraday spread pattern for NYSE 
stocks. They contended that the difference is due to different market making structure. CBOE, the 
option market, has a more competitive market making structure than NYSE. Specifically, there are 
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multiple market makers on CBOE and they do not see the order book, so that each of them has 
little monopolistic power and the demand imbalance in the market can be corrected quickly due 
to the competition. The difference in market making structure leads to differences in the spreads. 
While only one study reported about the pattern for option spreads, significantly more 
studies present patterns for stock spreads. 
One frequently proposed pattern of stock spreads within a trading day is the U-shaped 
pattern. U-shaped stock spread was presented in many studies, such as Brock and Kleidon (1992) 
and Lee et al. (1993). To the author’s knowledge, there has been no study proposing a U-shaped 
pattern for option spreads. The only remotely relevant work is Sheikh and Ronn (1994), who 
suggested a U-shaped pattern for option return variance. In Figure 2-1, Brock and Kleidon (1992) 
showed the U-shaped stock spread pattern and attributed the spike at the open and close of the 
day to the increased demand. They suggested demand appears to be high at the open because 
investors seek optimal portfolio proportions at the open, and at the close because of behaviors 
to transfer away or reduce overnight risk. 
 
Figure 2-1: U-shaped spread, Brock and Kleidon (1992) 
 
As in Figure 2-2, the research of Lee et al. (1993) also yielded similar U-shaped spread. Their 
main explanation for the pattern is that market makers adjust the spread up and depth down 
when they are not confident about the accuracy of their information, which typically happens at 
the open and the close. 
Figure 2-2 has been removed due to copyright restrictions. It was a figure of stock spread, 
depth and volume graphed against 13 half-hour intervals of a trading day. Original source: 
Lee, C. M., Mucklow, B., & Ready, M. J. (1993). Spreads, depths, and the impact of earnings 
information: An intraday analysis. Review of Financial Studies, 6(2), 345-374. 
Figure 2-2: U-shaped spread and reverse U-shaped depth, Lee et al. (1993) 
 
Figure 2-1 has been removed due to copyright restrictions. It was a figure of U-shaped stock 
spread graphed against 390 minutes of a trading day. Original source: Brock, W. A., & 
Kleidon, A. W. (1992). Periodic market closure and trading volume: A model of intraday bids 
and asks. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 16(3), 451-489. 
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Several other papers revealed different patterns for stock spreads. McInish and Wood (1992) 
discovered a reverse J-shaped stock spread as in Figure 2-3. They observed that even though 
high-priced stocks have a different pattern from low-priced stocks, the pattern still resembles a 
reverse J shape on average. The insight they provided is that the spread is correlated to the 
amount of new information that come into the market and that the reverse J-shaped pattern may 
reflect the time-of-day preference of trading for an average investor. 
Figure 2-3 has been removed due to copyright restrictions. It was a figure of percentage 
stock spread graphed against 390 minutes of a trading day, displaying reverse J shape. 
Original source: McInish, T. H., & Wood, R. A. (1992). An analysis of intraday patterns in 
bid/ask spreads for NYSE stocks. The Journal of Finance, 47(2), 753-764. 
Figure 2-3: Reverse J-shaped spread, McInish and Wood (1992) 
 
Reverse S-shaped stock spread was proposed by Chung and Van Ness (2001) as in Figure 2-
4. They suggested that the decline in spread from the beginning to midday is primarily because 
the traders and market makers have increasingly greater interests in trading and provide more 
competitive prices throughout the morning session, which boosts competition and drives down 
the spread. There is a decline in spread near the close of the day, which differentiates itself from 
reverse L-shaped pattern. They attributed this decline to inventory control of market makers near 
market close. Specifically, in order to readjust the inventory level to target inventory level, they 
offer more appealing pricing to replenish securities that they are running short of and sell off 
excess inventories that they have accumulated during the day. 
Figure 2-4 has been removed due to copyright restrictions. It was a figure of reverse S-
shaped (standardized) percentage stock spread graphed against 13 half-hour intervals of a 
trading day, displaying reverse J shape. All three time periods demonstrate such intraday 
pattern. Original source: Chung, K. H., & Van Ness, R. A. (2001). Order handling rules, tick 
size, and the intraday pattern of bid–ask spreads for NASDAQ stocks. Journal of Financial 
Markets, 4(2), 143-161. 
Figure 2-4: Reverse S-shaped spread, Chung and Van Ness (2001) 
 
An L-shaped stock spread pattern was found by Tannous et al. (2013) for stocks. As per 
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Figure 2-5, the spread starts to fall since opening and continues to decline at a decreasing rate 
until 1:30 PM after which the spread widens slightly during the 1:30-2:00 interval and then it 
resumes the declining pattern. They observe that the slight increase in the spread is 
corresponding to a significant increase in information asymmetry between 12:00 noon and 2:00 
PM. Tannous et al. (2013) argue that the difference between the intraday pattern of information 
asymmetry and the intraday pattern of spreads is observed because market makers are applying 
a dynamic strategy of adjusting the spread, the depth, or both to manage their risk. Close to the 
end of the day when the information asymmetry arises, market makers offer lower liquidity by 
lowering depth, instead of widening the spread. 
Figure 2-5 has been removed due to copyright restrictions. It was a figure of L-shaped stock 
spread graphed against 13 half-hour intervals of a trading day. Upper bound, mean and 
lower bound all demonstrate such intraday pattern. Original source: Tannous, G., Wang, J., 
& Wilson, C. (2013). The intraday pattern of information asymmetry, spread, and depth: 
Evidence from the NYSE. International Review of Finance, 13(2), 215-240. 
Figure 2-5: L-shaped spread, Tannous et al. (2013) 
 
2.4 Summary of Relevant Studies 
Compared to studies on stocks, there have been limited number of studies on option spreads, 
many of which used daily data and few of which used intraday data (also known as quote-level 
data or tick-level data). Moreover, among studies that used intraday option data, there are studies, 
like De Fontnouvelle et al. (2003), Kaul, Nimalendran and Zhang (2004) and Verousis and Gwilym 
(2013), who did not perform analysis at intraday level. They constructed daily variables, 
aggregated quote-level data into daily data by simple averaging or weighted averaging, and then 
performed daily analysis, whereas in this study we control for the intraday variances in the spread 
and its determinants by dividing a trading day into 13 intervals.  
Based on our search, Cho and Engle (1999) is the only paper on intraday option spreads that 
incorporated regression models. They proposed Derivative Hedge Theory and examined the 
impact of the underlying market on option liquidity and spread. They ran regression on 
percentage option spread, controlling for option price, moneyness, time to expiry, volatility of 
 18 
 
underlying security, option delta, volume and the percentage spread of underlying security. Our 
research is similar because we are also using intraday data and we control for many of the factors 
they use in their models. However, our research is different from Cho and Engle (1999) for the 
following reasons: 
[1] We collected a sample of equity options of 20 stocks in first three month of 2010, while 
they collected a sample of index option of S&P 100 American call options from May 1993. Our 
focus is entirely on the microstructure of equity options, which could be significantly different 
from that of index options. We also intend to compare call options and put options, instead of 
just call options. In addition, our sample is more recent which could lead to different results due 
to evolvement of the options market. 
[2] Cho and Engle (1999) did not control for time-of-the-day effect, while we believe it is 
important, since options exhibit patterns in their intraday variations, as evidenced by Chan et al. 
(1995). We incorporate interval variables similar to those employed by many intraday studies on 
stocks. Intraday studies on option spreads also divided each trading day into intervals and 
presented descriptive statistics or graphs but they did not run regressions. See following 
paragraphs in the current section for more details on those intraday option spread studies. 
[3] Our research provides a more comprehensive analysis of the impact of moneyness. We 
introduce dummy variables to identify deep in the money options and far out of the money 
options. Then, we interact these dummy variables with other key variables. The rationale is that 
the effect of the underlying spread, for example, on option spread for out-of-the-money options 
is likely to be different from the same effect for in-the-money options. This justifies introduction 
of interactions terms. 
 [4] Cho and Engle (1999) devoted most of their efforts to analyze percentage option 
spreads. We analyze both dollar spreads and percentage spreads as well as the depth. 
In addition to Cho and Engle (1999), there are three (3) intraday studies on option spreads. 
These are Chan et al. (1995), Kodippili (2004) and Mishra and Daigler (2014), although none of 
these papers developed a model. Table 1-1 has summarized some details about those three 
papers as well as this paper. 
Chan et al. (1995) focused on the options of 32 stocks. The selected the most active call 
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option and the most active put option for each of their 32 stocks and collected their data during 
the first 61 trading days in 1986 (January, February, and March 1986). They divided each trading 
day into 15-minute intervals. They found that, on average, option spread had an L-shape intraday 
pattern.  
Kodipilli (2004) had a sample period around 3 months in 2003 and selected all series from 
10% in-the-money to 10% out-of-the-money. They divided each trading day into 5-minute 
intervals and gathered option data for one index and two stocks. They did not find systematic or 
consistent pattern for option spreads among the index and the two stocks. They found out that 
option spreads increase with time to maturity and are higher for in-the-money options. 
Mishra and Daigler (2014) used a sample of 6 months altogether in 2007 and 2008 and also 
selected all series from 10% in-the-money to 10% out-of-the-money. They chose SPX and SPY 
options both with S&P 500 index as underlying security. Each trading day was divided into 15-
minute intervals. They found U-shaped option spread pattern for SPY options, but not for SPX 
options. 
We consider the literature inadequate, given that there are limited number of intraday 
studies on option spreads, compared to the abundance of intraday studies on stock spreads. In 
terms of the pattern of option spreads on intraday basis, only Chan et al. (1995) found a consistent 
intraday option spread pattern, which was L-shaped, while there have been so many different 
studies proposing intraday patterns in stock intraday study literature. Furthermore, according to 
our investigation, only one intraday study, Cho and Engle (1999) used regression models and the 
sample was drawn from a long time ago (in May of 1993), although many daily studies on option 
spreads developed models and drew sample from recent years. It will be the contribution of this 
paper to use a more recent sample to analyze the pattern for intraday option spreads, and 
finetune the models for intraday studies based on daily option spread studies, as well as briefly 
investigate the determinants of option depth. The major variables used in those models have 
been covered in Section 2.1. We will use some similar data cleaning and preparation techniques, 
but there will be some variations from those models, since many studies used daily data instead 
of intraday data, so some techniques do not apply to our data. 
Table 1-2 has already provided a quick summary of the regression models used in those daily 
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option spread studies, as a quick reference for the models to be introduced in this paper. 
The regression models in our paper will include some variables from the intraday study, 
which is Cho and Engle (1999), and daily studies, including but not limited to the papers in Table 
1-2, but our models include some but not all of their variables, and include some new variables, 
due to our limited scope and capacity, different methodologies we are to employ and the fact 
that we are analyzing intraday behaviors of option spreads. Among those studies (either intraday 
or daily), De Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) and Pinter (2003) chose option dollar spread as dependent 
variable, while Cho and Engle (1999), Wei and Zheng (2010) and Verousis and Gwilym (2013) 
chose option percentage spread as dependent variable. In our paper, we will run separate 
regressions using dollar spread and percentage spread as dependent variable to test how spread 
interacts with other factors both in dollar term and in percentage term. Apart from all these, in 
addition to existing literature, we will run regression with our control variables on option depth, 
so that we can improve our understanding about how option spread and option depth affect and 
complement each other. See the details of our models in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 3: Theoretical Arguments and Hypotheses 
Previous studies propose several theories to explain the magnitude and pattern of the bid-
ask spread in the stock market. Spread variation in stock markets has been attributed to market 
information asymmetry, fixed cost of trading, and inventory holding cost (Lee et al., 1993; Dupont, 
2000; Tannous et al. 2013). Information asymmetry theory argues that market makers are faced 
with adverse selection, because some traders have superior information over them, but market 
makers are obliged to provide liquidity to the market. Fixed cost of trading refers to the costs 
borne by market makers to carry their market making duties, such as order processing cost. 
Inventory holding cost is the potential capital loss resulting from holding securities, the cost to 
adjust inventory level, and the capital cost needed to hold the inventory. 
Previous studies that examine the spreads of options extend the asymmetric information, 
transaction cost, and the inventory holding cost theories to explain the intraday pattern of option 
spreads (Chan et al. 1995; Cho and Engle, 1999; Hait, 1999). In addition, previous studies propose 
the cost of hedging as an additional determinant of the spread in the options market (Hait, 1999). 
In this chapter, we summarize the propositions made by previous authors and explain their 
implications for option spreads. Beyond that, we make two unique propositions. The objective is 
to develop a comprehensive set of propositions regarding the determinants of the option bid-ask 
spread and to test these propositions jointly using intraday data of option quotations. 
3.1 Contributions by previous studies 
Information asymmetry theory suggests that market makers modify the bid-ask spread in 
response to the degree of information asymmetry in the options market (Chan et al. 1995; Cho 
and Engle, 1999; Hait, 1999). This theory is borrowed from the stock market studies which argue 
that market makers face significant risks from trading with informed traders (Lee et al., 1993; 
Dupont, 2000; De Fontnouvelle et al., 2003; Tannous et al. 2013). They manage this risk by 
widening the spread when they expect high level of informed trading and lower the spread when 
this risk subsides.  
Many previous studies of stock spreads use the asymmetric information theory to explain 
their observations of a U-shaped or L-shaped intraday pattern of stock spreads or option spreads 
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(Lee et al., 1993; Tannous et al., 2013). The common explanation is that information asymmetry 
is highest at the open because the amount of important private information accumulates 
overnight, resulting in high level of information asymmetry at market open. This situation leads 
market makers to increase the stock spread to be the highest at market open. Then, as 
information is transmitted to the market during the early minutes of trading the degree of 
information asymmetry drops and the spread is reduced accordingly. Furthermore, the level of 
information asymmetry reaches a low level and stays relatively stable for the remainder of the 
day leading to a relatively stable spread. Hence, some previous studies observe an L-shaped or U-
shaped patterns for stock spreads.  
Previous studies of option spreads use the theory of information asymmetry to argue that 
option spreads should be directly related to the underlying stock spreads (Cho and Engle, 1999; 
De Fontnouvelle et al., 2003; Verousis and Gwilym, 2013). This argument is supported by Sheikh 
and Ronn (1994) and Chan et al. (1995) who propose that since options are securities that derive 
their values from the values of the underlying assets, information asymmetry should feed into 
both stock and option markets at the same time. Therefore, information about the recent 
developments and the long-term prospects of a company affect both markets, resulting in the 
similarity of intraday variation of information asymmetry between stocks and options. 
Furthermore, the positive relationship between stock spreads and option spreads is also 
supported by the derivatives hedge theory proposed by Cho and Engle (1999). They argue that 
derivatives, such as options, are hedging tools used to transfer away risks associated with the 
underlying stocks. Therefore, illiquidity of the options markets is positively related to the 
illiquidity of the underlying market.  
Previous studies on option spreads argue that the volatility of the underlying stock should 
be negatively correlated with option spread (Wei and Zheng, 2010) and positively correlated with 
option liquidity (Mayhew et al., 1999). They argue that high volatility of the underlying suggests 
high trading volume or greater trading interest which means higher liquidity in the options market. 
However, Cho and Engle (1999) and Verousis and Gwilym (2013) argued that higher volatility of 
the underlying stock comes with greater asymmetric information, leads to greater variation in the 
option price, and brings about higher risks, which ultimately lead to wider spread. Nevertheless, 
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the significance of this factor has been discredited as minor De Fontnouvelle et al. (2003). 
Mayhew (2002) and Pinter (2003) propose that the option market activities (either quote 
revisions or executed trades) convey information to all market participants and mitigate risks 
associated with information asymmetry. Thus, market activities should ease the concerns of 
market makers. Therefore, quote revisions and trading volume should be negatively correlated 
with option spread. However, some empirical results of previous studies do not confirm this 
notion. For example, Cho and Engle (1999) and Wei and Zheng (2010) find the effect to be 
insignificant and minor.  
Unlike stocks, options are limited-life instruments while stocks are securities that have 
unlimited life. Previous studies, for example Pinter (2003) and Kodippili (2004), argue that option 
spread should be positively correlated with time to expiration of the specific contract. They 
explain that longer-term options involve more uncertainty, higher chance of occurrence of 
material private information, hence greater risks. The risk-averse nature of market makers pushes 
them to increase the spread to compensate for the risks. 
Kodippili (2004) and Verousis and Gwilym (2013) suggest that the degree by which an option 
is out-of-the-money or in-the money should affect the spread. They argue that in-the-money 
options carry greater uncertainty and have higher spread than out-of-the-money options, 
because they have higher premiums to allow for greater losses.  
3.2 Contributions of this study 
This research will examine the arguments proposed by previous studies. Our contributions 
in this regard is to examine these propositions jointly in a single regression model that controls 
for all factors proposed by previous studies. In addition, our analysis uses intraday data and 
controls for time-of-the-day variations. Therefore, confirmation of the conclusions of previous 
end-of-day studies is a worthy contribution. In addition, we make three new contributions to the 
literature. 
First, we propose that the asymmetric information theory also implies that an option bid-
ask spread should be inversely related to the average number of contracts offered at the bid and 
ask prices, known as the option depth. This conclusion follows from the arguments that the 
spread and depth are two dimensions of liquidity that may be used interchangeably to manage 
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stock market maker’s risk (Lee et al., 1993). Tannous et al (2013) confirm this conclusion for 
intraday stock bid-ask spreads and argue that market makers are using a dynamic strategy of 
reducing the spread or increasing the depth or both in response to a drop in information 
asymmetry. In contrast, when information asymmetry increases market makers can reduce the 
liquidity provided by raising the spread or reducing the depth or both. This study proposes that 
the option depth can be used by option market makers in the same way it may be used by stock 
market makers. Verousis and Gwilym (2013) study the determinants of the end-of-day option 
depth. Their results suggest that the determinants of the depth also affect the spread but in 
opposite directions. For example, the underlying proportional bid-ask spread affects the end-of-
day spread positively and the end-of-day depth negatively. One objective of this study is to 
examine the relationship between the bid-ask spread and the depth in the options market hoping 
to confirm that an increase in the depth is associated with a decrease in the spread or vice versa 
and confirm the findings of previous studies. Therefore, our first hypothesis may be stated as: 
Hypothesis 1: The bid-ask spread of an option is negatively related to the option’s depth.  
Second, we propose that the price of the underlying security has a significant positive effect 
on the spreads of the related options and this relation is the result of the costs of hedging that 
option writer are likely taking to supply options. We propose that option writers may be divided 
into three groups. First, there are traders who might write call options when they forecast a drop 
in the underlying stock or write puts when they forecast a rise in the underlying stock. We call 
this group “speculators”. We propose that the trades of speculators are short term in nature, 
conducted without hedging, and have little impact on the supply of options. Second, there are 
underwriters who enter the market to make profits from underwriting insurance contracts on the 
underlying stocks. As underwriters, this group are likely to hedge their positions by keeping an 
inventory of underlying assets. Third, some option writers may enter the market to hedge their 
inventories of stocks over a short period of time. For example, they may sell calls when they hold 
the underlying stock and they expect the stock price to drop or be stable until the expiry of the 
contract. Similar to underwriters, option writing by this group is done primarily in combination 
with a hedging portfolio of underlying securities held by the option writers. We call the 
combination of the second and third groups as “hedged writers”. We propose that the majority 
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of option writers belong to this category. Further, we propose that the inventory holding costs of 
options are directly related to the value of the hedging portfolio. This proposition follows if we 
assume that a high stock price implies high hedging cost as it requires a larger amount of capital 
to complete the hedge. Therefore, the inventory holding costs of options with high underlying 
stock price are higher than the inventory holding costs of options with low underlying stock price. 
The implication of this proposition is that the underlying stock price should positively affect the 
bid-ask spread of options because the higher stock price implies higher hedging costs for suppliers. 
Previous studies, for example Hait (1999), argue that hedging activities help in transmitting 
information asymmetry from the stock market to the option market so that information 
asymmetry affects option spreads in the same way it affects the spread of the underlying security. 
Our proposition suggests in addition that hedging activities increase the costs of writing options 
hence the spreads of options of high-priced stocks are higher than the spreads of options of low-
priced stocks. Therefore, our second hypothesis may be stated as follows. 
Hypothesis 2: The price of the underlying stock positively affects the bid-ask spread of the 
corresponding options.  
Third, we propose that option spreads are affected by market sentiment. Quoted spreads 
are provided by a group of market makers on CBOE, who are aware of the possibility that they 
may be facing information disadvantage compared to their trading counterparties. Despite this 
risk, market makers are obliged to maintain liquidity either by matching buy trade(s) and sell 
trade(s) or by filling trades from their own inventories. In contrast, informed market participants 
make trades only in situations when the quotes are lucrative to them. In a volatile and fast-moving 
market, characterized by high degree of information asymmetry, such behavior becomes more 
prominent. Consistent with the asymmetric information theory argument, we expect market 
makers to set wider spreads in the face of greater risks arising from overall market information 
asymmetry to compensate themselves for providing liquidity during a high-risk environment. 
Furthermore, we propose that the overall market information asymmetry is separate from and 
magnifies the degree of information asymmetry originating from company specific factors. For 
example, assume that on Day t, a market maker is market-making for the options of Stock X with 
average level of information asymmetry and during Day t the level of information asymmetry in 
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the market is also normal. Further assume that under this environment, the market maker will be 
satisfied with 8% spread. Now assume that on Day t+1, the information environment of Stock X 
is the same as it was during Day t but now the market environment has changed and the market 
information asymmetry is now higher. We propose that during Day t+1 the market maker will 
require a spread higher than 8%. Therefore, we propose that the component of the spread 
attributable to information asymmetry should be split into two independent components, one 
attributable to the underlying asset’s information environment and the other attributable to the 
overall market’s information asymmetry. Market information asymmetry measures the dispersion 
of investor’s opinions and uncertainty regarding overall market indicators such as policy changes, 
central bank actions, political risks, employment, and corporate earnings. Higher uncertainty 
about these market indicators implies higher expectations of market volatility and a sentiment of 
incoming risk. Therefore, we propose that the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) SPX 
Volatility Index, known as VIX underwritten on S&P 500 component stocks, is a proper proxy of 
the overall market’s information asymmetry. According to the CBOE website, VIX “is a key 
measure of market expectations of near-term volatility” and may be regarded as “the world's 
premier barometer of investor sentiment and market volatility.” 4  Therefore, our second 
hypothesis may be stated as follows: quotations  
Hypothesis 3: CBOE SPX Volatility Index (VIX) is positively related to the bid-ask spread of 
options or negatively related to the depth.   
 
 
   
                                                      
4  The quotations in this sentence are copied from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) webpage: 
http://www.cboe.com/products/vix-index-volatility/vix-options-and-futures/vix-index  
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Chapter 4: Data 
4.1 Sample Period 
The sample used in this study covers January, February and March of 2010. In the sample 
period, data were collected on 61 trading days, with 19 days in January, 19 days in February and 
23 days in March.  
4.2 Data Source 
The intraday data for options are Trade-and-Quote (TAQ) data. They were purchased from 
Options Price Reporting Authority (OPRA), a security information processor and distributor in the 
US that provide quotation information along with other services. The option quotation data we 
purchased from OPRA originated from Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). In the raw data, 
we have every quote of every monthly option that traded on CBOE in January, February and 
March of 2010. For stock data, the quoted minimum tick size for stocks is $0.01 cents. For option 
data, quoted minimum tick size is $0.05 for options trading below $3, and $0.10 for all other 
series. 
Besides option quotation data, daily average stock prices for the underlying stocks were 
obtained from the database of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
Additionally, we captured daily stock market volatility using CBOE SPX volatility VIX index, 
which is calculated using out-of-the-money call options and put options for S&P 500 component 
stocks and, by the definition of CBOE, measures the near-term market expectation of volatility of 
S&P 500. The VIX index data were downloaded from Datastream portal. 
4.3 Raw Data and Sample Construction 
The majority of raw data are the TAQ option data for the period of January, February and March 
of 2010, originated from CBOE and purchased from OPRA. A series of data trimming actions were 
conducted to remove all the erroneous quotes as well as those quotes that do not fit into this 
research. Figure 4-1 and 4-2 show a screengrab of raw data chosen at random. Figure 4-2 is just 
the continuation of Figure 4-1 due to the length of each record. 
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 Figure 4-1: Sample data, part 1 
 
Figure 4-2: Sample data, part 2 
 
This sample data consists of quote data for options written on the common stocks of 
Kellogg’s (whose underlying ticker symbol is K). The headings for all relevant columns are bolded 
in row 1. From left to right in order, there are date, time of day, millisecond, expiration date, 
call/put indicator, strike price, bid price and size for the option, ask price and size for the option, 
bid price5 and size for the underlying stock (which is Kellogg’s in this case), ask price and size for 
the underlying stock and the ticker symbol of the same stock. The total size of the raw TAQ option 
data files is astronomical, well over 40 Terabytes, and a small portion of the data are corrupted, 
which makes data trimming imperative. 
First off, the raw data files contain options underwritten on over 3400 equities and indices. 
Provided that this study focuses on equity options because the behavior of index options is 
                                                      
5 Bid price and ask price referred to in this paper are the best quoted bid and best quoted ask. 
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trickier to interpret, all the quotes on index options can be deleted.  
Further, after removing index options, there are still equity options on thousands of equities. 
The options on ADRs are also removed from our master data, because an ADR is the depository 
receipt of a foreign company whose primary stock exchange is outside of the US, whereas our 
option data originate from CBOE inside the US. Due to the complex structure of ADR, we decide 
the options on ADRs should be removed, despite some of which are very actively traded in 2010 
when the data were recorded, e.g. options on Baidu Inc. (ADR) and Petroleo Brasileiro SA 
Petrobras (ADR). 
The remainder are all non-ADR equity options traded on CBOE. Then we are to delete all 
options underwritten on the stocks with a ticker that starts with “A”, due to file corruption of 
some files containing quotes of options, whose underlying tickers start with “A”. All other files are 
intact from the same type of corruption. Deleting options on A-stocks is not ideal, especially for 
those with highest level of liquidity in option market, such as Apple (AAPL), Amazon (AMZN) and 
Barrick Gold Corp (ABX). It makes us lose important samples, however, in the case of corruption, 
deleting them is necessary. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that deleting them will lead 
to biased results, since options should not be expected to behave differently simply for whether 
their underlying stocks’ ticker start with “A” or not. 
Now, we are left with non-ADR equity options whose underlying stock tickers start with any 
letter but “A”. The amount of data is still beyond our and our devices’ capability to process. To 
shortlist the options, we added up the total number of market quotations for each underlying 
stock (company) within the three-month period: January 2010 to March 2010, then applied a 
sorting based on the total quote counts. As shown in Table 4-1, at the top of the list are those 
stocks with most number of option market quotes, which comes along with highest liquidity, but 
of course, those exclude ADRs and stocks whose ticker start with “A”, due to the prior filters, as 
well as companies whose ticker symbols in 2010 were no longer identifiable by early 2017, the 
time this research was conducted. 
 
Table 4-1: Selected Companies 
Number Ticker Symbol Quote Counts Company Name 
1 GOOG 1582051194 ALPHABET INC. 
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2 X 1306446428 UNITED STATES STEEL CP 
3 GS 1131494489 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC 
4 POT 1013679817 POTASH CORP SASKATCHEWAN 
5 GG 938175262 GOLDCORP INC. 
6 FSLR 928011817 FIRST SOLAR INC. 
7 NEM 889579883 NEWMONT MINING CORP 
8 JPM 848740853 JPMORGAN CHASE & CO COM STK 
9 FCX 802610212 FREEPORT-MCMORAN INC. 
10 IBM 652295187 INTL BUSINESS MACHINES CORP 
11 QCOM 633819852 QUALCOMM INC 
12 COF 624174620 CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP 
13 WFC 565269172 WELLS FARGO & CO 
14 ISRG 540810252 INTUITIVE SURGICAL INC 
15 CAT 540073409 CATERPILLAR INC 
16 DOW 539493507 DOW CHEMICAL CO 
17 CME 533958972 CME GROUP INC. 
18 NUE 528491043 NUCOR CORP 
19 SLB 518688203 SCHLUMBERGER LTD 
20 PCLN 509813355 PRICELINE GROUP INC/THE 
 
Only options written on those 20 companies are selected to construct the sample, because 
those companies had the most liquid option chains in the three-month sample period. By doing 
so, we can collect a sample to conduct a study that provides most insights for practitioners, 
because the options in our sample represent the most liquid and the most frequently traded ones. 
Next, some further data trimming will be carried out to clean this sample. 
4.4 Data Cleaning 
The remaining data are option Trade-and-Quote data on the selected 20 companies. We 
leave out trade data, and keep only quote data, because trade data do not reflect the spread in 
the market. Then, within the current dataset, there are only market quotes for all options of those 
20 companies on CBOE for January, February and March 2010. Some quotes are still erroneous 
or not suitable to the purpose of this study, which calls for more data trimming. 
Quotes with zero bid price or zero ask price for either the option or the underlying stock are 
removed. Quotes with non-positive bid-ask stock spread or non-positive bid-ask option spread 
are removed. 
 31 
 
Using the time stamp of each quote (consisting of date, time of the day and millisecond), we 
can obtain the exact moment that each quotation was quoted. All quotes with a time stamp 
before 8:30 a.m. CST or after 3:00 p.m. CST are removed, since those quotes were quoted before 
the market open or after the market close. Then the time elapsed between two consecutive 
quotes, which is equivalent to how long the former quote stayed active in the market, can be 
calculated using their time stamps. Those quotes that stayed active for longer than 30 minutes 
are deemed to be stale and inactive, and are left out of our sample. 
4.5 Data Preparation 
After removing those illiquid, inactive or erroneous data, in this section, we will tailor the 
data to better suit the needs of this research.  
Moneyness Filter: Previous studies focused mostly on liquid, active, near-the-money options. 
Chan et al. (1995) chose the most active option series for each day for a given stock in their 
matching sample. Kodippili (2004) only kept market quotes that range from 10% in-the-money to 
10% out-of-the-money. Verousis and Gwilym (2013) set the cut-off points at 5% in-the-money and 
5% out-of-the-money. In this study, 30% is used as the cut-offs to obtain a broader sample and 
better take advantage of the availability of our data, because we believe that there is large 
amount of applicable data between 10% - 30% in the money or out of the money. As shown in 
Table A.1, although volume clusters around at-the-money options for Apple on that specific date, 
we can observe decent amount of liquidity outside 10% cut-offs. Thus, we only exclude option 
quotes that are more than 30% in-the-money or more than 30% out-of-the-money, which means 
we keep options, if and only if they satisfy 0.7 <
S
K
< 1.3, where K stands for strike price and S 
stands for spot price6 for a specific option. Further, if an option series had a single quote on one 
day outside the acceptance range, we delete all quotes of that option series on that entire day. 
This means that all the quotes of an option series on one day should be selected into the sample 
if the mid-point of stock bid and ask of that option series on that day always remained no lower 
than 70% of and no higher than 130% of the strike price, otherwise all the quotes of that option 
series on that day should be discarded. 
                                                      
6 Spot price, in this paper, refers to the current market price of the underlying stock. 
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Time-to-Expiration Filter: Both De Fontnouvelle et al. (2003) and Verousis and Gwilym (2013) 
selected options that mature within 90 calendar days, but not within 7 calendar days. The 
explanation they provided is that short-term options are faced with expiration effects caused by 
rollover activities, while longer-term options are “thinly traded, making inference difficult”. This 
study will follow the same criteria to keep quotes of those option series that expire in more than 
7 calendar days, but less than 90 calendar days. 
Construct 12 Interval Dummies: The quote-level data in our sample are collected starting 
8:30 and ending at 15:00 CST. The 6.5-hour trading session per day can be divided equally into 
thirteen 30-minute intervals. Then, we convert quote-level data into interval-level data using a 
time-weighting technique. Although dividing a continuous trading day into intervals will average 
out some information in quote-level data, it will also get reduce the fuzziness, messiness, and 
outliers of all the quote-level data. At the same time, interval-level data can still satisfactorily 
reveal the microstructure and the daily variation, which is not viable with daily data. This 
technique is frequently used in intraday studies for stocks and options. Among intraday studies 
for option spreads, Chan et al. (1995) selected intervals of 15 minutes, while Kodippili (2004) and 
Mishra and Daigler (2014) chose intervals of 5 minutes. Chan et al. (1995) argued against the use 
of short intervals, because that will make estimates for less actively traded options difficult to 
interpret and provide fuzzy results. Most of intraday studies on stock spreads used 30-minute 
intervals. Therefore, this study will choose longer intervals following the example of Lee et al. 
(1993), Chung and Van Ness (2001) and Tannous et al. (2013) to divide each day into thirteen 
intervals of 30 minutes. Given 13 intervals, a dummy variable is assigned to each of the intervals, 
except the first interval 8:30 to 9:00, so that we can compare all other intervals with the first 30-
minute interval within a typical trading day. Previous studies on option spreads or stock spreads 
agree that the first trading period of the day has significantly lower liquidity and higher spread 
than the rest of the day.  
Construct 2 Moneyness Dummies: A common theme in previous literature is that they 
usually split selected options into three categories: in-the-money, at-the-money and out-of-the-
money (Pinter, 2003; Kodippili, 2004; Mishra and Daigler, 2014). For a brief example, Kodippili 
(2004) only selected options that are between 10% in-the-money and 10% out-of-the-money, 
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which means an option has to satisfy the condition: 0.9 <
S
K
< 1.1, where K stands for strike price 
and S stands for spot price. Using two cut-offs at 3% in-the-money and 3% out-of-the-money, he 
further categorized quotes into three categories, in-the-money (ITM), at-the-money (ATM)7 and 
out-of-the-money (OTM). In this study, we keep a broader spectrum of options as we include all 
options between 30% in-the-money and 30% out-of-the-money. Therefore, we use two broader 
cut-off values to group options between out-of-the-money, near-the-money, and in-the-money. 
Options that are more than 10% in-the-money are classified as in-the-money-group, options that 
are more than 10% out of the money are classified as out-of-the-money group, and options that 
satisfy the condition 0.9 <
S
K
< 1.1, where K stands for strike price and S stands for spot price, 
are classified as near-the-money group. We calculate spot price as the average of best bid price 
and best ask price (
bid+ask
2
). 
Formally, for call options, ITM, ATM and OTM should satisfy equations 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 
respectively. For put options, ITM, ATM and OTM options should satisfy equation 4.3, 4.2 and 4.1 
respectively. 
1.1 ≤
bid + ask
2K
< 1.3    (equation 4.1) 
0.9 <
bid + ask
2K
< 1.1    (equation 4.2) 
0.7 <
bid + ask
2K
≤ 0.9    (equation 4.3) 
This is in an attempt to follow the method of Kodippili (2004) and to divide the range equally. 
We assign two dummies ITM and OTM, so that we can label each quote as in-the-money, at-the-
money or out-of-the-money. We construct dummy variables for ITM and OTM, so that we can 
compare ITM and OTM option quotes against ATM options quotes. 
Define Option Quote Group: This study is interested in understanding the intraday 
relationship between option spread and moneyness. To the best of our knowledge, Kodippili 
(2004) is the only one paper that studies this relationship on an intraday basis. However, Kodippili 
                                                      
7 By strict definition, the middle category should be near-the-money options, but we will follow the definition 
of Kodippili to name them at-the-money (ATM) options. 
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(2004) divided the data into three groups ITM, ATM and OTM using 3% cut-off without explaining 
how exactly those three groups are constructed. Some other daily studies, such as Wei and Zheng 
(2010) and Verousis and Gwilym (2013), did not divide options into moneyness categories, instead 
they directly ran regression using moneyness variable, defined by exercise price over stock price. 
In this study, we divide options into three categories based on moneyness, which we believe is 
meaningful, because such method allows us to construct dummy variable and then construct 
interaction terms between moneyness dummies and other key variables. The construction 
process, however, has to be carefully done to avoid couple possible pitfalls. First, it is problematic 
to sort an entire day of quotes from an option series into moneyness categories because there is 
the possibility that an option series may straddle over the border of the cut-offs. For instance, a 
particular call option series may fall into the category of OTM in the first half of the trading day, 
and then move into the category of ATM or ITM, as the price of the underlying stock changes. 
Also, it is problematic to divide an entire 30-minute interval of quotes from an option series 
between ITM, ATM or OTM categories, because technically, during an interval an option series 
can belong to two categories. A reasonable solution to this problem is examining which range the 
spot price stays in for the longest time. Fortunately, our investigation suggests all option series in 
our sample did not cross over moneyness categories in any given interval, which eases the 
concern. Therefore, we divide the data into option quote groups to avoid the potential problems 
mentioned above. An “option quote group” is made up of quotes related to the same underlying 
security, the same expiration date, and the same moneyness criterion. There is no constraint over 
strike price, as long as the same moneyness criterion is met. More specifically, two option series 
with the same underlying security, the same expiration date, but different strike price may have 
quotes that belong to the same option quote group, because each of the three intervals (ITM, 
ATM and OTM) is wide enough to cover several strike prices. Also, the underlying security price 
may change, so an option with certain strike price may be determined as in-the-money during 
this interval, but becomes at-the-money in the next 30-minute interval. Once we grouped quote 
data into different option quote groups we then obtain the time-weighted average within each 
group and within each 30-minute interval. 
Apply Time Weight to Quotes: This method applies a time weight to quotes within the same 
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option quote group, using the length of time the quote stays on the market as the weight. With 
the time stamp of each quote, we can calculate the amount of time that each quote stayed on 
the market, which can sometimes be several seconds and sometimes as short as several 
milliseconds. Then, we use the time-weighting technique to summarize data of all quotes within 
each interval on one specific day for each option quote group into one sample point. Equation 
4.4, which is adapted McInish and Wood (1992) for stock studies, provides a formula to calculate 
the time-weighted option spread:  
𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑆𝐴𝐵𝐶,𝑇,𝑖 = ∑(𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐴𝐵𝐶,𝑇,𝑖,𝑞 − 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝐴𝐵𝐶,𝑇,𝑖,𝑞) ×
𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐴𝐵𝐶,𝑇,𝑖,𝑞
30𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑠
⁄
𝑄
𝑞=1
    4.4) 
Where “𝑊𝐴𝐼𝑆𝐴𝐵𝐶,𝑇,𝑖” is the weighted-average interval spread for “stock ABC” on “day T” for 
“interval I”, the term in the bracket calculates the bid-ask spread for the “quote q”, the term 
“𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝐴𝐵𝐶,𝑇,𝑖,𝑞” represents the length of time in minutes that this “quote q” stayed active on the 
market. 
Once the time-weighted average spreads for a particular stock are calculated for all trading 
days and all intervals, the interval spreads for the same 30-minute intervals can be averaged 
across different days to obtain the weighted-average interval spread for “interval I” for “stock ABC” 
but for the entire sample period, rather than for “day T” itself. Similarly, the time-weighted 
average depth for a given interval and a particular stock are determined using the same technique.  
There have been some studies that used this method for intraday studies of stocks, including 
McInish and Wood (1992), Li et al. (2005), Heflin et al. (2007), Heston et al. (2010), and Tannous 
et al. (2013). Within the limited number of intraday studies on options, Chan et al. (1995) also 
used this technique. As shown in Figure 4-1 and Figure 4-2, within the 14th second in the minute 
starting at 8:30 on March 1, 2010, there were so many quote changes for the call option on 
Kellogg with a strike price of 35 dollars and an expiration date of March 20, 2010. The time-
weighted technique groups thousands of (or even tens of thousands of) quotes into one interval-
level sample point. When a variable, such as option spread and option depth, varies from one 
quote to the next quote, this interval-level sample point takes the value of weighted average of 
this variable within the interval, using the weight of how long each quote stayed on the market. 
On the other side, when the variable, such as the number of days to expiration, does not vary 
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from one quote to the next quote (since the former and latter quotes are both for the same option 
quote group and recorded on the same date), the unvarying value can be assigned to the interval-
level sample point. By doing so, we create some new variables at interval level: time-weighted 
option spread, time-weighted option depth, time-weighted underlying stock spread, time-
weighted percentage option spread and time-weighted percentage underlying stock spread8 , 
which reduces the sample size to a manageable level and makes analysis possible. 
Trim Extreme Values: The processed data demonstrate some extreme values for option 
spread and quote count9. In two extreme cases, option spread for one option quote group of 
Nucor Corporation reached over 282 dollars at a time when the stock was trading at around 42 
dollars and the quote count for the option quote group in a 30-minute session was only 1. After 
investigation, we found that the former was due to erroneous option ask prices in some quotes 
that are unrealistically high, which drives up the time-weighted option spread for that interval, 
while the latter was due to the inactivity and illiquidity of some deep in-the-money or out-of-the-
money options that have only 1 or 2 quote changes in 30 minutes. We used data trimming to 
mitigate the problems caused by erroneous data or by the illiquidity of option quote group. Given 
that the total sample size for the interval level data is large, approximately 200,000 observations 
per interval, we can delete extreme values to lower the possibility of contaminating the sample 
with invalid data. Therefore, we delete all entries whose option spread or quote count falls within 
the highest or lowest 1%, which leads to 2% drop in the sample size of calls and a similar drop in 
the sample size of puts. 
4.6 Summary Statistics Related to the Key Variables 
A description of the key variables and how they are calculated is presented in Table 4-2. As 
the table shows, for each quote, the option depth is calculated as the average of the option’s bid 
size of best bid price and ask size of best ask price. Percentage stock spread is calculated as the 
difference between stock ask price and bid price divided by the average of stock ask price and bid 
price. Similarly, percentage option spread is calculated as the difference between option ask price 
                                                      
8 For simplicity, those time-weighted variables will be referred to by original variable names directly, when 
interval-level data are involved. For example, time-weighted option spread will be referred to as option spread. 
9 Quote count represents the number of quotations that are summarized into each interval-level sample point. 
It reflects the frequency of quote changes within that 30-minute interval for the option quote group. 
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and bid price divided by the average of option ask price and bid price. Quote Count variable has 
been scaled by 100,000. All time-weighted variables are the weighted averages using the weight 
of the time the quote stayed on the market. The entire dataset are panel data, where different 
option quote groups are the cross-sectional dimension and the 13 intervals are the time 
dimension. 
Table 4-2: Variable Description 
Dependent 
Variable Name 
Dependent Variable Explanation 
option_spread 
time-weighted option dollar spread within the interval for the option quote 
group 
%_option_spread 
time-weighted percentage option spread within the interval for the option 
quote group 
    
Independent 
Variable Name 
Independent Variable Explanation 
option_depth time-weighted option depth within the interval for the option quote group 
stock_spread 
time-weighted stock dollar spread within the interval for the option quote 
group 
%_stock_spread 
time-weighted percentage stock spread within the interval for the option 
quote group 
days_to_expiry number of days left till expiration date for the option quote group 
stock_stdev 
standard deviation for underlying stock daily returns from Dec 1 2009 to April 
30 2010 
daily_avg_stkprc daily average price of the underlying stock of the options 
quote_count frequency of quote revisions within the interval for the option quote group 
VIX_daily daily VIX index to control for near-term market expectation of volatility 
D_ITM 
in-the-money dummy, which equals 1 if it belongs to in-the-money option class 
group, otherwise equals 0 
D_OTM 
out-of-the-money dummy, which equals 1 if it belongs to out-of-the-money 
option class group, otherwise equals 0 
D2 equals 1 if it is interval 9:00-9:30 CST, otherwise equals 0 
D3 equals 1 if it is interval 9:30-10:00 CST, otherwise equals 0 
D4 equals 1 if it is interval 10:00-10:30 CST, otherwise equals 0 
D5 equals 1 if it is interval 10:30-11:00 CST, otherwise equals 0 
D6 equals 1 if it is interval 11:00-11:30 CST, otherwise equals 0 
D7 equals 1 if it is interval 11:30-12:00 CST, otherwise equals 0 
D8 equals 1 if it is interval 12:00-12:30 CST, otherwise equals 0 
D9 equals 1 if it is interval 12:30-13:00 CST, otherwise equals 0 
D10 equals 1 if it is interval 13:00-13:30 CST, otherwise equals 0 
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Summary statistics for both call options and put options are presented in Table 4-3.  
Several observations must be emphasized. First, days-to-expiry has a minimum of 8 and a 
maximum of 89, because we only keep the quotes of option series on specific days where they 
expire in more than 7 days but less than 90 days. Daily average stock price has a high of over 600 
due to the inclusion of Alphabet Inc. in our sample. Top and bottom 1% of extreme values of 
option spread and quote count have been trimmed as explained in the previous section. Lastly, 
the maximum of percentage option spread is around 161.7%, similar to the cut-off value of 150% 
adopted by Wei and Zheng (2010) and Verousis and Gwilym (2013) for sample selection. 
 
Table 4-3: Summary Statistics of Key Variables for Both Call Options and Put Options 
* Quote count has been scaled by 100,000. 
 
Some preliminary observations from summary statistics are as follow. [1] The option spreads 
are significantly higher than stock spreads, judging from mean, minimum, maximum and median. 
Options have medium spread of 10.57 cents, almost five times as high as the medium spread for 
stocks, 2.19 cents. The average spread for options, 30.21 cents, is almost four time as much as 
the average spread for stocks, 8.46 cents. The difference in magnitude between option dollar 
spread and percentage spread is also apparent in our graphs in the next chapter, where we have 
D11 equals 1 if it is interval 13:30-14:00 CST, otherwise equals 0 
D12 equals 1 if it is interval 14:00-14:30 CST, otherwise equals 0 
D13 equals 1 if it is interval 14:30-15:00 CST, otherwise equals 0 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Median 
option_spread 186725 0.302144 0.5291079 0.0183279 3.0038629 0.1057297 
%_option_spread 186725 0.115436 0.1885289 0.0057033 1.6169696 0.0342005 
option_depth 186725 218.3737667 297.9948668 7.2575758 7568.62 129.7559326 
stock_spread 186725 0.0845553 0.1289948 0.01 1.8269631 0.021908 
%_stock_spread 186725 0.000518132 0.000364572 0.0000938 0.0051078 0.00039412 
days_to_expiry 186725 40.4366314 21.0801598 8 89 39 
stock_stdev 186725 0.0221659 0.0052241 0.010399 0.032237 0.021531 
daily_avg_stkprc 186725 124.7782071 132.349548 26.18 626.75 63.07 
quote_count 186725 0.340965 0.364961 0.00197 2.04538 0.2126 
VIX_daily 186725 20.466453 3.0776963 16.35 27.31 19.35 
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to scale them on different axis due to the big difference. [2] The relationship between mean and 
median indicates that both stock spread and option spread are right-skewed, with significant 
extreme values in the right tail, which suggests that trading costs for both stocks and options can 
be much higher than usual in some rare occasions. [3] Percentage spread for options are higher 
than the percentage spread for stocks to a greater extent, compared to the relationship between 
dollar spread10 of stocks and dollar spread for options. Options’ percentage spread has a mean 
of 11.54%, a median of 3.42% and a maximum of 161.70%, as opposed to 0.052%, 0.039% and 
0.511% respectively for stocks’ percentage spread. The sharp contrast tells the same story about 
the trading cost for options and for stocks. 
Separate summary statistics for call options alone and put options alone are provided 
respectively in Table 4-4 and Table 4-5. The number of observations for calls and puts are roughly 
the same. The numbers are mostly similar to the statistics for calls and puts as a whole in Table 
4-3. The means of options spreads are $0.272 for call options and $0.331 for put options, while 
the respective medians are $0.103 and $0.110. The percentage option spreads are 14.92% for call 
options and 8.21% for put options, while the medians are 3.64% and 3.28% respectively. It seems 
that some large outliers caused the means to be much higher than medians. 
Table 4-4: Summary Statistics of Key Variables for Call Options 
* Quote count has been scaled by 100,000. 
 
                                                      
10 Dollar spreads are used to differentiate from percentage spreads. All option spreads and stock spreads 
mentioned later are dollar spreads, unless specifically indicated as percentage option spreads or percentage stock 
spreads. 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Median 
option_spread 92821 0.2724466 0.4835786 0.0183335 3.0035942 0.1028676 
%_option_spread 92821 0.1491598 0.2212194 0.0068338 1.6169696 0.0363997 
option_depth 92821 234.709129 341.953712 7.2575758 7568.62 134.318139 
stock_spread 92821 0.0869877 0.1320504 0.01 1.8269631 0.0221403 
%_stock_spread 92821 0.00052386 0.0003708 0.0000971 0.0051078 0.00039557 
days_to_expiry 92821 40.7294147 21.0059574 8 89 39 
stock_stdev 92821 0.0221882 0.0051967 0.010399 0.032237 0.021531 
daily_avg_stkprc 92821 126.49008 133.655293 26.18 626.75 63.32 
quote_count 92821 0.337645 0.359271 0.00197 2.04538 0.21635 
VIX_daily 92821 20.4773895 3.0813827 16.35 27.31 19.35 
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Table 4-5: Summary Statistics of Key Variables for Put Options  
* Quote count has been scaled by 100,000. 
 
Comparing option spread between call options and put options, we notice that call options 
have lower mean and median dollar spread, but higher mean and median percentage spread, 
compared to put options. The comparison demonstrates that in our sample, call options on 
average have lower premiums compared to put options. Table 4-6 provides some supporting 
statistics, while Figure 4-3 shows that the relationship holds across the day and it does not simply 
result from odd occurrences that are specific to peculiar time of the day only. 
 
Table 4-6: Statistics for Premium Comparison between Calls and Puts  
Premium Mean Median Maximum Minimum Standard Dev. 5th percentile 95th percentile 
Calls 8.3729 2.9646 104.6538 0.0197 15.0924 0.0531 39.2836 
Puts 11.4106 3.6678 176.8651 0.0198 21.2128 0.1087 51.9021 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum Median 
option_spread 93904 0.3314989 0.5690342 0.0183279 3.0038629 0.1100944 
%_option_spread 93904 0.0821012 0.1416605 0.0057033 1.4541651 0.0327676 
option_depth 93904 202.226801 245.907368 11.0487666 4020.64 125.498098 
stock_spread 93904 0.0821511 0.1258561 0.01 1.2748603 0.021686 
%_stock_spread 93904 0.00051247 0.00035822 0.0000938 0.0039605 0.00039273 
days_to_expiry 93904 40.1472248 21.1493794 8 89 39 
stock_stdev 93904 0.022144 0.005251 0.010399 0.032237 0.021531 
daily_avg_stkprc 93904 123.086077 131.024809 26.18 626.75 62.88 
quote_count 93904 0.344247 0.370471 0.00197 2.04508 0.208435 
VIX_daily 93904 20.4556426 3.0740262 16.35 27.31 19.26 
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Figure 4-3: Premiums of Calls and Puts across Intervals 
 
Table 4-7 displays the correlation coefficients of different pairs of variables. We used t-
statistic (𝑡𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 =
𝑟×√𝑛−2
√1−𝑟2
, where r is the correlation coefficient between two of the variables) to 
judge the significance of the correlation coefficient. Given that the number of observation is 
186,725, using a two-tailed t-test at 1% significance level, a correlation coefficient has to be 
greater than 0.00596 or lower than -0.00596 to be significant. In the table, notably, option depth 
is negatively correlated with option dollar spread and percentage spread, with coefficients of -
0.21 and -0.07, conforming to the negative relationship in Verousis and Gwilym (2013). Option 
dollar (percentage) spread is positively correlated with stock dollar (percentage) spread, with 
coefficient of 0.60 (0.14), confirming the observations of previous studies. Both quote count and 
volume of underlying stock, as metrics of market activities, have strong negative correlation with 
option dollar and percentage spreads, confirming the observations of Mayhew (2002) and Pinter 
(2003). The magnitude of underlying stock price has strong positive correlation with both option 
dollar spread and percentage spread, providing evidence of underlying stock price as hedging cost 
component of option spreads and support for Hypothesis 2.  
Coefficient matrices have been produced based on the data for call options alone and put 
options in Table 4-8 and Table 4-9 respectively. Using t-statistic at 1% significance level, for call 
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option observations, a significant correlation coefficient needs to be greater than 0.00846 or 
lower than -0.00846, while for put option observations a significant correlation needs to be 
greater than 0.00841 or lower than -0.00841. The highlighted numbers are the variables of 
interest that have significant correlations.  
Later, when we construct regression models, we will avoid using significantly correlated 
variables as independent variables at the same time. In this setting, significance refers to 
economic significance, instead of merely statistical significance. 
  
4
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Table 4-7: Correlation Coefficient Matrix for Both Calls and Puts 
 
  
 Option 
spread 
% option 
spread 
Option 
depth 
Stock 
spread 
% stock 
spread 
Days to 
expiry 
Stock 
stdev 
Daily avg 
stkprc 
Quote 
count 
VIX daily 
Option spread 1          
% option 
spread 
-0.135588 1         
Option depth -0.209788 -0.075069 1        
Stock spread 0.604737 0.198359 -0.282128 1       
% stock 
spread 
0.428442 0.137188 -0.215582 0.829363 1      
Days to expiry -0.001044 -0.228507 0.063415 -0.001197 -0.014394 1     
Stock stdev -0.128975 -0.114424 -0.136922 -0.071866 0.266069 -0.019092 1    
Daily avg 
stkprc 
0.575066 0.157957 -0.324068 0.790364 0.412191 -0.001453 -0.279564 1   
Quote count -0.071523 -0.3267 -0.055035 -0.077706 -0.04165 0.009305 0.023365 -0.022363 1  
VIX daily -0.003546 0.010763 -0.059181 0.044706 0.15573 -0.015798 -0.019963 -0.045755 0.223588 1 
  
4
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Table 4-8: Correlation Coefficient Matrix for Calls 
  
 Option 
spread 
% option 
spread 
Option 
depth 
Stock 
spread 
% stock 
spread 
Days to 
expiry 
Stock 
stdev 
Daily avg 
stkprc 
Quote 
count 
VIX daily 
Option spread 1          
% option 
spread 
-0.15077 1         
Option depth -0.18471 -0.11448 1        
Stock spread 0.639291 0.211656 -0.27663 1       
% stock 
spread 
0.46715 0.154742 -0.21713 0.833854 1      
Days to expiry 0.01439 -0.18178 0.042626 -0.00124 -0.0157 1     
Stock stdev -0.1355 -0.11204 -0.1441 -0.08283 0.252395 -0.02617 1    
Daily avg 
stkprc 
0.592351 0.164357 -0.31706 0.789145 0.41787 -0.00219 -0.28695 1   
Quote count -0.08811 -0.3707 -0.06677 -0.09285 -0.05774 -0.00437 0.02267 -0.03937 1  
VIX daily 0.008837 0.039479 -0.06208 0.043873 0.15341 -0.01845 -0.02105 -0.04529 0.19113 1 
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Table 4-9: Correlation Coefficient Matrix for Puts 
 
 Option 
spread 
% option 
spread 
Option 
depth 
Stock 
spread 
% stock 
spread 
Days to 
expiry 
Stock 
stdev 
Daily avg 
stkprc 
Quote 
count 
VIX daily 
Option spread 1          
% option 
spread 
-0.11144 1         
Option depth -0.24747 -0.02609 1        
Stock spread 0.584549 0.186186 -0.30035 1       
% stock 
spread 
0.401657 0.11476 -0.22185 0.824485 1      
Days to expiry -0.01251 -0.33053 0.092307 -0.00168 -0.01352 1     
Stock stdev -0.12417 -0.13209 -0.13278 -0.06087 0.279987 -0.01234 1    
Daily avg 
stkprc 
0.567785 0.157329 -0.34594 0.791739 0.406049 -0.00107 -0.27242 1   
Quote count -0.05941 -0.2926 -0.04047 -0.06228 -0.02546 0.022572 0.024104 -0.00552 1  
VIX daily -0.01364 -0.03423 -0.0577 0.045478 0.15808 -0.01329 -0.01893 -0.04633 0.254918 1 
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Chapter 5: Intraday Graphical Analysis 
With the existing data, averages of variables within each interval can be calculated to 
illustrate how these variables change on intraday basis. Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2 show the 
intraday trends of option spreads, respectively for call options and put options in our sample, 
compared to underlying stock spreads. Table 5-1 and Table 5-2 contain the corresponding data. 
The underlying stock spread data from 5-1 and 5-2 correspond to call option quote data and put 
option quote data respectively. Once again, the scale of the two axes reveal the significant 
difference in magnitude between option spreads and stock spreads, regardless of the intraday 
interval. The blue line with diamond markers represents an L-shaped pattern for option spreads, 
evidenced by both figures, which confirms the finding of Chan et al. (1995). The spreads of both 
call options and put options dropped sharply in the first 30-minute interval, by 10.8% and 8.1% 
respectively, decreased mildly in the following interval, and then remained relatively stable for 
the rest of the day. On the contrary, the orange line with round markers represents a reverse S-
shaped pattern for stock spreads, which is consistent with the results of Chung and Van Ness 
(2001). Despite using stock data corresponding to call option quotes and put option quotes, stock 
spreads in Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2 both decreased sharply by over 20% in the first 30 minutes, 
declined slowly during the day, and then dropped sharply again in the last 30 minutes by around 
20%. The L-shaped pattern of intraday option spread indicates that information asymmetry is the 
highest at the beginning of the day, then dropped quickly. 
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Figure 5-1: Averages of call option spreads in dollars (scaled on left axis) versus underlying stock 
spreads in dollars (scaled on right axis) across intervals 
 
Table 5-1: Data for Figure 5-1 
Interval 
Time Period 
(CST Time)  
Call Option 
Spread (in dollars) 
Underlying Stock 
Spread (in dollars) 
1 8:30 - 9:00 0.334465426 0.140947811 
2 9:00 - 9:30 0.298268462 0.107835137 
3 9:30 - 10:00 0.278238496 0.098093251 
4 10:00 - 10:30 0.271696132 0.092748788 
5 10:30 - 11:00 0.269344596 0.089640012 
6 11:00 - 11:30 0.265005895 0.085135691 
7 11:30 - 12:00 0.261688002 0.082183722 
8 12:00 - 12:30 0.260765256 0.078582424 
9 12:30 - 13:00 0.261039021 0.076946836 
10 13:00 - 13:30 0.262502653 0.076915327 
11 13:30 - 14:00 0.262100903 0.07602044 
12 14:00 - 14:30 0.261106656 0.071061008 
13 14:30 - 15:00 0.257739962 0.056624102 
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Figure 5-2: Averages of put option spreads in dollars (scaled on left axis) versus underlying stock 
spreads in dollars (scaled on right axis) across intervals 
 
Table 5-2: Data for Figure 5-2 
Interval 
Time Period 
(CST Time)  
Put Option 
Spreads (in dollars) 
Underlying Stock 
Spreads (in dollars) 
1 8:30 - 9:00 0.365227184 0.127365251 
2 9:00 - 9:30 0.335765602 0.099386539 
3 9:30 - 10:00 0.330943432 0.092168986 
4 10:00 - 10:30 0.326741745 0.087651053 
5 10:30 - 11:00 0.327458613 0.085092518 
6 11:00 - 11:30 0.326523556 0.081174968 
7 11:30 - 12:00 0.327802179 0.07912921 
8 12:00 - 12:30 0.327038969 0.07568097 
9 12:30 - 13:00 0.331264947 0.074406615 
10 13:00 - 13:30 0.329210937 0.073863295 
11 13:30 - 14:00 0.327023229 0.072502809 
12 14:00 - 14:30 0.328305569 0.06783705 
13 14:30 - 15:00 0.327871241 0.05464935 
 
Despite a similar L-shaped intraday pattern for option spreads, Chan et al. (1995) found a U-
shaped pattern for stock spreads, which suggests spreads of stocks should increase near the end 
of the day. They suspected the difference was due to the difference in market making structures 
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for option market and stock market. However, we found L-shaped intraday pattern for option 
spreads, but a reverse S-shaped pattern for stock spreads. The same reason could possibly result 
in this difference. 
In order to confirm the intraday dollar spread to be L-shaped, we will use t-test to analyze 
whether the fluctuations for the afternoon session can be considered to be stable, which is to 
test whether there is a significant difference in means. In Figure 5-1, there could possibly be a 
statistically significant drop from interval 10 to interval 13, while in Figure 5-2, there could 
possibly be a statistically significant rise from interval 8 to interval 9. Call option spread has a 
mean of 0.2625, a standard deviation of 0.47 and number of observations of 7174 in interval 10, 
as well as a mean of 0.2577, a standard deviation of 0.46 and number of observations of 7173 in 
interval 13. The one-tailed test for difference in means has a p-value of 0.27. The drop in call 
dollar spread is therefore not significant from interval 10 to interval 13. Similarly, the one-tailed 
test has a p-value of 0.33 for the difference in call dollar spread between interval 8 and interval 
9. So the increase is not significant either. Therefore, these tests serve as stronger evidence 
suggesting the dollar spread has an L-shaped pattern. 
Figure 5-3 and Figure 5-4 display the results for percentage spreads for call and put options 
respectively, compared to underlying stock spreads. Table 5-3 and Table 5-4 contain the 
corresponding data. The percentage spreads for options in the first 30 minutes of the day 
averaged to be 19.3% for call options and 10.6% for put options, then dropped and stabilized 
around 14% and 8% respectively. According to the two figures, percentage spreads remain quite 
steady, so we decide there is no strong urge to use t-test, as done earlier. For stocks, the 
percentage spreads started at around 0.08%, declined sharply from the first interval to the second, 
and then decline slowly and steadily to the last 30-minute interval, where they went through 
another sharp drop by about 15%. Percentage spread pattern also implies that information 
asymmetry in option market is the highest at market open. 
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Figure 5-3: Averages of percentage call option spreads (scaled on left axis) versus percentage 
stock spreads (scaled on right axis) across intervals 
 
Table 5-3: Data for Figure 5-3 
Interval 
Time period 
(CST Time) 
Percentage Option 
Spreads 
Percentage Underlying 
Stock Spreads 
1 8:30 - 9:00 14.755% 0.082% 
2 9:00 - 9:30 12.771% 0.062% 
3 9:30 - 10:00 12.303% 0.058% 
4 10:00 - 10:30 12.138% 0.055% 
5 10:30 - 11:00 12.101% 0.053% 
6 11:00 - 11:30 12.040% 0.051% 
7 11:30 - 12:00 12.027% 0.050% 
8 12:00 - 12:30 11.948% 0.048% 
9 12:30 - 13:00 11.977% 0.047% 
10 13:00 - 13:30 12.044% 0.047% 
11 13:30 - 14:00 12.009% 0.046% 
12 14:00 - 14:30 12.125% 0.043% 
13 14:30 - 15:00 12.147% 0.037% 
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Figure 5-4: Averages of percentage put option spreads (scaled on left axis) versus percentage 
stock spreads (scaled on right axis) across intervals 
Table 5-4: Data for Figure 5-4 
Interval 
Time period 
(CST Time) 
Percentage Option 
Spreads 
Percentage Underlying 
Stock Spreads 
1 8:30 - 9:00 14.755% 0.082% 
2 9:00 - 9:30 12.771% 0.062% 
3 9:30 - 10:00 12.303% 0.058% 
4 10:00 - 10:30 12.138% 0.055% 
5 10:30 - 11:00 12.101% 0.053% 
6 11:00 - 11:30 12.040% 0.051% 
7 11:30 - 12:00 12.027% 0.050% 
8 12:00 - 12:30 11.948% 0.048% 
9 12:30 - 13:00 11.977% 0.047% 
10 13:00 - 13:30 12.044% 0.047% 
11 13:30 - 14:00 12.009% 0.046% 
12 14:00 - 14:30 12.125% 0.043% 
13 14:30 - 15:00 12.147% 0.037% 
 
For both stocks and options, spreads and percentage spreads resemble similar pattern in 
Figure 5-1 and Figure 5-2. Shape is L-shaped for options and reverse S-shaped for stocks. The 
declines at the market open of spreads for stocks and options can be due to various reasons, such 
as market makers’ decision to avoid risks caused by information asymmetry, etc., as mentioned 
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in Section 2.2. The spread declines for stocks, but not for options near the market end. Chung and 
Van Ness (2001) explained the decline of stock spreads near market close with inventory control 
by market makers, who offer attractive pricing in order to achieve desired inventory level. The 
decline in option spreads does not occur near the market close, probably because market makers 
in option market do not involve themselves in inventory control at the end of the day, or control 
the risks through hedging in stock market (Cho and Engle, 1999). 
Figure 5-5 and Figure 5-6 compare the option spreads and percentage option spreads for call 
options and put options across intraday intervals. There is a huge drop after the first interval and 
it stays comparatively flat, regardless of whether it is for calls or puts and whether it is spread or 
percentage spread. Compared to put options, call options have higher spreads in dollar value, but 
lower percentage spreads, consistent with summary statistics, where call options have a mean 
dollar spread of 0.2724 and a mean percentage spread of 14.92%, but put options have a mean 
dollar spread of 0.3315 and a mean percentage spread of 8.21%. This indicates that call options 
have higher premiums than put options on average (across different strikes and expiry). It is 
reasonably expected because most businesses are expected to grow and so are their stock prices. 
Overall premiums for call options should be of greater value than overall premiums for put 
options. The premium data in the example in Table A.1 confirm this argument. The average bid 
price and ask price for all available call options’ premium are $26.74 and $ 26.95, while the 
average bid price and ask price for all available put options’ premium are merely $21.14 and 
$21.31. 
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Figure 5-5: Averages of option spreads (in dollars) for calls and puts across intervals 
 
 
Figure 5-6: Averages of percentage option spreads for calls and puts across intervals 
 
Regardless of the moneyness, Figure 5-7 and Figure 5-8 present L-shaped pattern for dollar 
spreads for call options and put options while Figure 5-9 and Figure 5-10 present L-shaped pattern 
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for percentage spreads for call options and put options. The two kinds of spreads would typically 
fall drastically in the first interval and stay relatively flat for the rest of the day, with the only 
exception being dollar spread for deep in-the-money put options, which does not show a drop in 
the first interval. However, Figure 5-7 and Figure 5-8 show that, on average, in-the-money options 
have higher spreads in dollar value than at-the-money options and at-the-money options have 
higher spread in dollar value than out-of-the-money spreads, consistent with the results of 
Kodippili (2004). On the contrary, Figure 5-9 and Figure 5-10 show that, in-the-money options 
have the lowest percentage spreads and out-of-the-money options have the highest percentage 
spreads, consistent with Cho and Engle (1999) and Kodippili (2004). Mayhew (2002) explains the 
inverse relationship arguing that option spreads increase with option prices but spreads do not 
increase as fast as option prices.  
 
Figure 5-7: Average option dollar spreads for out-of-the-money, at-the-money and in-the-money 
call options across intervals 
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Figure 5-8: Average option dollar spreads for out-of-the-money, at-the-money and in-the-money 
put options across intervals 
  
 
Figure 5-9: Average percentage option spreads for out-of-the-money, at-the-money and in-the-
money call options across intervals 
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Figure 5-10: Average percentage option spreads for out-of-the-money, at-the-money and in-the-
money put options across intervals 
 
Consistent with previous studies, for example Lee et al. (1993), we find paper found the 
intraday pattern of the option depth is shown in Figure 5-11. For calls and puts, the depth starts 
off low at the market open, rises in the morning session, and then dips a bit near market close. 
The drop near the end of the trading day is not as much as the rise at the beginning of the day. If 
the drop is deemed as significant, this intraday variation would resemble a reverse U-shaped 
pattern, otherwise a reverse L-shaped pattern. We compare the option depth for intervals 11 and 
13, because interval 11 is a local maximum for option depth and interval 13 is the last interval, 
using a similar t-test at the beginning of this chapter. For call options, average depth in last two 
intervals are 246.10612 and 235.54063, while for put options the average depths in last two 
intervals are 212.67386 and 202.88609. The number of observations are 7167 and 7173 for calls, 
7285 and 7294 for puts. Standard deviations are 345.61 and 345.69 for calls, 252.20 and 247.95 
for puts. Conducting one-tailed t-test to test whether the mean depths are the same between 
interval 11 and interval 13 for calls and puts respectively, the p-values are 3.362% for calls and 
0.908% for puts. The drop is therefore significant for puts at 5% level and for calls at even 1% level. 
Therefore, we consider the drop significant overall, so the shape should be perceived as reverse 
U-shaped. Although being U-shaped, the drop near the end of the day is not as much as the jump 
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at the beginning of the day, which can be attributed to many explanations, but the most plausible 
is that market makers are decreasing the depth to avoid information risks at the start and the end 
of the trading hours. Similar to previous argument, low depth at market open can be attributed 
to high level of information asymmetry, while the drop at the end of the day may also suggest the 
level of information asymmetry increases slightly at market close. 
 
 
Figure 5-11: Average option depth (in number of contracts) across intervals 
 
Option spreads and percentage option spreads are grouped based on interval dummies and 
days-to-expiry variable, averaged and plotted against the variables in Figure 5-12 and Figure 5-14 
for call options, Figure 5-13 and Figure 5-15 for put options, respectively. Similar to the results 
reported earlier, interval 1 has the highest dollar spreads regardless of time to expiration, as 
interval 1 generally has the highest spikes. However, no obvious pattern can be identified from 
Figure 5-12 or Figure 5-13 for any interval horizontally, which fails to confirm the results of Pinter 
(2003) and Kodippili (2004) that option dollar spreads are positively related to time to expiry of 
the options. In contrast, Figure 5-14 and Figure 5-15 collectively suggest that the percentage 
option spreads decrease with days to expiry, as there is a consistent downward slope from the 
left to the right for all intervals. This fact is expectedly backed up by the correlation coefficients. 
As in Table 4-8 for call options, the coefficient between option dollar spread and days to expiry is 
close to zero, at 0.01439, while the coefficient between percentage option spread and days to 
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expiry is strongly negative, at -0.18178. Similarly for put options, Table 4-9 shows that the 
coefficient between option dollar spread and days to expiry is close to zero, at -0.01251, while 
the coefficient between percentage option spread and days to expiry is strongly negative, at -
0.33053. The two graphs as well as summary statistics collectively suggest that option spreads 
are not highly correlated with days to maturity, and that percentage option spreads decrease, 
when days to expiry increase, as a result from an increase in option prices (premiums).  
 
 
Figure 5-12: Average call option spreads (in dollars) plotted against days to expiry across 
intervals 
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Figure 5-13: Average put option spreads (in dollars) plotted against days to expiry across 
intervals 
 
 
Figure 5-14: Average percentage call option spreads plotted against days to expiry across 
intervals 
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Figure 5-15: Average percentage put option spreads plotted against days to expiry across 
intervals 
 
Once dollar spreads and percentage spreads are graphed against days to expiry for in-the-
money, at-the-money and out-of-the-money options, as in Figure 5-16 and Figure 5-18 for call 
options, and in Figure 5-17 and Figure 5-19 for put options, a clear pattern cannot be summarized 
for dollar spreads. However, for percentage spreads, we can observe significant drops, as days to 
expiry increase for both out-of-the-money options and at-the-money options, but not for in-the-
money options. The two results collectively suggest that the price (or the premium) of deep in-
the-money options is stable regardless of the days to expiry, because the option is expected to 
expire in the money and the price should be close to the difference between underlying stock 
price and its strike price. Also, the two graphs suggest that the option price rises sharply for at-
the-money options and out-the-money options, as days to expiry increases, because those 
options will have greater chance of ending up in the money and greater time value, if there are 
more days left till expiration date. Therefore, it is indicated that options that expire in a longer 
period have greater time value, but time value generally has stronger effects on at-the-money 
and out-of-the-money options as opposed to in-the-money-options. 
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Figure 5-16: Average call option spreads (in dollars) for out-of-the-money, at-the-money and in-
the-money options plotted against Days to Expiry 
 
 
Figure 5-17: Average put option spreads (in dollars) for out-of-the-money, at-the-money and in-
the-money options plotted against days to expiry 
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Figure 5-18: Average percentage call option spread for out-of-the-money, at-the-money and in-
the-money options plotted against days to expiry 
 
 
Figure 5-19: Average percentage put option spread for out-of-the-money, at-the-money and in-
the-money options plotted against days to expiry 
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straightforward, but may not tell the full story given that some factors interact with each other 
and that some relationships cannot be recognized visually. Next we use regression analysis to 
analyze the impact of all variables jointly.  
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Chapter 6: Regression Analysis Models 
This research is based on propositions made and tested by previous studies. We extend the 
theoretical framework of intraday option spreads, develop models that incorporate more 
variables, test the results of previous studies, and evaluate the impact of newly included factors. 
We also seek to examine how these determinants of option spread affect option depth. 
In Section 2.1 a list of variables has been discussed. There are findings consistently 
suggesting that option spread is negatively correlated with option depth (Verousis and Gwilym, 
2013), positively correlated with underlying stock spread (Cho and Engle, 1999; De Fontnouvelle 
et al., 2003; Verousis and Gwilym, 2013), positively correlated with time to expiration (Pinter, 
2003; Kodippili, 2004), positively correlated with moneyness 11  (Kodippili, 2004), positively 
correlated with option price (Mayhew, 2002; De Fontnouvelle et al., 2003), and positively 
correlated with option delta (De Fontnouvelle et al., 2003; Pinter, 2003). Our model will include 
these variables except option price, option volatility, and option delta. Wei and Zheng (2010) 
revealed that option price is highly correlated with moneyness, time to expiry, and the underlying 
volatility, and they dropped option price variable in most of their regression models because the 
dependent variable is the percentage option spread. Also, in each option quote group of this study, 
there are usually multiple strike price, leading to multiple levels of option price, so there is not a 
good metric for option price for the entire group of quotes. In addition to all those reasons to not 
include option price as an independent variable, this factor can be taken care of the use of 
percentage option spread, which places dollar spread on the scale of option price. Moreover, 
option delta and option volatility for each option quote group (which contain multiple strike 
prices) are hard to calculate and do not have very meaningful interpretations for intraday data. 
Previous studies that incorporated option delta were daily studies, instead of intraday studies, 
and they had much smaller sample size, so there was no need to bundle options series with 
different strike prices into groups.  
There are some mixed results in past literatures. Hait (1999) contended that the volatility of 
the underlying stock is a key factor for option spread, while Mayhew (2002), De Fontnouvelle et 
                                                      
11 It means in-the-money options tend to have higher spreads than out-of-the-money options. 
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al. (2003) and Wei and Zheng (2010) indicate that the volatility is not significant. Mayhew (2002) 
and Pinter (2003) both argue for the negative relationship between spread and the intensity of 
market activities (trading volume) of the options, while Cho and Engle (1999) and Wei and Zheng 
(2010) conclude that the impact is minor. 
Overall, all those factors will be included in our models, no matter whether previous studies 
report results in consensus or in controversy. For those in consensus, we aim to test their 
significance and validity with our sample; for those in controversy, we aim to provide our own 
insight in hope to help reinforce one or the other. 
As has been done in former research, the spread of the underlying stock, option depth, days 
to expiry and volatility of underlying stock are included as independent variables for option 
spread. In addition, we use two dummy variables to control for moneyness effects and 12 interval 
dummy variables to capture the intraday variations in the spread. Since sample period is January, 
February and March of 2010, the standard deviation for each underlying stock’s daily returns in 
the period of Dec 1st 2009 to April 30th 2010 are used to calculate the volatility of the underlying 
stock. Quote count divided by 100,000 for each option quote group for each interval is used to 
replace option volume as a proxy for intensity of market activities, since the frequency of quote 
changes symbolizes that the option is active and of interest to traders. Chan, Chung and Fong 
(2002) suggests that from investors’ perspective the option quote revisions are stronger 
indicators of activeness of options and they contain more information than option volume. They 
argued the reason is that informed traders much prefer submitting limit orders than placing 
market orders, therefore many of those activities can be captured by quote revisions, but not 
necessarily by trading volume. Quote revisions can more effectively convey information and bring 
down the level of information asymmetry, especially when the option market is characterized by 
illiquidity and lack of volume. Chung, Chuwonganant and Jiang (2008) also argued that stock 
liquidity providers are likely to speed up or slow down spread and depth adjustments in response 
to higher or lower volume of trading. Therefore, frequent quote revisions and high quote counts 
become associated with high liquidity and fast-moving market, justifying our use of it to represent 
the level of market activities. 
In addition to variables suggested by previous studies, we propose, based on Hypotheses 2 
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and 3, including the average stock price on each day for each stock and the daily VIX index as 
explanatory variables of the spread and the depth. Average stock price is introduced as a proxy 
for the costs of hedging. The daily VIX index is introduced to examine whether the changes in 
market sentiment and expectations of overall market volatility on one day affects option spread.  
Our basic model which is based on previous studies may be presented as follows: 
Model 1:     
Option Dollar 
Spread 
= 
β0 + β1Stock Dollar Spread + β2Option Depth + β3Days to Expiry + 
β4Quote Count + β5Volatility of Underlying Stock + ∑ αi𝐷𝑖
13
𝑖=2  + εij 
6.1 
 
Where εij is the random error, i denotes the time interval, j represents the option quote group. 
Within interval i and for option quote group j, Option Dollar Spread is the time-weighted option 
bid-ask spread of all quotes, Stock Dollar Spread is the time-weighted stock bid-ask spread, Option 
Depth is the time-weighted option depth of all quotes, Days to Expiry is the number of days left 
till expiration date for the entire option quote group, Quote Count is the frequency of quote 
revisions (scaled by 100,000), Volatility of Underlying Stock is the standard deviation of daily 
returns for underlying stock of the entire option quote group from Dec 1st 2009 to April 30th 
2010, 𝐷𝑖  is the interval dummy that captures the time-of-the-day effect. 
In this study, we acknowledge that there are significant differences in the option spread 
patterns depending on the degree by which an option is in-the-money (ITM) or out-of-the-money 
(OTM). Therefore, we divide our sample between OTM, ATM, and ITM options and we use two 
dummy variables to find the impact of moneyness. We also incorporate out-of-the-money and in-
the-money interaction terms with other main independent variables in Model 1 to construct 
Model 2. Model 2 may be stated as follow: 
Model 2:     
Option Dollar 
Spread 
= 
β0 + β1Stock Dollar Spread + β2Option Depth + β3Days to Expiry + β4Quote 
Count + β5Volatility of Underlying Stock + β6DITM + β7DOTM + β8DITM × Stock 
Dollar Spread + β9DOTM × Stock Dollar Spread + β10DITM × Option Depth + 
β11DOTM × Option Depth + β12DITM × Days to Expiry + β13DOTM × Days to Expiry + 
β14DITM × Quote Count + β15DOTM × Quote Count + β16DITM × Volatility of 
6.2 
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Underlying Stock + β17DOTM × Volatility of Underlying Stock + ∑ αi𝐷𝑖
13
𝑖=2  + εij 
 
DITM is in-the-money dummy variable that takes 1 if the option quote group is in the money 
and 0 otherwise, DOTM is out-of-the-money dummy variable that takes 1 if the option quote group 
is out of the money and 0 otherwise. All other variables and notations are as defined with 
Equation 7.1. 
Model 3 is an extension of Model 2 to incorporate and analyze the effect of the cost of 
hedging on option spread that we put forward in Hypothesis 2, using average daily stock price as 
the proxy, as well as its in-the-money and out-of-the-money interaction terms. 
Model 3:     
Option Dollar 
Spread 
= 
β0 + β1Stock Dollar Spread + β2Option Depth + β3Days to Expiry + β4Quote 
Count + β5Volatility of Underlying Stock + β6Average Daily Stock Price + β7DITM 
+ β8DOTM + β9DITM × Stock Dollar Spread + β10DOTM × Stock Dollar Spread + 
β11DITM × Option Depth + β12DOTM × Option Depth + β13DITM × Days to Expiry + 
β14DOTM × Days to Expiry + β15DITM × Quote Count + β16DOTM × Quote Count + 
β17DITM × Volatility of Underlying Stock + β18DOTM × Volatility of Underlying 
Stock + β19DITM × Average Daily Stock Price + β20DOTM × Average Daily Stock 
Price + ∑ αi𝐷𝑖
13
𝑖=2  + εij 
6.3 
 
Average Daily Stock Price is the daily average price of the underlying stock. All other variables 
and notations are as defined with Equation 7.1 and 7.2. 
Model 4 further develops Model 3 to include expected market volatility, using VIX index as 
a proxy, to test its effect on option spread, as mentioned in Hypothesis 3. The in-the-money and 
out-of-the-money interaction terms of the variable are also added. 
Model 4:     
Option Dollar 
Spread 
= 
β0 + β1Stock Dollar Spread + β2Option Depth + β3Days to Expiry + β4Quote 
Count + β5Volatility of Underlying Stock + β6Average Daily Stock Price + β7Daily 
VIX + β8DITM + β9DOTM + β10DITM × Stock Dollar Spread + β11DOTM × Stock Dollar 
Spread + β12DITM × Option Depth + β13DOTM × Option Depth + β14DITM × Days to 
Expiry + β15DOTM × Days to Expiry + β16DITM × Quote Count + β17DOTM × Quote 
6.4 
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Count + β18DITM × Volatility of Underlying Stock + β19DOTM × Volatility of 
Underlying Stock + β20DITM × Average Daily Stock Price + β21DOTM × Average 
Daily Stock Price + β22DITM × Daily VIX + β23DOTM × Daily VIX + ∑ αi𝐷𝑖
13
𝑖=2  + εij 
 
Daily VIX is the index level of the CBOE SPX Volatility Index (VIX). All other variables and 
notations are as defined with Equation 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3. 
This study also develops models with percentage option spread as independent variable. As 
noted in the literature, option spread and option price are positively correlated. Since we do not 
have a variable that controls for option price, percentage option spread is analyzed to mitigate 
this concern. In order to be consistent on both side of the equation, percentage stock spread will 
substitute stock dollar spread in Equations 7.1, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4. The resulting Models 5, 6, 7 and 
8 may be presented as follows: 
Model 5: 
Percentage 
Option Spread 
= 
β0 + β1Percentage Stock Spread + β2Option Depth + β3Days to Expiry + β4Quote 
Count + β5Volatility of Underlying Stock + ∑ αi𝐷𝑖
13
𝑖=2  + εij 
6.5 
 
Model 6: 
Percentage 
Option Spread 
= 
β0 + β1Percentage Stock Spread + β2Option Depth + β3Days to Expiry + β4Quote 
Count + β5Volatility of Underlying Stock + β6DITM + β7DOTM + β8DITM × Percentage 
Stock Spread + β9DOTM × Percentage Stock Spread + β10DITM × Option Depth + 
β11DOTM × Option Depth + β12DITM × Days to Expiry + β13DOTM × Days to Expiry + 
β14DITM × Quote Count + β15DOTM × Quote Count + β16DITM × Volatility of 
Underlying Stock + β17DOTM × Volatility of Underlying Stock + ∑ αi𝐷𝑖
13
𝑖=2  + εij 
6.6 
 
Model 7:     
Percentage 
Option Spread 
= 
β0 + β1Percentage Stock Spread + β2Option Depth + β3Days to Expiry + 
β4Quote Count + β5Volatility of Underlying Stock + β6Average Daily Stock 
Price + β7DITM + β8DOTM + β9DITM × Percentage Stock Spread + β10DOTM × 
Percentage Stock Spread + β11DITM × Option Depth + β12DOTM × Option 
Depth + β13DITM × Days to Expiry + β14DOTM × Days to Expiry + β15DITM × 
6.7 
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Quote Count + β16DOTM × Quote Count + β17DITM × Volatility of Underlying 
Stock + β18DOTM × Volatility of Underlying Stock + β19DITM × Average Daily 
Stock Price + β20DOTM × Average Daily Stock Price + ∑ αi𝐷𝑖
13
𝑖=2  + εij 
 
Model 8:     
Percentage 
Option Spread 
= 
β0 + β1Percentage Stock Spread + β2Option Depth + β3Days to Expiry + 
β4Quote Count + β5Volatility of Underlying Stock + β6Average Daily Stock 
Price + β7Daily VIX + β8DITM + β9DOTM + β10DITM × Percentage Stock Spread 
+ β11DOTM × Percentage Stock Spread + β12DITM × Option Depth + β13DOTM 
× Option Depth + β14DITM × Days to Expiry + β15DOTM × Days to Expiry + 
β16DITM × Quote Count + β17DOTM × Quote Count + β18DITM × Volatility of 
Underlying Stock + β19DOTM × Volatility of Underlying Stock + β20DITM × 
Average Daily Stock Price + β21DOTM × Average Daily Stock Price + β22DITM 
× Daily VIX + β23DOTM × Daily VIX + ∑ αi𝐷𝑖
13
𝑖=2  + εij 
6.8 
 
Variables in Models 5, 6, 7 and 8 are corresponding to variables in Model 1, 2, 3 and 4, except 
Option Dollar Spread is replaced by Percentage Option Spread (the time-weighted percentage 
option spread) on the left-hand side and Stock Dollar Spread is replaced by Percentage Stock 
Spread on the right-hand side (time-weighted percentage stock spread) within interval i and for 
option quote group j. 
Additionally, it is argued by Lee et al. (1993) that the spread and the depth are respectively 
the price dimension and the quantity dimension of liquidity. Thus, an interaction, instead of a 
causal relationship, exists between the two of them, so we develop models to regress option 
depth on option spread to examine this relationship. In these models, we use the option depth 
as the dependent variable and option dollar spread as an explanatory variable. We observe that 
there are strong correlations between the option dollar spread and the percentage option spread, 
therefore we can only include one of them as an explanatory variable. Further, we noticed that 
percentage spread has strong correlations with other independent variables in the depth model 
(days to expiry and quote count) while the dollar spread does not have such strong correlations. 
Therefore, option dollar spread seems to be a better choice to be used as an explanatory variable, 
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given its relatively low correlations with other independent variables. All other independent 
variables stay the same for the models of option depth. Model 9 takes similar form as the other 
two basic models, Model 1 and Model 5; Model 10 takes similar form as the other two models 
involving moneyness interactions. However, due to strong correlation between option dollar 
spread and daily average stock price (over 0.5), we cannot regress option depth on these two 
variables at the same time. Given that there are some arguments suggesting relationship 
between option spread and option depth (Verousis and Gwilym, 2013) and that we have found 
no theoretical support for the effect of underlying stock price on option depth, we will only extend 
models for option depth by including Daily VIX variable, but not Daily Average Stock Price variable. 
Thus, in addition to Model 10, Model 11 will include VIX index and its interaction terms. 
Model 9: 
Option Depth = 
β0 + β1Option Dollar Spread + β2Days to Expiry + β3Quote Count + β4Volatility of 
Underlying Stock + ∑ αi𝐷𝑖
13
𝑖=2  + εij 
6.9 
 
Model 10: 
Option Depth = 
β0 + β1 Option Dollar Spread + β2Days to Expiry + β3Quote Count + β4Volatility 
of Underlying Stock + β5DITM + β6DOTM + β7DITM × Option Dollar Spread + β8DOTM 
× Option Dollar Spread + β9DITM × Days to Expiry + β10DOTM × Days to Expiry + 
β11DITM × Quote Count + β12DOTM × Quote Count + β13DITM × Volatility of 
Underlying Stock + β14DOTM × Volatility of Underlying Stock + ∑ αi𝐷𝑖
13
𝑖=2  + εij 
6.10 
 
Model 11:     
Option Depth = 
β0 + β1Option Dollar Spread + β2Days to Expiry + β3Quote Count + 
β4Volatility of Underlying Stock + β5Daily VIX + β6DITM + β7DOTM + β8DITM × 
Option Dollar Spread + β9DOTM × Option Dollar Spread + β10DITM × Days to 
Expiry + β11DOTM × Days to Expiry + β12DITM × Quote Count + β13DOTM × 
Quote Count + β14DITM × Volatility of Underlying Stock + β15DOTM × 
Volatility of Underlying Stock + β16DITM × Daily VIX + β17DOTM × Daily VIX + 
∑ αi𝐷𝑖
13
𝑖=2  + εij 
6.11 
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All variables and notations are as defined previously. 
Most previous studies acknowledge that call options and put options behave differently. For 
this reason, previous studies always run two separate regressions for call options and put options. 
Following this convention, this study will also run two separate regressions for each model, using 
data of call options in one regression and data of put options in another.  
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Chapter 7: Empirical Results 
We examine three dependent variables: option dollar spreads, option percentage spreads 
and option depth. We will run models with similar control variables for each of them. For each 
model, we use call option data and put option data separately to produce two sets of results for 
calls and puts. Starting from our basic models (Model 1, 5 and 9), we introduce moneyness 
dummies and in-the-money and out-of-the-money interaction terms as control variables hoping 
to gain some empirical knowledge regarding the impact of moneyness on option spread and 
depth. This addition leads to Models 2, 6, and 10. Afterwards, we add to Models 2 and 6 the 
average daily stock price and its interactions with the moneyness dummy variables as explanatory 
variables of the dollar and percentage spreads. These additions lead to Models 3 and 7. Finally, 
we add to Models 3, 7, and 10 the daily VIX index and terms that interact the VIX with the 
moneyness dummy variables as explanatory variables for dollar spread, percentage spread, and 
the depth of puts and calls. These additions lead to models 4, 8, and 11. We consider Models 4, 
8, and 11 to be superior because they control for moneyness, the interaction terms, and allow us 
to analyze the effect of underlying stock price and expected market volatility. 
The regression results of Models 1, 2, 3, and 4 are displayed in Table 7-1 for call options and 
in Table 7-2 for put options. For both calls and puts, the adjusted R-squared values jump from 
lower than 0.45 to around 0.85, after including moneyness dummy variables and the variables 
representing the interactions between moneyness and other explanatory variables. The change 
demonstrates the power of moneyness in explaining intraday option dollar spreads. In another 
word, they suggest that big differences exist among in-the-money (ITM), at-the-money (ATM) and 
out-of-the-money (OTM) options, as option spreads react very differently to those explanatory 
factors, given different moneyness. Adding daily stock price shows an effect on improving overall 
fitness, while adding daily VIX variable doesn’t significantly increase adjusted R-squared. 
 
Table 7-1: Main Regression Results for Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4, 
Using Call Option Data, with Option Dollar Spread as Dependent Variable 
Column # (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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Dependent Variable 
Option dollar 
spread 
Option dollar 
spread 
Option dollar 
spread 
Option dollar 
spread 
Calls or Puts Calls Calls Calls Calls 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Independent Variables         
stock_spread 2.30933*** 1.87182*** 1.66942*** 1.63066*** 
 (235.016) (201.652) (127.008) (121.202) 
option_depth -0.00004*** -0.00006*** -0.00002*** -0.00000 
 (-9.969) (-8.770) (-2.938) (-0.321) 
days_to_expiry 0.00032*** 0.00104*** 0.00099*** 0.00097*** 
 (5.510) (20.569) (20.696) (20.268) 
quote_count -0.02559*** -0.03779*** -0.05184*** -0.06478*** 
 (-7.228) (-13.700) (-19.778) (-23.181) 
stock_stdev -8.03621*** -1.05775*** 0.57743*** 0.94967*** 
 (-33.883) (-5.016) (2.611) (4.264) 
daily_avg_stkprc   0.00026*** 0.00030*** 
   (18.336) (20.955) 
VIX_daily    0.00487*** 
    (13.321) 
D_ITM  0.63440*** 0.39393*** 0.52135*** 
  (76.771) (43.620) (37.151) 
D_OTM  -0.09773*** -0.07212*** -0.00194 
  (-10.799) (-7.271) (-0.124) 
Interaction Terms         
ITM_stock_spread  3.09876*** 2.09380*** 2.13594*** 
  (238.824) (108.082) (108.233) 
OTM_stock_spread  -1.18116*** -1.05306*** -1.02642*** 
  (-94.442) (-58.896) (-56.523) 
ITM_option_depth  -0.00003*** -0.00001* -0.00003*** 
  (-3.975) (-1.957) (-4.408) 
OTM_option_depth  0.00007*** 0.00004*** 0.00002** 
  (7.832) (4.037) (2.193) 
ITM_days_to_expiry  -0.00130*** -0.00133*** -0.00131*** 
  (-18.299) (-19.748) (-19.457) 
OTM_days_to_expiry  -0.00023*** -0.00010 -0.00003 
  (-2.946) (-1.338) (-0.458) 
ITM_quote_count  -0.14732*** -0.23259*** -0.21865*** 
  (-29.050) (-47.662) (-43.190) 
OTM_quote_count  0.03025*** 0.02149*** 0.02359*** 
  (3.892) (2.914) (3.030) 
ITM_stock_stdev  -20.86744*** -12.73813*** -13.14468*** 
  (-70.781) (-41.108) (-42.185) 
OTM_stock_stdev  2.27264*** 1.39793*** 1.26906*** 
  (7.189) (4.229) (3.780) 
ITM_daily_avg_stkprc   0.00124*** 0.00119*** 
   (61.277) (57.658) 
OTM_daily_avg_stkprc   -0.00017*** -0.00020*** 
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   (-8.849) (-10.113) 
ITM_VIX_daily    -0.00594*** 
    (-11.921) 
OTM_VIX_daily    -0.00354*** 
    (-6.861) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Interval Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 92,821 92,821 92,821 92,821 
Adjusted R-squared 0.420 0.846 0.861 0.861 
 
t-statistics in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively. 
Quote_count captures the frequency of quote revisions, stock_stdev captures the standard 
deviation of daily returns of underlying stock, daily_avg_stkprc captures the daily average stock 
price of underlying stock. The Interaction terms capture either the interaction of in-the-money 
dummy and corresponding independent variable or the interaction of out-of-the-money dummy 
and corresponding independent variable.  
 
Table 7-2: Main Regression Results for Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4, 
Using Put Option Data, with Option Dollar Spread as Dependent Variable 
Column # (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable 
Option dollar 
spread 
Option dollar 
spread 
Option dollar 
spread 
Option dollar 
spread 
Calls or Puts Puts Puts Puts Puts 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Independent Variables         
stock_spread 2.51645*** 2.35508*** 2.13338*** 2.11316*** 
 (199.676) (195.773) (126.464) (122.075) 
option_depth -0.00022*** -0.00006*** -0.00002*** -0.00002** 
 (-34.797) (-7.439) (-2.899) (-2.392) 
days_to_expiry -0.00010 0.00051*** 0.00044*** 0.00042*** 
 (-1.408) (7.669) (6.994) (6.773) 
quote_count -0.01932*** -0.06944*** -0.08766*** -0.09404*** 
 (-4.623) (-19.055) (-25.744) (-25.622) 
stock_stdev -11.14664*** -4.95431*** -3.33454*** -3.24544*** 
 (-38.886) (-17.941) (-11.758) (-11.418) 
daily_avg_stkprc   0.00028*** 0.00029*** 
   (15.156) (15.798) 
VIX_daily    0.00136*** 
    (2.885) 
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D_ITM  0.94637*** 0.53911*** 0.40193*** 
  (87.704) (46.550) (21.707) 
D_OTM  -0.23069*** -0.20498*** -0.26326*** 
  (-20.785) (-17.232) (-14.232) 
Interaction Terms         
ITM_stock_spread  3.47756*** 1.57983*** 1.51510*** 
  (192.905) (58.020) (54.395) 
OTM_stock_spread  -1.55111*** -1.40923*** -1.42365*** 
  (-94.697) (-59.846) (-59.367) 
ITM_option_depth  -0.00026*** -0.00017*** -0.00017*** 
  (-26.858) (-17.888) (-18.195) 
OTM_option_depth  0.00007*** 0.00004*** 0.00004*** 
  (7.098) (4.068) (4.207) 
ITM_days_to_expiry  -0.00225*** -0.00230*** -0.00226*** 
  (-23.563) (-25.847) (-25.417) 
OTM_days_to_expiry  0.00055*** 0.00072*** 0.00081*** 
  (5.657) (7.956) (8.895) 
ITM_quote_count  -0.16525*** -0.26104*** -0.28931*** 
  (-29.049) (-48.645) (-49.087) 
OTM_quote_count  0.04333*** 0.02390** 0.00598 
  (4.197) (2.480) (0.599) 
ITM_stock_stdev  -24.90149*** -11.40355*** -10.66664*** 
  (-64.223) (-28.440) (-26.381) 
OTM_stock_stdev  6.29609*** 5.41539*** 5.79006*** 
  (15.933) (13.381) (14.204) 
ITM_daily_avg_stkprc   0.00216*** 0.00223*** 
   (79.483) (79.966) 
OTM_daily_avg_stkprc   -0.00020*** -0.00018*** 
   (-7.792) (-6.983) 
ITM_VIX_daily    0.00596*** 
    (8.834) 
OTM_VIX_daily    0.00216*** 
    (3.348) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Interval Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 93,904 93,904 93,904 93,904 
Adjusted R-squared 0.362 0.808 0.833 0.834 
 
t-statistics in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively. 
Quote_count captures the frequency of quote revisions, stock_stdev captures the standard 
deviation of daily returns of underlying stock, daily_avg_stkprc captures the daily average stock 
price of underlying stock, VIX_daily captures the daily VIX index price. The Interaction terms 
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capture either the interaction of in-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable 
or the interaction of out-of-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable.  
 
Dollar spreads of the underlying stocks are shown to be significantly and positively 
correlated with option dollar spreads in all columns, consistent with previous studies. It could be 
attributed to information flow and hedging between stock market and option market.  
In the absence of control for market volatility, option depth consistently has a negative 
relationship between the depth and the option dollar spread for at-the-money calls and puts, 
which is in line with the findings of previous studies on both stocks and options that depth and 
spread are two negatively correlated dimensions of liquidity. After we control for market volatility, 
the impact is non-significant for at-the-money call options, but still significantly negative for at-
the-money put options. One possible reason is that the explanatory power of the quoted option 
depth gets transferred to market volatility variable, so option depth does not appear to be as 
significant. In another word, option depth may contain a component that is related to market 
volatility, as market makers lower depth provision in volatile market. This explanation is actually 
backed up by regression results with option depth as dependent variable, which will be discussed 
later in this chapter. The interaction terms related to option depth also provide some interesting 
insights that the effect of option depth on dollar spread is more negative for in-the-money options 
and more positive for out-of-the-money options, compared to the same effect for at-the-money 
options. On one hand, spread and depth could be positively correlated in the sense that market 
makers sometimes take the strategy to quote higher option depth, but set wider spread to offset 
the risks caused by depth (Verousis et al., 2016). On the other hand, they could be negatively 
correlated, as market makers incline to adopt an alternative strategy to set wide spread and low 
depth when faced with high information risk, or to provide low spread and high depth in safe 
environment. This reveals that market makers may prefer to simultaneously utilize option spread 
and depth to revise liquidity provided for in-the-money options, but mainly use one of them to 
change liquidity level, and the other as an offset for out-of-the-money options.  
Time to expiry demonstrates an overall positive relationship with dollar spread, confirming 
the results of Pinter (2003) and Kodippili (2004). The justification may be that longer-term options 
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have greater risks embedded and are therefore riskier. The insignificant result in column 1 for 
puts is possibly due to lack of control for moneyness and its interactions.  
As suggested by Chan et al. (2002), quote count is an informative measure of market 
activities. Our analysis shows that it is significant and negatively correlated with option dollar 
spread across the board, confirming the findings of Mayhew (2002) and Pinter (2003) that active 
options tend to be associated with low information asymmetry and low spreads.  
The volatility of the underlying stock, as measured by the standard deviation of the daily 
stock returns, has significant negative coefficients, except in columns 3 and 4 for calls. This result 
is different from Mayhew (2002) and De Fontnouvelle et al. (2003), who argued that the effect of 
volatility is minor. We suspect that the change of signs between calls (positive) and puts (negative) 
exists because of two forces: on one side, stocks with higher price volatility may attract higher 
demand from traders leading to a narrower option spread; on the other side, high volatility of 
underlying stock implies high risks of options, which incentivize market makers to adjust up the 
spread. When the first force dominates, volatility of underlying stocks should have an overall 
negative effect on option spread; when the second force dominates, the effect should be positive. 
In this case, the second force dominates for selected call options and the first force dominates for 
selected put options. The interaction terms actually provide strong justification for this 
explanation, as the corresponding out-of-the-money interaction term has positive signs (because 
they are riskier options and second force dominates) and the corresponding in-the-money 
interaction term has negative signs (because they are less risky and the second force appears to 
be less of a concern).  
As for the daily average stock price, option dollar spread consistently increases with average 
daily stock price. This result is contrary to the argument of Mayhew et al. (1999), which suggests 
options are more liquid for stocks with higher prices. We believe Mayhew et al. (1999) arrived at 
different results primarily because spread is the measure of liquidity in our study, but they use 
volume as proxy for liquidity, which can act significantly differently than option spread does. 
Additionally, they did not control for as many variables. Given the differences, we still believe, 
based on our results, that options should be less liquid and have higher spread, if the underlying 
stock prices are higher. The positive price effect can be attributed to hedging costs, a component 
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of option spread proposed by Hait (1999). More specifically, in order to hedge an option contract, 
market participants need to place an offsetting trade in the stock market, so an option contract 
with higher underlying stock price will be more expensive to hedge and require greater hedging 
capital. The related interaction terms suggest that the positive price effect is stronger for in-the-
money options but weaker for out-of-the-money options. One possible explanation is that the 
price of in-the-money options changes in greater magnitude than out-of-the-money options, 
given the same change in the underlying stock price, so the in-the-money options have higher 
hedge ratio and require more capital to balance the hedge. Therefore, the effect of underlying 
stock price, as a proxy of hedging cost, should expect greater effect for in-the-money options, but 
less for out-of-the-money options. 
Our results show that the VIX positively affects option dollar spreads. The impact of the VIX, 
which represents the implied market volatility, suggests that risk aversion leads market makers to 
widen the spread when they observe greater unpredictability in the overall market. Judging from 
interaction terms, the impact of market volatility on dollar spreads seems to be weaker for in-
the-money and out-of-the-money call options than for at-the-money call options, while the 
impact seems to be stronger for in-the-money and out-of-the-money put options than for at-the-
money put options. 
From the dummy variables ITM and OTM, we discovered that in-the-money options have 
higher dollar spreads than at-the-money options, and that at-the-money options have higher 
dollar spreads than out-of-the-money options, validating the conclusion of Kodippili (2004). The 
same results have been discussed in Figure 5-7 for calls and Figure 5-8 for puts. It could potentially 
be attributed to the fact that ITM options have higher premiums, therefore higher dollar spreads. 
Next, we explore the topic of percentage option spread, which factors the premium level 
into option dollar spread. The regression results for Models 5, 6, 7 and 8 are displayed in Table 7-
3 for call options and in Table 7-4 for put options. The adjusted R-squared values increase by large 
magnitude from lower than 0.25 to over 0.80 for calls, and from lower than 0.25 to almost 0.65 
for puts, suggesting that the inclusion of moneyness dummies and interaction terms improves 
the explanatory power of the model for percentage option spread as well. It implies that 
percentage spread for options differs greatly for different moneyness. Adding daily average stock 
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price and daily VIX improves the explanatory power for percentage spread of call options, but not 
so much for percentage spread of put options. 
 
Table 7-3: Main Regression Results for Model 5, Model 6, Model 7 and Model 8, 
Using Call Option Data, with Percentage Option Spread as Dependent Variable 
Column # (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Calls or Puts Calls Calls Calls Calls 
Model Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Independent Variables         
%_stock_spread 64.53316*** 42.40096*** 38.28771*** 38.03695*** 
 (33.922) (25.519) (20.701) (19.708) 
option_depth -0.00008*** 0.00001** 0.00001*** 0.00001*** 
 (-42.613) (2.540) (3.809) (3.691) 
days_to_expiry -0.00189*** -0.00119*** -0.00120*** -0.00120*** 
 (-62.727) (-46.130) (-46.427) (-46.418) 
quote_count -0.24928*** -0.02804*** -0.02875*** -0.02893*** 
 (-134.318) (-20.176) (-20.628) (-19.396) 
stock_stdev -6.50265*** -3.22152*** -2.97435*** -2.97255*** 
 (-51.137) (-29.788) (-23.647) (-23.217) 
daily_avg_stkprc   0.00002*** 0.00002*** 
   (3.581) (3.494) 
VIX_daily    -0.00009 
    (-0.437) 
D_ITM  -0.13030*** -0.12691*** -0.13742*** 
  (-32.455) (-26.452) (-18.180) 
D_OTM  0.90355*** 0.86186*** 0.82242*** 
  (206.295) (163.104) (97.596) 
Interaction Terms         
ITM_%_stock_spread  -27.63933*** -26.83952*** -28.19753*** 
  (-11.924) (-10.218) (-10.369) 
OTM_%_stock_spread  140.60175*** 123.68118*** 120.56214*** 
  (63.126) (49.349) (46.732) 
ITM_option_depth  -0.00001** -0.00001*** -0.00001*** 
  (-2.362) (-3.396) (-3.255) 
OTM_option_depth  -0.00005*** -0.00003*** -0.00002*** 
  (-10.253) (-5.235) (-4.658) 
ITM_days_to_expiry  0.00110*** 0.00111*** 0.00111*** 
  (30.391) (30.549) (30.538) 
OTM_days_to_expiry  -0.00498*** -0.00495*** -0.00491*** 
  (-126.155) (-125.580) (-123.448) 
ITM_quote_count  0.00496* 0.00327 0.00165 
  (1.921) (1.258) (0.612) 
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OTM_quote_count  -0.24944*** -0.24843*** -0.25764*** 
  (-63.006) (-62.857) (-61.976) 
ITM_stock_stdev  2.84777*** 2.76888*** 2.83302*** 
  (18.560) (15.611) (15.737) 
OTM_stock_stdev  -17.49740*** -16.08599*** -15.80023*** 
  (-108.600) (-86.136) (-82.522) 
ITM_daily_avg_stkprc   -0.00001 -0.00001 
   (-1.053) (-0.639) 
OTM_daily_avg_stkprc   0.00011*** 0.00012*** 
   (13.661) (14.643) 
ITM_VIX_daily    0.00047* 
    (1.745) 
OTM_VIX_daily    0.00156*** 
    (5.562) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Interval Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 92,821 92,821 92,821 92,821 
Adjusted R-squared 0.239 0.808 0.809 0.809 
 
t-statistics in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively. 
Quote_count captures the frequency of quote revisions, stock_stdev captures the standard 
deviation of daily returns of underlying stock, daily_avg_stkprc captures the daily average stock 
price of underlying stock, VIX_daily captures the daily VIX index price. The Interaction terms 
capture either the interaction of in-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable 
or the interaction of out-of-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable.  
  
Table 7-4: Main Regression Results for Model 5, Model 6, Model 7 and Model 8, 
Using Put Option Data, with Percentage Option Spread as Dependent Variable 
Column # (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Calls or Puts Puts Puts Puts Puts 
Model Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Independent Variables         
%_stock_spread 50.81208*** 36.58721*** 28.57297*** 29.72334*** 
 (40.486) (25.046) (17.593) (17.647) 
option_depth 0.00000 0.00002*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 
 (1.183) (8.041) (10.856) (10.965) 
days_to_expiry -0.00217*** -0.00059*** -0.00061*** -0.00060*** 
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 (-113.125) (-25.541) (-26.478) (-26.656) 
quote_count -0.11561*** -0.01515*** -0.01607*** -0.01529*** 
 (-101.515) (-12.158) (-12.987) (-11.535) 
stock_stdev -4.43484*** -1.35002*** -0.86115*** -0.87690*** 
 (-54.927) (-14.030) (-7.777) (-7.904) 
daily_avg_stkprc   0.00004*** 0.00004*** 
   (8.270) (8.015) 
VIX_daily    0.00030* 
    (1.743) 
D_ITM  -0.03024*** -0.01590*** -0.01433** 
  (-8.449) (-3.790) (-2.132) 
D_OTM  0.55943*** 0.49795*** 0.68003*** 
  (152.515) (114.886) (100.462) 
Interaction Terms         
ITM_%_stock_spread  -27.44812*** -20.39534*** -20.54756*** 
  (-12.611) (-8.406) (-8.257) 
OTM_%_stock_spread  74.11781*** 41.58993*** 60.80137*** 
  (37.421) (18.669) (26.639) 
ITM_option_depth  -0.00002*** -0.00003*** -0.00003*** 
  (-6.770) (-9.483) (-9.681) 
OTM_option_depth  -0.00002*** 0.00000 -0.00001** 
  (-6.470) (1.179) (-2.133) 
ITM_days_to_expiry  0.00040*** 0.00042*** 0.00042*** 
  (12.251) (12.921) (13.018) 
OTM_days_to_expiry  -0.00516*** -0.00515*** -0.00527*** 
  (-153.271) (-154.521) (-159.138) 
ITM_quote_count  -0.00140 -0.00183 -0.00243 
  (-0.713) (-0.936) (-1.148) 
OTM_quote_count  -0.12482*** -0.12400*** -0.08472*** 
  (-34.982) (-35.136) (-23.420) 
ITM_stock_stdev  0.78443*** 0.29631* 0.28323* 
  (5.657) (1.884) (1.788) 
OTM_stock_stdev  -10.16706*** -7.94844*** -9.12284*** 
  (-73.307) (-50.352) (-57.396) 
ITM_daily_avg_stkprc   -0.00004*** -0.00005*** 
   (-6.418) (-6.427) 
OTM_daily_avg_stkprc   0.00019*** 0.00014*** 
   (27.414) (20.779) 
ITM_VIX_daily    -0.00003 
    (-0.106) 
OTM_VIX_daily    -0.00770*** 
    (-32.239) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Interval Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 93,904 93,904 93,904 93,904 
Adjusted R-squared 0.236 0.628 0.637 0.645 
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t-statistics in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively. 
Quote_count captures the frequency of quote revisions, stock_stdev captures the standard 
deviation of daily returns of underlying stock, daily_avg_stkprc captures the daily average stock 
price of underlying stock. The Interaction terms capture either the interaction of in-the-money 
dummy and corresponding independent variable or the interaction of out-of-the-money dummy 
and corresponding independent variable.  
 
 The percentage stock spread has positive signs for all columns as expected, because 
information simultaneously feed into both stock and option markets. Both percentage option 
spread and percentage stock spread will increase, when there is high degree of uncertainty or 
information asymmetry in the market.  
As for the impact of the option depth, our results almost unanimously show that option 
depth is positively associated with percentage option spread. Verousis, Gwilym and Chen (2016) 
discovered the same positive relationship and they argued that higher depth represented an 
inventory risks to market makers, because more potential trades could possibly deviate their 
inventory further away from their desired holding level. Therefore, they set up wider spread to 
compensate the additional risks brought by higher depth. 
Time to expiry is negatively correlated with percentage option spread, consistent with the 
declining trend in Figure 5-14 and Figure 5-15. One possible cause is that longer-term options 
have only slightly higher dollar spreads compared to near-term options, but due to the higher 
risks, longer-term options have much higher option premiums than near-term options.  
Same as in Mayhew (2002) and Pinter (2003), percentage option spread is negatively related 
to the intensity of market activities, proxied by quote count variable. It can be explained that 
higher volume of trades conveys information to the market and reduces information risks.  
The volatility of the underlying stock is shown to have a negative impact on percentage 
option spread for at the money options. For out-of-the-money options, this impact is stronger, 
but for in-the-money options, it is significantly weaker. The same result applies for both puts and 
calls. At the same time, we observe earlier that increased volatility of the underlying stock 
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increases dollar spreads for at-the-money options, but this impact is weaker for in-the-money 
options and stronger for out-of-the-money options. The same result applies to both puts and calls. 
We propose that the driving force for the negative relationship between percentage spread and 
the volatility of the underlying is that the higher volatility increases the premiums of put and call 
options and the increase in premiums is much higher than the increase in the spread for both at-
the-money and out-of-the-money options. In contrast, the premium of deep-in-the-money 
options may increase only slightly with increased volatility because the intrinsic value is the main 
component of the premium. At the same time, our analysis suggests that the dollar spreads of 
deep-in-the-money options tend to decrease with an increase in the market volatility. Therefore, 
the overall impact of volatility on the percentage spread is of in-the-money options is negative. 
The impact is even more negative for at-the-money and out-of-the-money options. 
All columns support a positive underlying stock price impact on the option percentage 
spread, once again lending support to Hypothesis 2 that high stock price implies a high hedging 
cost for options. Similar explanation applies that hedging costs for options of expensive stocks 
are higher proportionate to the premium, holding other factors the same, so the percentage 
spreads should also be higher. The interaction terms, however, have opposite signs, showing that 
in-the-money options have lower price effect and lower percentage hedging cost, while out-of-
the-money options have higher price effect and higher percentage hedging cost. As argued earlier, 
in-the-money options are harder to hedge than out-of-the-money options, but due to the higher 
premium of in-the-money options than out-of-the-money options, the hedging cost 
proportionate to the premium appears to be lower. Therefore, the in-the-money interaction term 
has negative sign, while the out-of-the-money interaction term has positive sign. 
In regard to implied market volatility, the effect of VIX index on percentage option spreads 
does not appear to be quite significant after controlling for interactions. Compared with 
significantly positive coefficients for the dollar spread regression in Table 7-1 and Table 7-2, it 
leads us to believe that high market volatility results in high option dollar spread, but does not 
necessary lead to high percentage spread, since it also boosts the premium of options. Looking 
at the interaction terms, the in-the-money interactions are not very significant for either calls or 
puts, but the out-of-the-money interactions are positive for calls and negative for puts. The 
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interaction terms demonstrate that impact of market volatility on percentage spread does not 
differentiate between in-the-money options and at-the-money options, but market volatility does 
have a much more positive impact for out-of-the-money call options, compared to at-the-money 
call options, and a much more negative impact for out-of-the-money put options, compared to 
at-the-money put options. As concluded by previous papers such as Giot (2005), Wee and Yang 
(2012), Lubnau and Todorova (2015), high implied market volatility (e.g. high VIX) is usually 
associated with falling market and negative returns in the future. We suspect high market 
volatility is indicative of an expectation for market downturn, which reduces the value of out-of-
the-money call options, but increases the probability for out-of-the-money put options to end up 
in the money. Therefore, the change in market volatility does not have as much implications on 
in-the-money or at-the-money options, because volatility does not greatly affect their value. 
However, increased level in market volatility impairs the value of out-of-the-money call options 
even further, leading to wider spread, and it largely boosts the value and interest of out-of-the-
money options, leading to narrower spread, exactly as we have observed. 
With respect to moneyness dummies, contrary to the results for option dollar spreads (in-
the-money options have higher option dollar spreads than out-of-the-money options), out-of-
money options have higher percentage option spreads than in-the-money options. The same 
conclusions are drawn from Figure 5-9 for calls and Figure 5-10 for puts. This result is consistent 
with findings of Cho and Engle (1999) as well. It makes sense in a way that in-the-money options 
are usually more expensive (premiums are higher) than out-of-money options, so even if the 
percentage spread is higher for the out-of-money options (since they are riskier), their actual 
dollar spread is lower. Our results contrast with the statement by Kodipilli (2004) that in-the-
money options have higher option spread because they are pricey and hard to hedge against, 
thus riskier. Our results   suggest that the dollar spreads of in-the-money options may be higher 
but the percentage spreads are lower because their premiums are higher. In contrast, out-of-the-
money options have higher percentage spread. As the chance is low for out-of-the-money options 
to end up in-the-money and their potential returns are more volatile, they may be risker and their 
premiums are lower so the percentage spread is higher. 
The regression results of Models 9, 10, and 11, by which we analyze the determinants of the 
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option depth are reported in Table 7-5 for calls and Table 7-6 for puts. Relative to the regression 
results in Tables 7-1 to 7-4, the fitness of these models is lower, as the adjusted R-squared values 
are lower. Therefore, it may be necessary to identify additional explanatory variables for the 
depth. Another observation to point out is that the inclusion of moneyness dummies and 
interaction terms boosts the explanatory power of our depth models significantly in comparison 
to the fitness of the basic model.  
 
Table 7-5: Main Regression Results for Model 9, Model 10 and Model 11, 
Using Call Option Data, with Option Depth as Dependent Variable 
Column # (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable Option depth Option depth Option depth 
Calls or Puts Calls Calls Calls 
Model Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Independent Variables       
option_spread -151.48806*** -292.44713*** -283.42190*** 
 (-66.738) (-44.814) (-42.929) 
days_to_expiry 0.66479*** 1.14546*** 1.14250*** 
 (12.912) (13.974) (13.944) 
quote_count -73.68274*** -59.22863*** -44.21404*** 
 (-23.477) (-13.117) (-9.169) 
stock_stdev -11202.44687*** -7,104.23364*** -7,086.76653*** 
 (-53.333) (-21.276) (-21.232) 
VIX_daily   -5.29565*** 
   (-8.707) 
D_ITM  496.57099*** 413.85332*** 
  (39.485) (20.332) 
D_OTM  -88.51954*** -146.02763*** 
  (-6.601) (-6.524) 
Interaction Terms       
ITM_option_spread  53.97842*** 45.17269*** 
  (7.732) (6.407) 
OTM_option_spread  -195.70313*** -202.58443*** 
  (-10.994) (-11.368) 
ITM_days_to_expiry  -0.09353 -0.08959 
  (-0.809) (-0.776) 
OTM_days_to_expiry  -0.09199 -0.14077 
  (-0.731) (-1.110) 
ITM_quote_count  -257.59200*** -268.59302*** 
  (-31.310) (-31.588) 
OTM_quote_count  -138.19481*** -140.19814*** 
  (-11.002) (-10.590) 
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ITM_stock_stdev  -12045.88283*** -12081.33655*** 
  (-25.369) (-25.450) 
OTM_stock_stdev  1,035.06075** 858.01834* 
  (2.062) (1.701) 
ITM_VIX_daily   4.57144*** 
   (5.478) 
OTM_VIX_daily   3.59746*** 
   (4.161) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes 
Interval Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 92,821 92,821 92,821 
Adjusted R-squared 0.072 0.181 0.182 
 
t-statistics in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively. 
Daily_avg_stkprc is not included in regression on option depth due to lack of theoretical 
arguments and stock price’s strong correlation with option dollar spread. Quote_count captures 
the frequency of quote revisions, stock_stdev captures the standard deviation of daily returns of 
underlying stock, VIX_daily captures the daily VIX index price. The Interaction terms capture 
either the interaction of in-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable or the 
interaction of out-of-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable.  
  
Table 7-6: Main Regression Results for Model 9, Model 10 and Model 11, 
Using Put Option Data, with Option Depth as Dependent Variable 
Column # (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable Option depth Option depth Option depth 
Calls or Puts Puts Puts Puts 
Model Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Independent Variables       
option_spread -116.09788*** -241.02089*** -236.30848*** 
 (-85.950) (-64.044) (-62.411) 
days_to_expiry 1.02165*** 1.33308*** 1.34679*** 
 (28.380) (22.316) (22.576) 
quote_count -30.03856*** -61.71778*** -48.45403*** 
 (-14.069) (-18.461) (-13.522) 
stock_stdev -7,673.56553*** -8,328.15639*** -8,253.65898*** 
 (-52.524) (-33.851) (-33.588) 
VIX_daily   -4.63311*** 
   (-10.428) 
D_ITM  22.05999** -167.11437*** 
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  (2.315) (-10.747) 
D_OTM  -90.87999*** -95.01342*** 
  (-9.741) (-6.201) 
Interaction Terms       
ITM_option_spread  109.26164*** 105.47707*** 
  (26.630) (25.572) 
OTM_option_spread  -178.73122*** -169.88051*** 
  (-15.617) (-14.731) 
ITM_days_to_expiry  0.24823*** 0.25062*** 
  (2.902) (2.934) 
OTM_days_to_expiry  -0.51484*** -0.60960*** 
  (-5.820) (-6.863) 
ITM_quote_count  -93.46398*** -125.70751*** 
  (-18.188) (-22.675) 
OTM_quote_count  -79.18454*** -70.77775*** 
  (-8.440) (-7.278) 
ITM_stock_stdev  -20.07836 107.12833 
  (-0.057) (0.305) 
OTM_stock_stdev  1,646.26082*** 1,368.88975*** 
  (4.676) (3.884) 
ITM_VIX_daily   9.80680*** 
   (15.430) 
OTM_VIX_daily   0.96691 
   (1.571) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes 
Interval Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 93,904 93,904 93,904 
Adjusted R-squared 0.101 0.157 0.160 
 
t-statistics in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively. 
Daily_avg_stkprc is not included in regression on option depth due to lack of theoretical 
arguments and stock price’s strong correlation with option dollar spread. Quote_count captures 
the frequency of quote revisions, stock_stdev captures the standard deviation of daily returns of 
underlying stock, VIX_daily captures the daily VIX index price. The Interaction terms capture 
either the interaction of in-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable or the 
interaction of out-of-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable.  
 
As mentioned earlier, option depth varies across the different moneyness ranges. Therefore, 
we should focus our attention on interpreting the results of Models 8 and 9 where we control for 
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moneyness and introduce terms that interact moneyness with other variables. Option depth is 
shown to be negatively and significantly associated with option spread. It resonates with previous 
argument that spread and depth are two negatively correlated measurements of liquidity. Market 
makers may sometimes set high depth with high spread or low depth with low spread, but this 
result suggests they still set option spread and depth in opposite directions most of the time.  
Days to expiry variable is shown to increase option depth across all columns. It seems that 
although longer-term options are less liquid and have larger dollar spreads, market makers tend 
to quote slightly larger quantity of them, compared to near-term options. This effect persists, 
regardless of whether the option is in-the-money, at-the-money or out-of-the-money and 
whether the option is a call or a put. 
The coefficients of the quote count variable are mostly negative suggesting that market 
makers typically provide less depth for options that fluctuate more frequently. This is likely to be 
the time, when they have limited and insufficient time to process market information, so that a 
low-depth strategy can avoid potential losses from adverse selection in the market. The only 
insignificant exception in column 3 indicates that the effect may not be stable or existent for at-
the-money call options. The negative coefficients for the interaction terms show that market 
makers will provide even less depth for highly-volatile ITM or OTM options, compared to highly-
volatile ATM options. We suspect the reason might be that these options tend to be illiquid and 
receive less attention from traders.  
The depth seems to be negatively and significantly affected by the volatility of the underlying 
stocks which can be attributed to risk avoidance by market makers. 
The coefficients of the VIX index are significantly negative. The results imply that market 
makers tend to decrease the depth level in anticipation of a volatile market. When depth level is 
relatively low, market makers can reduce their risk exposure to adverse market movement as 
fewer orders will get filled at a disadvantageous price for them. Given the low depth, market 
makers can quickly adjust their quotes to minimize their immediate losses. 
The moneyness dummies demonstrate that in-the-money options have significantly higher 
depth and out-of-the-money options have significantly lower depth relative to at-the-money 
options. We can think of two reasons. One reason might be that there is greater demand for in-
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the-money options but less demand for out-of-the-money options and market makers are simply 
responding to demand conditions. Second, one might argue that in-the-money options are less 
risky while out-of-the-money options are more risky than at-the-money options. Therefore, 
market makers limit the depth for out-of-the-money options to reduce risk exposure and are 
willing to provide higher depth for in-the-money options.  
Finally, we graph the coefficients of interval dummies12 for Model 4, Model 8 and Model 11 
from all six tables respectively in Figure 7-1, Figure 7-2 and Figure 7-3, because those three 
models are more complete and control for the most number of factors. Interval dummies for both 
option dollar spreads and percentage option spread resemble U-shaped patterns. In the figure 
for option dollar spread, the change is more significant at the end of the day. In the figure for 
percentage option spread, the change is more significant at the beginning of the day. The interval 
dummies for option depth rise significantly at the beginning of the day, then fluctuate in the rest 
of the day. The changes in coefficients of interval dummies in Model 4, Model 8 and Model 11 
throughout the day are significant. This observation suggests that, besides all control factors, the 
changes in the market environment and trading patterns from one interval to the next also 
significantly contribute the intraday spread and the depth of options. 
 
Figure 7-1: Coefficients of interval dummies in model 3 (option dollar spread as dependent 
variable) 
                                                      
12 Interval 1 (8:30 to 9:00 CST) is the base interval and it is assigned a value of 0 for graphing purposes. 
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Figure 7-2: Coefficients of interval dummies in model 6 (percentage option spread as dependent 
variable) 
 
 
Figure 7-3: Coefficients of interval dummies in model 9 (option depth as dependent variable) 
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for each interval separately and report results for different intervals side-by-side. See Table 7-7 to 
Table 7-14. By doing so, we can study how effect of each variable on spread and depth changes 
throughout the day, instead of viewing them from an aggregate level. This method also allows for 
greater model flexibility and provide more information. Due to the amount of information, we 
focus on Model 8 and Model 11, both of which are the most complete models for their 
corresponding dependent variables, percentage option spread and option depth. We will not 
present similar results for option dollar spread, because we regard percentage spread as a more 
informative measure for spread and liquidity. It practically represents the spread investor faces 
for each unit ($1) of investment. 
Table 7-7 and Table 7-8 present cross-interval regression results from interval 1 to interval 
13 on percentage option spread for call options. Table 7-9 and Table 7-10 present cross-interval 
regression results from interval 1 to interval 13 on percentage option spread for put options. 
Percentage stock spread has significant and positive impact on percentage option spread in 
all intervals for both calls and puts, as a stronger confirmation for argument in information 
asymmetry theory that liquidity in option market and liquidity in stock market are closely related, 
as well as Derivative Hedge Theory. Option depth is significant in all intervals for puts, but 
insignificant in all intervals for calls, which may be due to the possibility that market makers or 
traders perceive and handle calls and puts differently. Days to expiry, quote count and stock 
volatility are all shown to be consistently negatively correlated with percentage spread for both 
call options and put options, giving stronger results interval by interval. Like for option depth, 
average daily stock price, as hedging cost, is only significant across intervals for put options, 
potentially due to mechanisms used to hedge against call options and put options are different. 
The significance level varies throughout the day and is typically insignificant in the first 3 intervals, 
which we speculate to be an indication of intraday hedging pattern for option market makers, 
where they manage risks majority with low depth early in the morning, then increasingly with 
wide spread later during the day. VIX index, capturing market volatility, is insignificant for all 
intervals, consistent with results on an aggregate level. OTM dummy variable has consistent 
negative and significant coefficients for calls and puts, while ITM dummy variable has the same 
only for calls. It somehow aligns with Figure 5-9 and Figure 5-10, where OTM options have much 
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higher percentage spread than ATM options, but the difference between ATM options and ITM 
options are much less evident. Adjusted R-squared stays relatively stable across intervals, 
stipulate that our model for percentage option spread performs reasonably well in all intervals. 
Table 7-11 and Table 7-12 present cross-interval regression results from interval 1 to interval 
13 on option depth for call options. Table 7-13 and Table 7-14 present cross-interval regression 
results from interval 1 to interval 13 on option depth for put options. 
Option spread is shown to be significantly negatively correlated with option depth, a piece 
of evidence for the tendency of market makers to use option spread and depth jointly and 
oppositely at interval level. We also receive consistent results that days to expiry positively 
contributes to option depth, and stock volatility negatively contributes to option depth. Quote 
count is either insignificant or negatively significant in explaining option depth. As explained 
earlier, market makers may be unwilling to provide large depth when market moves quickly, given 
that they do not have sufficient time to process the fast-changing information. However, as 
suggested by the changes in significance level, their reaction to intensity of market activities 
differs throughout the day. VIX daily is significantly negative in all intervals for both calls and puts, 
providing confidence to our belief that market makers lower depth provision when faced with 
greater market uncertainty. Coefficients of dummy variables suggest, regardless of the time of 
the day, in-the-money call options tend to have higher depth than at-the-money call options, 
which in turn have higher depth than out-of-the-money call options, however, at-the-money put 
options tend to have the highest quoted depth compared to in-the-money and out-of-the-money 
put options. No matter for calls or puts, explanatory power of the model for depth stays stable 
across all intervals, a result showing the model works not only for an aggregate day, but also for 
each individual interval. 
 
     
9
3 
Table 7-7: Cross-interval Results of Model 8 for Interval 1-6 
Using Call Option Data, with Percentage Option Spread as Dependent Variable 
Interval # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Calls or Puts Calls Calls Calls Calls Calls Calls 
Model Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 
Independent Variables             
%_stock_spread 34.25058*** 38.72260*** 39.45457*** 39.64070*** 42.53875*** 50.18029*** 
 (6.700) (5.105) (5.047) (4.834) (5.184) (5.803) 
option_depth 0.00000 0.00001 0.00001 0.00002 0.00001 0.00002 
 (0.033) (0.463) (0.863) (1.365) (0.995) (1.168) 
days_to_expiry -0.00147*** -0.00123*** -0.00119*** -0.00115*** -0.00115*** -0.00117*** 
 (-13.213) (-12.369) (-12.591) (-12.479) (-12.288) (-12.915) 
quote_count -0.03459*** -0.02579*** -0.02486*** -0.02423*** -0.02439*** -0.02103*** 
 (-6.047) (-4.758) (-4.550) (-4.328) (-3.850) (-3.326) 
stock_stdev -4.39307*** -3.54371*** -3.30025*** -2.95369*** -3.00026*** -3.07631*** 
 (-7.786) (-6.686) (-6.582) (-6.010) (-6.170) (-6.506) 
daily_avg_stkprc 0.00002 0.00000 0.00000 0.00001 0.00000 0.00000 
 (0.528) (0.160) (0.143) (0.396) (0.213) (0.105) 
VIX_daily -0.00066 -0.00052 -0.00050 -0.00035 -0.00019 -0.00073 
 (-0.741) (-0.623) (-0.636) (-0.454) (-0.238) (-0.986) 
D_ITM -0.19653*** -0.15742*** -0.14566*** -0.12861*** -0.12489*** -0.12891*** 
 (-5.888) (-5.140) (-5.007) (-4.507) (-4.334) (-4.657) 
D_OTM 0.86929*** 0.79854*** 0.74693*** 0.73756*** 0.86233*** 0.83248*** 
 (23.631) (23.414) (23.128) (23.265) (27.085) (26.902) 
Interaction Terms             
ITM_%_stock_spread -23.33272*** -23.13246** -22.96788** -22.75103* -23.75210** -30.29383** 
 (-3.100) (-2.161) (-2.064) (-1.933) (-2.013) (-2.423) 
OTM_%_stock_spread 83.66792*** 103.47084*** 104.98958*** 105.83153*** 125.75431*** 138.92389*** 
 (12.369) (10.283) (9.947) (9.514) (11.206) (11.675) 
ITM_option_depth -0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00002 
 (-0.132) (-0.442) (-0.790) (-1.222) (-0.882) (-1.072) 
     
9
4 
OTM_option_depth -0.00015*** -0.00007*** -0.00003 0.00001 -0.00000 -0.00001 
 (-5.304) (-3.721) (-1.527) (0.539) (-0.240) (-0.692) 
ITM_days_to_expiry 0.00137*** 0.00114*** 0.00111*** 0.00107*** 0.00107*** 0.00109*** 
 (8.825) (8.270) (8.404) (8.244) (8.141) (8.515) 
OTM_days_to_expiry -0.00464*** -0.00466*** -0.00464*** -0.00468*** -0.00509*** -0.00494*** 
 (-27.056) (-30.333) (-31.958) (-32.602) (-35.751) (-35.195) 
ITM_quote_count 0.01636* 0.01230 0.01059 0.00891 0.00907 0.00275 
 (1.713) (1.368) (1.094) (0.841) (0.785) (0.220) 
OTM_quote_count -0.31217*** -0.27999*** -0.30621*** -0.31516*** -0.19289*** -0.25994*** 
 (-21.464) (-20.768) (-21.476) (-19.951) (-12.531) (-14.844) 
ITM_stock_stdev 3.90300*** 3.07644*** 2.85669*** 2.57755*** 2.52306*** 2.55877*** 
 (4.912) (4.098) (3.979) (3.644) (3.635) (3.764) 
OTM_stock_stdev -17.42264*** -15.98674*** -14.35131*** -14.12344*** -17.22655*** -16.13771*** 
 (-20.982) (-20.332) (-19.075) (-18.956) (-23.629) (-22.430) 
ITM_daily_avg_stkprc -0.00002 -0.00000 -0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 
 (-0.495) (-0.069) (-0.114) (-0.245) (-0.232) (-0.205) 
OTM_daily_avg_stkprc 0.00011*** 0.00011*** 0.00015*** 0.00017*** 0.00009*** 0.00010*** 
 (2.994) (3.401) (4.905) (5.396) (2.887) (3.189) 
ITM_VIX_daily 0.00073 0.00062 0.00059 0.00031 0.00025 0.00068 
 (0.612) (0.560) (0.557) (0.295) (0.235) (0.672) 
OTM_VIX_daily 0.00477*** 0.00427*** 0.00379*** 0.00338*** 0.00095 0.00086 
 (3.918) (3.718) (3.500) (3.175) (0.869) (0.833) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,946 7,089 7,157 7,171 7,151 7,159 
Adjusted R-squared 0.831 0.819 0.814 0.809 0.806 0.806 
 
  
     
9
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Table 7-8: Cross-interval Results of Model 8 for Interval 7-13 
Using Call Option Data, with Percentage Option Spread as Dependent Variable 
Interval # (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Dependent Variable 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Calls or Puts Calls Calls Calls Calls Calls Calls Calls 
Model Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 
Independent Variables               
%_stock_spread 51.50983*** 53.66566*** 50.94604*** 52.50188*** 51.87702*** 56.47857*** 64.72652*** 
 (6.016) (6.119) (5.609) (5.962) (5.787) (5.697) (5.127) 
option_depth 0.00001 0.00002 0.00002 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 
 (1.073) (1.192) (1.350) (0.832) (1.052) (0.547) (0.566) 
days_to_expiry -0.00117*** -0.00116*** -0.00115*** -0.00117*** -0.00115*** -0.00115*** -0.00120*** 
 (-13.210) (-13.177) (-13.117) (-13.131) (-13.056) (-12.659) (-13.315) 
quote_count -0.02162*** -0.02385*** -0.02404*** -0.02271*** -0.02293*** -0.02145*** -0.02824*** 
 (-3.321) (-3.563) (-3.586) (-3.645) (-3.641) (-3.478) (-4.592) 
stock_stdev -3.10663*** -3.10691*** -2.92327*** -3.18613*** -2.98846*** -3.12733*** -3.12843*** 
 (-6.789) (-6.859) (-6.441) (-7.091) (-6.741) (-6.852) (-7.072) 
daily_avg_stkprc 0.00000 0.00000 0.00002 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00002 
 (0.126) (0.245) (0.751) (0.314) (0.644) (0.334) (1.132) 
VIX_daily -0.00083 -0.00076 -0.00051 -0.00057 -0.00055 -0.00055 -0.00008 
 (-1.174) (-1.087) (-0.712) (-0.816) (-0.777) (-0.726) (-0.107) 
D_ITM -0.12970*** -0.12848*** -0.11736*** -0.12925*** -0.12214*** -0.12622*** -0.12455*** 
 (-4.839) (-4.847) (-4.398) (-4.889) (-4.630) (-4.581) (-4.643) 
D_OTM 0.81507*** 0.79861*** 0.83606*** 0.78890*** 0.80558*** 0.80696*** 0.79805*** 
 (27.172) (26.942) (28.072) (26.555) (27.050) (26.030) (26.727) 
Interaction Terms               
ITM_%_stock_spread -30.99423** -31.73193** -27.14143** -27.62689** -27.44219** -30.85116** -28.79313 
 (-2.512) (-2.483) (-2.046) (-2.152) (-2.134) (-2.149) (-1.560) 
OTM_%_stock_spread 
127.48671**
* 
127.11471**
* 
135.73711**
* 
130.48567**
* 
126.77295**
* 
130.85939**
* 
171.08366**
* 
 (10.753) (10.484) (10.836) (10.688) (10.204) (9.524) (9.834) 
ITM_option_depth -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 
     
9
6 
 (-1.002) (-1.125) (-1.278) (-0.788) (-0.952) (-0.525) (-0.515) 
OTM_option_depth -0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00003* -0.00001 0.00001 
 (-0.153) (-0.918) (-0.754) (-0.437) (-1.697) (-0.344) (0.445) 
ITM_days_to_expiry 0.00109*** 0.00108*** 0.00107*** 0.00109*** 0.00107*** 0.00106*** 0.00112*** 
 (8.697) (8.667) (8.576) (8.651) (8.599) (8.295) (8.821) 
OTM_days_to_expiry -0.00489*** -0.00475*** -0.00483*** -0.00478*** -0.00486*** -0.00517*** -0.00512*** 
 (-35.509) (-34.643) (-35.458) (-34.650) (-35.565) (-36.818) (-37.010) 
ITM_quote_count 0.00424 0.00509 0.00418 0.00596 0.00764 0.00595 0.01325 
 (0.330) (0.367) (0.293) (0.456) (0.628) (0.509) (1.163) 
OTM_quote_count -0.25750*** -0.31135*** -0.25027*** -0.28906*** -0.29766*** -0.26176*** -0.22394*** 
 (-14.652) (-15.920) (-13.514) (-15.997) (-16.434) (-15.766) (-14.243) 
ITM_stock_stdev 2.53051*** 2.58988*** 2.30941*** 2.56342*** 2.43712*** 2.57553*** 2.56487*** 
 (3.855) (3.966) (3.520) (3.968) (3.849) (3.954) (4.073) 
OTM_stock_stdev -15.87952*** -15.35865*** -16.23687*** -14.58036*** -14.71884*** -14.69247*** -14.57330*** 
 (-22.798) (-22.117) (-23.489) (-21.225) (-21.607) (-21.069) (-21.944) 
ITM_daily_avg_stkprc -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00002 -0.00001 -0.00003 
 (-0.274) (-0.314) (-0.741) (-0.444) (-0.604) (-0.429) (-0.873) 
OTM_daily_avg_stkprc 0.00011*** 0.00012*** 0.00009*** 0.00014*** 0.00012*** 0.00014*** 0.00017*** 
 (3.869) (4.093) (3.176) (4.741) (4.070) (4.698) (5.878) 
ITM_VIX_daily 0.00073 0.00061 0.00042 0.00052 0.00038 0.00041 -0.00007 
 (0.749) (0.632) (0.426) (0.530) (0.392) (0.395) (-0.069) 
OTM_VIX_daily 0.00129 0.00145 0.00052 0.00100 0.00101 0.00158 0.00080 
 (1.284) (1.465) (0.522) (0.996) (1.012) (1.491) (0.763) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,155 7,158 7,167 7,174 7,167 7,154 7,173 
Adjusted R-squared 0.805 0.803 0.804 0.804 0.807 0.804 0.809 
 
  
     
9
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Table 7-9: Cross-interval Results of Model 8 for Interval 1-6 
Using Put Option Data, with Percentage Option Spread as Dependent Variable 
Interval # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Calls or Puts Puts Puts Puts Puts Puts Puts 
Model Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 
Independent Variables             
%_stock_spread 25.05285*** 29.87065*** 30.72248*** 30.76208*** 32.94749*** 34.27754*** 
 (5.521) (4.458) (4.416) (4.271) (4.577) (4.557) 
option_depth 0.00003** 0.00003** 0.00003*** 0.00004*** 0.00003*** 0.00004*** 
 (1.977) (2.519) (2.865) (3.308) (3.264) (3.736) 
days_to_expiry -0.00072*** -0.00061*** -0.00058*** -0.00059*** -0.00059*** -0.00059*** 
 (-7.351) (-6.923) (-6.910) (-7.213) (-7.113) (-7.515) 
quote_count -0.02017*** -0.01325*** -0.01267*** -0.01339*** -0.01305** -0.01307** 
 (-3.868) (-2.743) (-2.588) (-2.656) (-2.367) (-2.309) 
stock_stdev -1.53189*** -1.17701*** -1.04281** -0.88559** -0.93235** -0.85950** 
 (-3.128) (-2.584) (-2.375) (-2.088) (-2.222) (-2.117) 
daily_avg_stkprc 0.00004 0.00003 0.00003 0.00004* 0.00003* 0.00003* 
 (1.507) (1.549) (1.479) (1.880) (1.737) (1.863) 
VIX_daily 0.00044 0.00028 0.00018 0.00012 0.00026 0.00010 
 (0.564) (0.374) (0.256) (0.185) (0.370) (0.157) 
D_ITM -0.03922 -0.02645 -0.01932 -0.01676 -0.01393 -0.01050 
 (-1.276) (-0.946) (-0.731) (-0.655) (-0.536) (-0.427) 
D_OTM 0.74494*** 0.69110*** 0.70518*** 0.68470*** 0.69158*** 0.67691*** 
 (25.204) (25.154) (26.578) (26.549) (26.590) (27.362) 
Interaction Terms             
ITM_%_stock_spread -18.32295** -22.16049** -21.48578** -22.12513** -23.14176** -22.93633** 
 (-2.542) (-2.253) (-2.141) (-2.115) (-2.179) (-2.089) 
OTM_%_stock_spread 50.30831*** 55.05381*** 60.33789*** 55.01824*** 64.47576*** 64.69874*** 
 (8.215) (6.106) (6.346) (5.542) (6.492) (6.197) 
ITM_option_depth -0.00004** -0.00003** -0.00003** -0.00004*** -0.00003*** -0.00004*** 
 (-2.182) (-2.333) (-2.560) (-2.880) (-2.818) (-3.208) 
     
9
8 
OTM_option_depth -0.00005** -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00001 
 (-2.472) (-1.399) (-1.082) (-0.316) (-0.833) (-0.874) 
ITM_days_to_expiry 0.00054*** 0.00041*** 0.00040*** 0.00042*** 0.00041*** 0.00042*** 
 (3.861) (3.318) (3.321) (3.597) (3.509) (3.707) 
OTM_days_to_expiry -0.00560*** -0.00531*** -0.00527*** -0.00520*** -0.00528*** -0.00524*** 
 (-39.213) (-41.535) (-42.994) (-43.050) (-43.780) (-45.420) 
ITM_quote_count 0.00094 -0.00192 -0.00133 -0.00412 -0.00277 -0.00500 
 (0.115) (-0.259) (-0.173) (-0.505) (-0.311) (-0.517) 
OTM_quote_count -0.14101*** -0.06866*** -0.07024*** -0.07330*** -0.05810*** -0.06553*** 
 (-11.386) (-5.986) (-5.592) (-5.210) (-3.996) (-4.287) 
ITM_stock_stdev 0.80033 0.60268 0.38925 0.32098 0.30499 0.21812 
 (1.119) (0.910) (0.615) (0.521) (0.501) (0.371) 
OTM_stock_stdev -10.25131*** -9.43986*** -9.56435*** -9.11840*** -9.53018*** -9.27580*** 
 (-14.719) (-14.304) (-14.929) (-14.636) (-15.572) (-15.672) 
ITM_daily_avg_stkprc -0.00005 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 -0.00004 
 (-1.415) (-1.169) (-1.315) (-1.531) (-1.505) (-1.645) 
OTM_daily_avg_stkprc 0.00017*** 0.00015*** 0.00013*** 0.00014*** 0.00012*** 0.00013*** 
 (5.183) (5.272) (4.853) (5.318) (4.690) (5.020) 
ITM_VIX_daily 0.00009 0.00022 0.00016 0.00019 0.00008 0.00005 
 (0.076) (0.209) (0.157) (0.192) (0.082) (0.053) 
OTM_VIX_daily -0.00741*** -0.00767*** -0.00843*** -0.00815*** -0.00801*** -0.00764*** 
 (-7.116) (-7.815) (-8.951) (-8.866) (-8.478) (-8.654) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,925 7,072 7,208 7,232 7,206 7,263 
Adjusted R-squared 0.672 0.647 0.641 0.637 0.634 0.641 
 
  
     
9
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Table 7-10: Cross-interval Results of Model 8 for Interval 7-13 
Using Put Option Data, with Percentage Option Spread as Dependent Variable 
Interval # (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Dependent Variable 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Calls or Puts Puts Puts Puts Puts Puts Puts Puts 
Model Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 Model 8 
Independent Variables               
%_stock_spread 36.15455*** 36.49514*** 37.63342*** 38.06843*** 37.48523*** 38.83632*** 49.15956*** 
 (4.751) (4.715) (4.712) (4.912) (4.633) (4.514) (4.463) 
option_depth 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 0.00003*** 
 (3.214) (3.144) (3.183) (2.762) (2.858) (3.134) (2.897) 
days_to_expiry -0.00058*** -0.00058*** -0.00059*** -0.00058*** -0.00059*** -0.00061*** -0.00061*** 
 (-7.357) (-7.354) (-7.616) (-7.416) (-7.492) (-7.704) (-7.735) 
quote_count -0.01228** -0.01367** -0.01457** -0.01329** -0.01396** -0.01380** -0.01601*** 
 (-2.096) (-2.265) (-2.372) (-2.388) (-2.423) (-2.493) (-2.982) 
stock_stdev -0.88533** -0.83211** -0.93870** -0.97645** -1.00170** -0.93225** -0.91184** 
 (-2.202) (-2.108) (-2.389) (-2.493) (-2.544) (-2.385) (-2.382) 
daily_avg_stkprc 0.00003* 0.00003* 0.00004** 0.00003* 0.00003* 0.00004** 0.00004** 
 (1.735) (1.950) (1.980) (1.786) (1.846) (1.991) (2.454) 
VIX_daily -0.00015 -0.00001 0.00007 0.00014 0.00001 0.00015 0.00027 
 (-0.241) (-0.017) (0.107) (0.226) (0.014) (0.230) (0.411) 
D_ITM -0.01228 -0.00533 -0.00912 -0.01081 -0.01056 -0.00369 -0.00743 
 (-0.508) (-0.226) (-0.385) (-0.461) (-0.439) (-0.152) (-0.313) 
D_OTM 0.68338*** 0.66040*** 0.63722*** 0.65383*** 0.67497*** 0.67248*** 0.66310*** 
 (27.911) (27.649) (26.449) (27.392) (27.669) (27.409) (27.694) 
Interaction Terms               
ITM_%_stock_spread -23.51402** -22.33466** -23.76294** -23.55730** -22.25271* -22.13042* -24.88692 
 (-2.104) (-1.996) (-2.073) (-2.095) (-1.865) (-1.758) (-1.540) 
OTM_%_stock_spread 69.43447*** 70.07204*** 59.86339*** 56.05245*** 59.62830*** 66.33722*** 90.78521*** 
 (6.569) (6.497) (5.383) (5.152) (5.300) (5.535) (5.933) 
ITM_option_depth -0.00003*** -0.00003*** -0.00003*** -0.00003** -0.00003** -0.00003*** -0.00003*** 
 (-2.831) (-2.838) (-2.834) (-2.474) (-2.494) (-2.857) (-2.603) 
     
1
0
0 
OTM_option_depth -0.00001 0.00000 0.00002 0.00001 -0.00000 -0.00001 -0.00001 
 (-0.998) (0.350) (1.626) (0.415) (-0.259) (-0.560) (-0.544) 
ITM_days_to_expiry 0.00041*** 0.00041*** 0.00040*** 0.00040*** 0.00041*** 0.00041*** 0.00041*** 
 (3.650) (3.666) (3.606) (3.534) (3.654) (3.626) (3.671) 
OTM_days_to_expiry -0.00527*** -0.00523*** -0.00516*** -0.00524*** -0.00528*** -0.00524*** -0.00518*** 
 (-45.384) (-45.854) (-45.207) (-45.542) (-45.491) (-45.183) (-44.742) 
ITM_quote_count -0.00313 -0.00212 -0.00213 -0.00018 -0.00022 0.00062 0.00181 
 (-0.323) (-0.211) (-0.209) (-0.020) (-0.023) (0.071) (0.214) 
OTM_quote_count -0.06931*** -0.07381*** -0.07966*** -0.08287*** -0.07680*** -0.09828*** -0.11503*** 
 (-4.279) (-4.508) (-4.519) (-5.343) (-4.816) (-6.153) (-7.515) 
ITM_stock_stdev 0.17763 0.08971 0.19888 0.25315 0.25030 0.16086 0.19948 
 (0.305) (0.157) (0.350) (0.449) (0.440) (0.286) (0.364) 
OTM_stock_stdev -9.41503*** -8.93179*** -8.61728*** -8.56686*** -8.93160*** -8.67184*** -8.48311*** 
 (-16.052) (-15.505) (-14.950) (-14.985) (-15.556) (-15.236) (-15.388) 
ITM_daily_avg_stkprc -0.00004 -0.00005* -0.00005* -0.00005* -0.00005* -0.00005** -0.00006** 
 (-1.595) (-1.847) (-1.888) (-1.818) (-1.787) (-2.090) (-2.170) 
OTM_daily_avg_stkprc 0.00012*** 0.00013*** 0.00016*** 0.00015*** 0.00014*** 0.00015*** 0.00016*** 
 (4.773) (5.395) (6.254) (6.228) (5.585) (5.909) (6.644) 
ITM_VIX_daily 0.00013 -0.00013 -0.00001 -0.00009 -0.00016 -0.00034 -0.00031 
 (0.145) (-0.148) (-0.012) (-0.100) (-0.175) (-0.361) (-0.337) 
OTM_VIX_daily -0.00774*** -0.00746*** -0.00686*** -0.00721*** -0.00767*** -0.00781*** -0.00789*** 
 (-8.885) (-8.774) (-7.971) (-8.425) (-8.761) (-8.706) (-8.878) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,276 7,283 7,285 7,293 7,285 7,282 7,294 
Adjusted R-squared 0.638 0.639 0.640 0.639 0.640 0.646 0.653 
 
  
     
1
0
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Table 7-11: Cross-interval Results of Model 11 for Interval 1-6 
Using Call Option Data, with Option Depth as Dependent Variable 
Interval # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable Option depth Option depth Option depth Option depth Option depth Option depth 
Calls or Puts Calls Calls Calls Calls Calls Calls 
Model Model 11 Model 11 Model 11 Model 11 Model 11 Model 11 
Independent Variables             
option_spread -130.43105*** -237.78326*** -277.09557*** -284.83021*** -316.72446*** -299.14821*** 
 (-10.153) (-10.795) (-11.231) (-11.170) (-11.492) (-11.070) 
days_to_expiry 0.75143*** 1.03521*** 1.15107*** 1.30251*** 1.25075*** 1.22432*** 
 (3.300) (3.641) (3.964) (4.362) (3.954) (3.968) 
quote_count 1.02168 -30.95197** -31.44487* -16.89772 -41.02674* -21.90386 
 (0.087) (-2.020) (-1.876) (-0.945) (-1.919) (-1.020) 
stock_stdev -5,630.16611*** -7,189.51934*** -7,120.65484*** -7,158.46537*** -7,680.61223*** -6,903.01811*** 
 (-6.049) (-6.148) (-5.974) (-5.862) (-5.958) (-5.494) 
VIX_daily -6.33511*** -5.91305*** -6.72055*** -6.18608*** -5.80428** -6.98590*** 
 (-3.680) (-2.690) (-3.038) (-2.737) (-2.327) (-3.000) 
D_ITM 336.62654*** 394.79702*** 361.61150*** 391.13021*** 366.10325*** 379.99692*** 
 (5.910) (5.579) (5.002) (5.238) (4.618) (4.928) 
D_OTM -144.28812** -183.51801** -176.18889** -139.07383* -113.03110 -116.20340 
 (-2.339) (-2.341) (-2.202) (-1.681) (-1.295) (-1.366) 
Interaction Terms             
ITM_option_spread -37.99958*** 22.00352 42.19413 32.64585 60.88701** 42.89331 
 (-2.656) (0.940) (1.614) (1.205) (2.085) (1.494) 
OTM_option_spread -108.50869*** -232.01626*** -246.95524*** -296.98102*** -249.76515*** -294.45190*** 
 (-3.709) (-4.104) (-3.793) (-4.157) (-3.342) (-3.885) 
ITM_days_to_expiry -0.23056 -0.18694 -0.08937 -0.09088 -0.15271 -0.25724 
 (-0.727) (-0.472) (-0.219) (-0.216) (-0.343) (-0.590) 
OTM_days_to_expiry 0.25574 0.27701 0.09272 -0.12176 -0.23564 -0.18318 
 (0.732) (0.627) (0.205) (-0.260) (-0.485) (-0.381) 
ITM_quote_count -108.61751*** -199.38334*** -277.23741*** -359.12101*** -367.91691*** -441.94736*** 
 (-5.810) (-8.207) (-9.753) (-11.072) (-9.796) (-10.856) 
OTM_quote_count -124.16795*** -137.93173*** -145.09816*** -190.08729*** -131.80357** -175.42668*** 
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 (-4.298) (-3.627) (-3.298) (-3.722) (-2.531) (-2.946) 
ITM_stock_stdev -8,729.02870*** -10606.29448*** -10210.46068*** -11172.71015*** -11376.98808*** -12271.07300*** 
 (-6.751) (-6.470) (-6.036) (-6.410) (-6.202) (-6.824) 
OTM_stock_stdev 1,478.92615 1,928.97199 1,242.46460 661.42951 320.36892 -97.38050 
 (1.085) (1.108) (0.690) (0.354) (0.165) (-0.051) 
ITM_VIX_daily 3.23351 4.66300 6.20145** 7.40360** 8.16294** 9.17838*** 
 (1.397) (1.582) (2.066) (2.394) (2.423) (2.870) 
OTM_VIX_daily 4.97039** 4.55877 4.77092 4.71184 2.88580 4.32606 
 (2.095) (1.493) (1.534) (1.473) (0.831) (1.306) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,946 7,089 7,157 7,171 7,151 7,159 
Adjusted R-squared 0.179 0.186 0.185 0.190 0.181 0.179 
 
 
  
     
1
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Table 7-12: Cross-interval Results of Model 11 for Interval 7-13 
Using Call Option Data, with Option Depth as Dependent Variable 
Interval # (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Dependent Variable Option depth Option depth Option depth Option depth Option depth Option depth Option depth 
Calls or Puts Calls Calls Calls Calls Calls Calls Calls 
Model Model 11 Model 11 Model 11 Model 11 Model 11 Model 11 Model 11 
Independent 
Variables 
              
option_spread -311.42275*** -312.63846*** -309.97059*** -314.69537*** -337.31045*** -345.78583*** -319.32051*** 
 (-11.775) (-12.039) (-11.651) (-12.106) (-13.008) (-12.687) (-12.130) 
days_to_expiry 1.14650*** 1.15615*** 1.26643*** 1.26003*** 1.13333*** 1.14141*** 1.14490*** 
 (3.857) (3.951) (4.174) (4.222) (3.855) (3.736) (3.849) 
quote_count -28.98553 -29.84217 -36.08243 -44.19473** -48.32817** -57.06570*** -61.15025*** 
 (-1.336) (-1.346) (-1.574) (-2.096) (-2.307) (-2.751) (-3.024) 
stock_stdev -6,925.7796*** -6,800.4531*** -6,864.9847*** -7,069.3234*** -7,648.7880*** -7,755.3380*** -7,805.0817*** 
 (-5.740) (-5.727) (-5.583) (-5.834) (-6.366) (-6.216) (-6.364) 
VIX_daily -5.61553** -5.47200** -5.81172** -4.55639** -5.77567*** -5.09088** -4.67997** 
 (-2.545) (-2.518) (-2.549) (-2.028) (-2.629) (-2.154) (-2.036) 
D_ITM 391.46401*** 387.98348*** 422.32366*** 417.12272*** 428.31720*** 459.17774*** 470.96587*** 
 (5.280) (5.321) (5.583) (5.612) (5.872) (6.034) (6.381) 
D_OTM -116.04520 -94.31036 -84.36490 -180.02701** -197.90891** -204.80189** -166.69842** 
 (-1.425) (-1.169) (-1.010) (-2.188) (-2.453) (-2.421) (-2.062) 
Interaction Terms               
ITM_option_spread 50.31267* 60.92866** 59.81805** 65.06532** 88.82176*** 92.06034*** 79.79011*** 
 (1.789) (2.206) (2.112) (2.353) (3.226) (3.182) (2.850) 
OTM_option_spread -285.81491*** -290.20700*** -277.00349*** -255.16690*** -266.60868*** -216.32429*** -155.59292** 
 (-3.843) (-3.940) (-3.649) (-3.417) (-3.605) (-2.897) (-2.245) 
ITM_days_to_expiry -0.26837 -0.13912 0.06517 0.07664 0.04786 -0.16123 -0.28261 
 (-0.638) (-0.335) (0.152) (0.181) (0.115) (-0.373) (-0.673) 
OTM_days_to_expiry -0.09580 -0.29924 -0.50783 -0.22016 -0.11453 -0.13667 -0.32758 
 (-0.207) (-0.654) (-1.074) (-0.472) (-0.249) (-0.288) (-0.714) 
ITM_quote_count -443.16419*** -464.29820*** -468.93535*** -387.19526*** -337.22849*** -299.42380*** -289.31010*** 
 (-10.785) (-10.641) (-10.175) (-9.201) (-8.721) (-8.001) (-8.265) 
     
1
0
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OTM_quote_count -181.02255*** -207.50187*** -192.24093*** -185.17246*** -190.34341*** -159.89374*** -130.77694** 
 (-3.087) (-3.202) (-3.021) (-3.056) (-3.174) (-2.885) (-2.546) 
ITM_stock_stdev 
-
12788.04913*** 
-
12120.82782*** 
-
12387.41551*** 
-
13120.57673*** 
-
12862.76067*** 
-
13234.55555*** 
-
13562.05339*** 
 (-7.388) (-7.124) (-7.025) (-7.562) (-7.524) (-7.464) (-7.817) 
OTM_stock_stdev 64.07344 -549.15883 -251.31952 1,530.44884 1,398.69854 1,581.78501 1,826.44692 
 (0.035) (-0.301) (-0.134) (0.827) (0.768) (0.837) (1.000) 
ITM_VIX_daily 8.44435*** 6.97514** 5.36150* 5.70557* 4.38198 3.41234 3.44701 
 (2.767) (2.318) (1.706) (1.845) (1.450) (1.062) (1.108) 
OTM_VIX_daily 3.61669 3.79451 3.18216 4.62208 5.24869* 4.91046 3.18477 
 (1.143) (1.216) (0.977) (1.442) (1.671) (1.469) (0.988) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,155 7,158 7,167 7,174 7,167 7,154 7,173 
Adjusted R-squared 0.188 0.184 0.176 0.182 0.192 0.183 0.182 
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Table 7-13: Cross-interval Results of Model 11 for Interval 1-6 
Using Put Option Data, with Option Depth as Dependent Variable 
Interval # (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable Option depth Option depth Option depth Option depth Option depth Option depth 
Calls or Puts Puts Puts Puts Puts Puts Puts 
Model Model 11 Model 11 Model 11 Model 11 Model 11 Model 11 
Independent Variables             
option_spread -120.92459*** -207.22472*** -236.02425*** -246.05339*** -255.46860*** -251.81105*** 
 (-15.007) (-16.102) (-16.796) (-16.863) (-16.897) (-16.553) 
days_to_expiry 0.85828*** 1.21015*** 1.36213*** 1.45300*** 1.44816*** 1.33433*** 
 (5.094) (5.766) (6.443) (6.746) (6.419) (5.968) 
quote_count -8.15080 -45.80533*** -44.04165*** -30.16403** -44.27982*** -31.13381* 
 (-0.894) (-3.983) (-3.574) (-2.275) (-2.929) (-1.939) 
stock_stdev -6,456.78185*** -8,163.24969*** -8,216.08110*** -8,219.23067*** -8,496.79157*** -8,369.28720*** 
 (-9.174) (-9.308) (-9.387) (-9.283) (-9.185) (-9.118) 
VIX_daily -5.96462*** -5.50875*** -5.68041*** -4.92504*** -5.29041*** -6.52064*** 
 (-4.664) (-3.391) (-3.525) (-3.013) (-2.975) (-3.828) 
D_ITM -133.20616*** -201.35375*** -215.22242*** -210.30274*** -193.47672*** -232.64264*** 
 (-2.986) (-3.619) (-3.878) (-3.720) (-3.248) (-3.975) 
D_OTM -63.97517 -116.55507** -113.59261** -90.55332 -132.82073** -121.16498** 
 (-1.494) (-2.150) (-2.075) (-1.615) (-2.250) (-2.094) 
Interaction Terms             
ITM_option_spread 14.51584 85.14163*** 109.10564*** 110.87292*** 114.55782*** 112.99263*** 
 (1.528) (6.027) (7.191) (7.044) (7.019) (6.890) 
OTM_option_spread -91.89837*** -190.91837*** -194.68680*** -215.40304*** -216.06562*** -225.25087*** 
 (-4.668) (-4.972) (-4.556) (-4.662) (-4.498) (-4.663) 
ITM_days_to_expiry 0.27661 0.30426 0.16562 0.22620 0.17325 0.45737 
 (1.150) (1.013) (0.548) (0.734) (0.538) (1.428) 
OTM_days_to_expiry -0.52237** -0.43359 -0.55221* -0.61022* -0.47752 -0.58686* 
 (-2.099) (-1.380) (-1.747) (-1.870) (-1.417) (-1.760) 
     
1
0
6 
ITM_quote_count -74.24212*** -85.56813*** -123.19557*** -167.85266*** -162.98016*** -232.19456*** 
 (-5.572) (-5.071) (-6.606) (-8.070) (-6.909) (-8.853) 
OTM_quote_count -31.06838 -38.74537 -40.84586 -81.87532** -92.21067** -106.65109** 
 (-1.457) (-1.404) (-1.279) (-2.176) (-2.292) (-2.440) 
ITM_stock_stdev 698.69226 911.54544 1,145.75036 1,071.95360 256.23313 38.63637 
 (0.709) (0.738) (0.919) (0.844) (0.194) (0.029) 
OTM_stock_stdev 636.64179 1,445.97440 1,380.41400 1,361.94096 1,568.14189 1,452.05626 
 (0.650) (1.162) (1.094) (1.058) (1.174) (1.096) 
ITM_VIX_daily 8.32461*** 10.45306*** 11.32174*** 11.99843*** 12.05325*** 14.32693*** 
 (4.549) (4.501) (4.907) (5.107) (4.759) (5.888) 
OTM_VIX_daily 2.28642 1.73068 1.61868 1.16896 2.43519 2.76328 
 (1.330) (0.786) (0.731) (0.516) (1.002) (1.173) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 6,925 7,072 7,208 7,232 7,206 7,263 
Adjusted R-squared 0.156 0.154 0.159 0.162 0.160 0.159 
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Table 7-14: Cross-interval Results of Model 11 for Interval 7-13 
Using Put Option Data, with Option Depth as Dependent Variable 
Interval # (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Dependent Variable Option depth Option depth Option depth Option depth Option depth Option depth Option depth 
Calls or Puts Puts Puts Puts Puts Puts Puts Puts 
Model Model 11 Model 11 Model 11 Model 11 Model 11 Model 11 Model 11 
Independent Variables               
option_spread -264.10720*** -260.14056*** -253.15561*** -261.96335*** -263.69825*** -276.45391*** -260.98666*** 
 (-17.441) (-17.474) (-17.316) (-17.310) (-18.006) (-18.165) (-17.717) 
days_to_expiry 1.34794*** 1.45383*** 1.48662*** 1.51488*** 1.40676*** 1.37511*** 1.35243*** 
 (6.139) (6.757) (6.924) (6.811) (6.459) (6.199) (6.269) 
quote_count -41.93798*** -34.72203** -42.75767** -51.25232*** -49.57861*** -68.06625*** -76.76848*** 
 (-2.588) (-2.082) (-2.525) (-3.204) (-3.135) (-4.336) (-5.205) 
stock_stdev -8,365.92652*** -8,162.75402*** -8,107.24553*** -8,289.06349*** -8,582.41569*** -8,920.55017*** -9,361.32248*** 
 (-9.301) (-9.288) (-9.236) (-9.078) (-9.508) (-9.669) (-10.284) 
VIX_daily -4.55186*** -4.26900*** -4.83038*** -3.77962** -4.88827*** -3.94813** -3.31095** 
 (-2.794) (-2.661) (-2.977) (-2.252) (-2.985) (-2.283) (-1.982) 
D_ITM -176.41274*** -144.90744*** -161.13792*** -174.47089*** -161.78401*** -151.24606*** -141.16702** 
 (-3.088) (-2.588) (-2.876) (-3.022) (-2.864) (-2.609) (-2.518) 
D_OTM -117.07107** -89.01140 -95.97462* -73.50500 -95.50194* -116.01480** -72.30233 
 (-2.066) (-1.607) (-1.730) (-1.282) (-1.705) (-2.018) (-1.301) 
Interaction Terms               
ITM_option_spread 129.42205*** 127.73686*** 121.37994*** 130.35385*** 128.12877*** 142.62965*** 131.75385*** 
 (7.951) (7.989) (7.723) (8.002) (8.106) (8.715) (8.310) 
OTM_option_spread -231.11197*** -238.22380*** -221.20113*** -217.45256*** -217.90781*** -186.21807*** -151.70244*** 
 (-4.784) (-4.962) (-4.651) (-4.518) (-4.626) (-3.938) (-3.389) 
ITM_days_to_expiry 0.28396 0.04751 0.13049 0.22226 0.36316 0.20821 0.18564 
 (0.904) (0.154) (0.424) (0.696) (1.162) (0.655) (0.602) 
OTM_days_to_expiry -0.49344 -0.66893** -0.58791* -0.73104** -0.65424** -0.56645* -0.64209** 
 (-1.504) (-2.089) (-1.825) (-2.200) (-2.010) (-1.707) (-1.987) 
ITM_quote_count -185.00211*** -184.47794*** -201.09608*** -160.76023*** -155.63460*** -123.25220*** -98.75078*** 
 (-7.202) (-6.923) (-7.477) (-6.354) (-6.329) (-5.217) (-4.481) 
OTM_quote_count -147.87313*** -152.30184*** -149.93629*** -113.01886** -119.25244*** -103.66824** -71.15842* 
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 (-3.276) (-3.347) (-3.057) (-2.540) (-2.704) (-2.291) (-1.685) 
ITM_stock_stdev -599.86815 -585.53189 -456.18290 -225.52529 -149.28982 -32.43020 123.41351 
 (-0.462) (-0.461) (-0.360) (-0.172) (-0.116) (-0.025) (0.096) 
OTM_stock_stdev 1,566.24746 1,118.47975 1,404.93402 868.27298 1,374.90149 2,090.07187 2,108.64327 
 (1.206) (0.880) (1.108) (0.661) (1.066) (1.588) (1.643) 
ITM_VIX_daily 11.20257*** 9.98509*** 10.83288*** 10.47651*** 9.62640*** 8.46704*** 7.90672*** 
 (4.796) (4.352) (4.669) (4.394) (4.118) (3.468) (3.361) 
OTM_VIX_daily 2.23142 1.88753 1.40535 0.97609 1.23261 0.48343 -1.51070 
 (0.978) (0.842) (0.623) (0.418) (0.541) (0.203) (-0.658) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 7,276 7,283 7,285 7,293 7,285 7,282 7,294 
Adjusted R-squared 0.159 0.160 0.163 0.155 0.164 0.161 0.159 
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Chapter 8: Robustness Check 
We conduct a robustness check to examine whether our results are affected by our choice 
of data. As described earlier in the data section, only options for the top 20 most actively quoted 
companies are chosen to construct our sample. As a robustness check, we repeat our analysis this 
time using data related to the top 10 most actively quoted companies. These companies are the 
first 10 companies in Table 4-1 which include Alphabet, United States Steel, Goldman Sachs, 
Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan, Goldcorp Inc., First Solar Inc., Newmont Mining Corporation, 
JPMorgan Chase, Freeport-McMoRan, and IBM. The sample is used to rerun Models 1 to 11.  
The results related to the determinants of the option dollar spread are presented in Table 8-
1 for calls and Table 8-2 for puts. 
 
Table 8-1: Robustness Check for Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4, Based on the Call 
Option Data of the First 10 Companies listed in Table 4-1 - Option Dollar Spread is Dependent 
Variable 
Column # (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable 
Option dollar 
spread 
Option dollar 
spread 
Option dollar 
spread 
Option dollar 
spread 
Calls or Puts Calls Calls Calls Calls 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Independent Variables         
stock_spread 2.25405*** 1.68015*** 1.07420*** 1.02932*** 
 (129.359) (97.329) (32.105) (29.916) 
option_depth -0.00010*** -0.00008*** -0.00003*** -0.00002 
 (-14.305) (-8.520) (-3.193) (-1.537) 
days_to_expiry 0.00022*** 0.00108*** 0.00098*** 0.00096*** 
 (3.447) (18.237) (17.715) (17.323) 
quote_count 0.00516 -0.00786** -0.01698*** -0.02286*** 
 (1.435) (-2.570) (-5.944) (-7.506) 
stock_stdev -9.24839*** -0.93229*** 1.72176*** 1.99032*** 
 (-41.487) (-4.688) (7.540) (8.511) 
daily_avg_stkprc   0.00042*** 0.00046*** 
   (20.286) (20.971) 
VIX_daily    0.00209*** 
    (4.852) 
D_ITM  0.68020*** 0.41332*** 0.39183*** 
  (79.151) (41.192) (23.711) 
D_OTM  -0.03525*** -0.00667 0.01666 
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  (-3.617) (-0.606) (0.893) 
Interaction Terms         
ITM_stock_spread  3.13735*** 1.35423*** 1.32826*** 
  (133.223) (29.583) (28.333) 
OTM_stock_spread  -1.17406*** -0.87591*** -0.85239*** 
  (-49.881) (-19.192) (-18.341) 
ITM_option_depth  -0.00011*** -0.00005*** -0.00006*** 
  (-10.182) (-4.433) (-5.346) 
OTM_option_depth  0.00005*** 0.00003* 0.00001 
  (3.609) (1.792) (1.027) 
ITM_days_to_expiry  -0.00137*** -0.00155*** -0.00152*** 
  (-16.689) (-20.150) (-19.871) 
OTM_days_to_expiry  -0.00056*** -0.00042*** -0.00036*** 
  (-6.193) (-4.985) (-4.251) 
ITM_quote_count  -0.09144*** -0.11416*** -0.11785*** 
  (-17.231) (-23.053) (-23.013) 
OTM_quote_count  0.02036*** 0.02197*** 0.02120*** 
  (2.627) (3.000) (2.726) 
ITM_stock_stdev  -22.00342*** -13.17427*** -13.06286*** 
  (-78.106) (-40.746) (-39.716) 
OTM_stock_stdev  0.96748*** -0.12053 -0.15854 
  (3.102) (-0.348) (-0.442) 
ITM_daily_avg_stkprc   0.00131*** 0.00133*** 
   (45.239) (44.095) 
OTM_daily_avg_stkprc   -0.00021*** -0.00022*** 
   (-7.041) (-7.393) 
ITM_VIX_daily    0.00092 
    (1.591) 
OTM_VIX_daily    -0.00124** 
    (-2.053) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Interval Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 47,173 47,173 47,173 47,173 
Adjusted R-squared 0.363 0.819 0.843 0.844 
 
t-statistics in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively. 
Quote_count captures the frequency of quote revisions, stock_stdev captures the standard 
deviation of daily returns of underlying stock, daily_avg_stkprc captures the daily average stock 
price of underlying stock, VIX_daily captures the daily VIX index price. The Interaction terms 
capture either the interaction of in-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable 
or the interaction of out-of-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable.  
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Table 8-2: Robustness Check for Model 1, Model 2, Model 3 and Model 4, Based on the Put 
Option Data of the First 10 Companies listed in Table 4-1 - Option Dollar Spread is Dependent 
Variable 
 
Column # (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable 
Option dollar 
spread 
Option dollar 
spread 
Option dollar 
spread 
Option dollar 
spread 
Calls or Puts Puts Puts Puts Puts 
Model Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Independent Variables         
stock_spread 2.22118*** 1.95262*** 1.14457*** 1.08435*** 
 (87.863) (71.712) (21.557) (19.968) 
option_depth -0.00054*** -0.00008*** -0.00001 0.00000 
 (-38.388) (-5.362) (-0.971) (0.046) 
days_to_expiry 0.00008 0.00078*** 0.00064*** 0.00060*** 
 (0.867) (8.337) (7.232) (6.825) 
quote_count 0.06344*** -0.01309*** -0.02371*** -0.03292*** 
 (13.110) (-2.660) (-5.126) (-6.636) 
stock_stdev -14.70778*** -2.69425*** 0.75143** 1.01092*** 
 (-48.417) (-8.651) (2.092) (2.785) 
daily_avg_stkprc   0.00056*** 0.00061*** 
   (17.085) (17.784) 
VIX_daily    0.00236*** 
    (3.515) 
D_ITM  1.21991*** 0.80553*** 0.62636*** 
  (90.928) (51.235) (24.072) 
D_OTM  -0.10564*** -0.04552*** -0.06310** 
  (-7.435) (-2.762) (-2.317) 
Interaction Terms         
ITM_stock_spread  3.53556*** 0.46016*** 0.36950*** 
  (91.453) (6.101) (4.836) 
OTM_stock_spread  -1.30300*** -0.78113*** -0.79341*** 
  (-35.643) (-10.879) (-10.827) 
ITM_option_depth  -0.00068*** -0.00048*** -0.00049*** 
  (-34.960) (-25.472) (-25.777) 
OTM_option_depth  0.00005** 0.00001 0.00001 
  (2.056) (0.343) (0.385) 
ITM_days_to_expiry  -0.00173*** -0.00210*** -0.00203*** 
  (-13.211) (-17.101) (-16.481) 
OTM_days_to_expiry  -0.00001 0.00021 0.00032** 
  (-0.105) (1.626) (2.458) 
ITM_quote_count  -0.16482*** -0.13679*** -0.16828*** 
  (-22.625) (-19.968) (-22.581) 
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OTM_quote_count  0.00211 -0.01281 -0.02119* 
  (0.176) (-1.131) (-1.796) 
ITM_stock_stdev  -33.82443*** -20.82905*** -19.79405*** 
  (-76.342) (-41.134) (-38.520) 
OTM_stock_stdev  3.07592*** 1.03495** 1.32504** 
  (6.748) (2.000) (2.505) 
ITM_daily_avg_stkprc   0.00215*** 0.00224*** 
   (46.032) (46.722) 
OTM_daily_avg_stkprc   -0.00037*** -0.00036*** 
   (-8.143) (-7.688) 
ITM_VIX_daily    0.00776*** 
    (8.221) 
OTM_VIX_daily    0.00014 
    (0.152) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Interval Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 47,759 47,759 47,759 47,759 
Adjusted R-squared 0.283 0.747 0.778 0.779 
 
t-statistics in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively. 
Quote_count captures the frequency of quote revisions, stock_stdev captures the standard 
deviation of daily returns of underlying stock, daily_avg_stkprc captures the daily average stock 
price of underlying stock, VIX_daily captures the daily VIX index price. The Interaction terms 
capture either the interaction of in-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable 
or the interaction of out-of-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable.  
 
The results related to the determinants of the option percentage spread are presented in 
Table 8-3 for calls and Table 8-4 for puts. 
 
Table 8-3: Robustness Check for Model 5, Model 6, Model 7 and Model 8, Based on the Call 
Option Data of the First 10 Companies listed in Table 4-1 - Percentage Option Spread is 
Dependent Variable 
 
Column # (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Calls or Puts Calls Calls Calls Calls 
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Model Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Independent Variables         
%_stock_spread -3.37061 8.48296*** 7.26855** 6.04585* 
 (-0.980) (2.775) (2.295) (1.848) 
option_depth -0.00013*** 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001* 
 (-32.936) (1.383) (1.545) (1.853) 
days_to_expiry -0.00194*** -0.00088*** -0.00088*** -0.00088*** 
 (-53.139) (-27.390) (-27.421) (-27.465) 
quote_count -0.21251*** -0.01974*** -0.02034*** -0.02129*** 
 (-103.225) (-11.885) (-12.236) (-11.944) 
stock_stdev -5.03191*** -2.64023*** -2.57972*** -2.52844*** 
 (-37.027) (-22.468) (-18.249) (-17.350) 
daily_avg_stkprc   0.00000 0.00001 
   (0.633) (1.007) 
VIX_daily    0.00035 
    (1.378) 
D_ITM  -0.11134*** -0.11588*** -0.12675*** 
  (-25.999) (-21.134) (-13.758) 
D_OTM  0.93325*** 0.89788*** 0.92172*** 
  (197.933) (146.344) (87.732) 
Interaction Terms         
ITM_%_stock_spread  -10.57384** -12.71573*** -14.85534*** 
  (-2.539) (-2.921) (-3.310) 
OTM_%_stock_spread  -27.50139*** -39.99166*** -37.59772*** 
  (-6.489) (-9.010) (-8.301) 
ITM_option_depth  -0.00001 -0.00001 -0.00001 
  (-1.335) (-1.026) (-1.238) 
OTM_option_depth  -0.00020*** -0.00018*** -0.00018*** 
  (-26.425) (-21.199) (-21.294) 
ITM_days_to_expiry  0.00079*** 0.00079*** 0.00079*** 
  (17.695) (17.626) (17.694) 
OTM_days_to_expiry  -0.00558*** -0.00556*** -0.00558*** 
  (-113.431) (-112.930) (-111.519) 
ITM_quote_count  0.00038 -0.00067 -0.00213 
  (0.133) (-0.234) (-0.713) 
OTM_quote_count  -0.09871*** -0.09669*** -0.09249*** 
  (-22.724) (-22.275) (-20.155) 
ITM_stock_stdev  2.48197*** 2.65654*** 2.73136*** 
  (15.129) (13.234) (13.283) 
OTM_stock_stdev  -15.70647*** -14.54319*** -14.71781*** 
  (-91.297) (-68.139) (-66.207) 
ITM_daily_avg_stkprc   0.00001 0.00001 
   (1.330) (1.586) 
OTM_daily_avg_stkprc   0.00007*** 0.00006*** 
   (8.117) (7.081) 
ITM_VIX_daily    0.00049 
    (1.454) 
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OTM_VIX_daily    -0.00097*** 
    (-2.757) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Interval Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 47,173 47,173 47,173 47,173 
Adjusted R-squared 0.263 0.812 0.813 0.813 
 
t-statistics in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively. 
Quote_count captures the frequency of quote revisions, stock_stdev captures the standard 
deviation of daily returns of underlying stock, daily_avg_stkprc captures the daily average stock 
price of underlying stock, VIX_daily captures the daily VIX index price. The Interaction terms 
capture either the interaction of in-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable 
or the interaction of out-of-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable. 
  
Table 8-4: Robustness Check for Model 5, Model 6, Model 7 and Model 8, Based on the Put 
Option Data of the First 10 Companies listed in Table 4-1 - Percentage Option Spread is 
Dependent Variable 
 
Column # (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent Variable 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Percentage 
option spread 
Calls or Puts Puts Puts Puts Puts 
Model Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
Independent Variables         
%_stock_spread 23.74601*** 10.66326*** 6.33457** 8.15367*** 
 (10.211) (3.775) (2.194) (2.764) 
option_depth -0.00000 -0.00000 0.00001* 0.00001 
 (-0.917) (-0.097) (1.751) (1.460) 
days_to_expiry -0.00182*** -0.00040*** -0.00042*** -0.00041*** 
 (-75.239) (-13.417) (-14.073) (-13.984) 
quote_count -0.10065*** -0.00522*** -0.00663*** -0.00514*** 
 (-77.235) (-3.329) (-4.282) (-3.111) 
stock_stdev -4.47001*** -0.88135*** -0.58713*** -0.63211*** 
 (-50.044) (-8.060) (-4.572) (-4.881) 
daily_avg_stkprc   0.00002*** 0.00002*** 
   (3.989) (3.530) 
VIX_daily    -0.00002 
    (-0.083) 
D_ITM  -0.01962*** -0.00798 -0.01322 
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  (-4.952) (-1.617) (-1.590) 
D_OTM  0.58139*** 0.49947*** 0.67475*** 
  (141.139) (95.775) (77.686) 
Interaction Terms         
ITM_%_stock_spread  -8.85844** -4.51755 -5.16954 
  (-2.239) (-1.118) (-1.267) 
OTM_%_stock_spread  -2.47646 -34.82931*** -11.92817*** 
  (-0.644) (-8.772) (-2.954) 
ITM_option_depth  -0.00000 -0.00002** -0.00001** 
  (-0.578) (-2.406) (-2.297) 
OTM_option_depth  -0.00002*** 0.00005*** 0.00002*** 
  (-2.729) (7.000) (2.943) 
ITM_days_to_expiry  0.00027*** 0.00028*** 0.00028*** 
  (6.349) (6.877) (6.832) 
OTM_days_to_expiry  -0.00481*** -0.00477*** -0.00494*** 
  (-110.765) (-111.273) (-115.328) 
ITM_quote_count  -0.00469** -0.00348 -0.00500** 
  (-2.020) (-1.510) (-2.015) 
OTM_quote_count  -0.03647*** -0.03600*** -0.00266 
  (-9.452) (-9.466) (-0.676) 
ITM_stock_stdev  0.21777 -0.17538 -0.15882 
  (1.418) (-0.969) (-0.868) 
OTM_stock_stdev  -11.09576*** -8.41137*** -9.73463*** 
  (-71.838) (-45.552) (-51.722) 
ITM_daily_avg_stkprc   -0.00003*** -0.00003*** 
   (-4.113) (-3.883) 
OTM_daily_avg_stkprc   0.00018*** 0.00013*** 
   (23.168) (17.070) 
ITM_VIX_daily    0.00030 
    (0.947) 
OTM_VIX_daily    -0.00703*** 
    (-22.795) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Interval Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 47,759 47,759 47,759 47,759 
Adjusted R-squared 0.239 0.627 0.638 0.646 
 
t-statistics in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively. 
Quote_count captures the frequency of quote revisions, stock_stdev captures the standard 
deviation of daily returns of underlying stock, daily_avg_stkprc captures the daily average stock 
price of underlying stock, VIX_daily captures the daily VIX index price. The Interaction terms 
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capture either the interaction of in-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable 
or the interaction of out-of-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable.  
 
The results related to the determinants of the option depth are presented in Table 8-5 for 
calls and Table 8-6 for puts. 
 
Table 8-5: Robustness Check for Model 9, Model 10 and Model 11, Based on the Call Option 
Data of the First 10 Companies listed in Table 4-1 - Option Depth is Dependent Variable 
 
Column # (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable Option depth Option depth Option depth 
Calls or Puts Calls Calls Calls 
Model Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Independent Variables       
option_spread -142.89875*** -454.05894*** -450.95345*** 
 (-56.505) (-50.142) (-50.063) 
days_to_expiry 0.66533*** 1.50396*** 1.50784*** 
 (15.875) (22.467) (22.647) 
quote_count 19.76755*** 26.70856*** 51.21796*** 
 (8.346) (7.697) (14.059) 
stock_stdev -6,386.43757*** -4,075.22661*** -4,077.76339*** 
 (-43.957) (-18.260) (-18.370) 
VIX_daily   -9.99309*** 
   (-20.459) 
D_ITM  347.34081*** 188.65988*** 
  (36.787) (11.799) 
D_OTM  -36.42046*** -106.44570*** 
  (-3.647) (-5.966) 
Interaction Terms       
ITM_option_spread  226.26522*** 222.96483*** 
  (23.833) (23.608) 
OTM_option_spread  -181.74919*** -209.53874*** 
  (-6.788) (-7.828) 
ITM_days_to_expiry  -0.56723*** -0.57356*** 
  (-6.070) (-6.170) 
OTM_days_to_expiry  -1.06169*** -1.24213*** 
  (-10.416) (-12.083) 
ITM_quote_count  -83.82822*** -101.39800*** 
  (-13.984) (-16.475) 
OTM_quote_count  -62.54486*** -50.80257*** 
  (-7.103) (-5.382) 
ITM_stock_stdev  -10417.73439*** -10454.43032*** 
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  (-31.864) (-32.134) 
OTM_stock_stdev  631.20231* 111.86420 
  (1.838) (0.324) 
ITM_VIX_daily   8.68079*** 
   (13.004) 
OTM_VIX_daily   5.15797*** 
   (7.375) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes 
Interval Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 47,173 47,173 47,173 
Adjusted R-squared 0.089 0.229 0.237 
 
t-statistics in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively. 
Daily_avg_stkprc is not included in regression on option depth due to lack of theoretical 
arguments and stock price’s strong correlation with option dollar spread. Quote_count captures 
the frequency of quote revisions, stock_stdev captures the standard deviation of daily returns of 
underlying stock, VIX_daily captures the daily VIX index price. The Interaction terms capture 
either the interaction of in-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable or the 
interaction of out-of-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable.  
 
Table 8-6: Robustness Check for Model 9, Model 10 and Model 11, Based on the Put Option 
Data of the First 10 Companies listed in Table 4-1 - Option Depth is Dependent Variable 
 
Column # (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Variable Option depth Option depth Option depth 
Calls or Puts Puts Puts Puts 
Model Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Independent 
Variables 
      
option_spread -98.80293*** -400.06947*** -400.16198*** 
 (-72.905) (-70.128) (-70.614) 
days_to_expiry 0.70094*** 1.55735*** 1.58163*** 
 (23.497) (32.166) (32.878) 
quote_count 34.18553*** 35.08697*** 55.68064*** 
 (21.179) (13.667) (20.458) 
stock_stdev -3,818.41435*** -4,087.62134*** -4,000.67918*** 
 (-37.460) (-24.833) (-24.460) 
VIX_daily   -7.71643*** 
   (-21.598) 
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D_ITM  77.69749*** -106.53691*** 
  (10.795) (-8.672) 
D_OTM  -34.38646*** -83.84677*** 
  (-5.046) (-7.046) 
Interaction Terms       
ITM_option_spread  293.56852*** 294.88086*** 
  (49.447) (49.959) 
OTM_option_spread  -172.67081*** -166.77478*** 
  (-10.535) (-10.241) 
ITM_days_to_expiry  -0.80819*** -0.81963*** 
  (-11.851) (-12.089) 
OTM_days_to_expiry  -1.09611*** -1.23018*** 
  (-15.323) (-17.184) 
ITM_quote_count  -80.88833*** -108.00228*** 
  (-21.767) (-26.887) 
OTM_quote_count  -36.45977*** -33.21164*** 
  (-5.767) (-5.054) 
ITM_stock_stdev  -2,252.40797*** -2,218.59365*** 
  (-9.192) (-9.071) 
OTM_stock_stdev  606.80651*** 293.27874 
  (2.578) (1.250) 
ITM_VIX_daily   9.89665*** 
   (19.423) 
OTM_VIX_daily   3.60795*** 
   (7.316) 
Include Intercept Yes Yes Yes 
Interval Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 47,759 47,759 47,759 
Adjusted R-squared 0.126 0.244 0.254 
 
t-statistics in parentheses, ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
significance level respectively. 
Daily_avg_stkprc is not included in regression on option depth due to lack of theoretical 
arguments and stock price’s strong correlation with option dollar spread. Quote_count captures 
the frequency of quote revisions, stock_stdev captures the standard deviation of daily returns of 
underlying stock, VIX_daily captures the daily VIX index price. The Interaction terms capture 
either the interaction of in-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable or the 
interaction of out-of-the-money dummy and corresponding independent variable.  
 
Overall, this robustness check using data for only 10 companies gives similar results to our 
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main regression results with one exception. In the main regressions, the depth for in-the-money 
calls and puts is negatively related to the quote count but in the robustness test the depth for in-
the-money calls and puts is positively related to the quote count. The results for ITM or OTM 
options is the same in the main analysis and in the robustness test.  
Therefore, the robustness test suggests that the impact of the quote count on the depth for 
the 10 most active companies is different from the impact of the quote count on the depth for 
the next 10 most active companies. We offer one possible interpretation for this observation. The 
depth for the options of the 10 most active companies could be simply a function of the supply 
and demand conditions and the nature of the orders. In a highly active environment, the supply 
and demand for the options may increase leading to high limit order sizes. In such an environment 
the depth is no longer controlled by market makers and it is not a source of risk to them. Therefore, 
the depth increases and decreases in response to market activity. We leave further investigation 
of this observation to future studies.  
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Chapter 9: Summary, Conclusions, and Directions for Future Research 
This research uses quote-level intraday data to analyze the intraday variation of quoted 
dollar spread, percentage spread, and depth for options that are ranked as the top actively quoted 
options listed on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). Our data cover the period of 
January, February, and March 2010 and include all quote level data of options related to the 20 
companies. The initial data we started with consists of a huge number of market quotes. After 
filtering the data and summarizing the observations within a single 30-minute intraday interval 
into single data points for the intraday variables such as option spread, option depth, underlying 
stock spread and quote count, our data set was reduced to 186,725 observations.  
Combining graphical and descriptive analysis, we reinforce some arguments made by 
previous studies and arrive at some new findings. Our descriptive and graphical analysis suggest 
that, on average, option depth follows a reverse U-shaped pattern. The depth starts low at the 
open and increases until it reaches a maximum sometime mid-day and then it drops during the 
last trading interval. The drop of option depth at market close is usually much less than the jump 
at the market open. Our analysis also reveals that option spread is several times wider than stock 
spread, while option spread proportionate to option price is far greater than stock spread 
proportionate to stock price. Option spread and percentage option spread have L-shaped intraday 
patterns, which start high in the first 30-minute session, then drop sharply and hold steady for 
the rest of the day. In contrast, stock spread and percentage stock spread have a reverse S-shaped 
intraday pattern, which start high at market open, drop sharply immediately after, then continue 
to decline slowly and finally experience another sharp drop near the market close. The difference 
between option spread and stock spread may be attributed to different market making structures 
(Chan et al., 1995), different strategies by market makers on different markets to divert intraday 
risks, or the hedging activities associated with option writing but irrelevant to stock trading.  
In addition to descriptive and graphical analysis, we use regression analysis to examine the 
determinants of the spread and the depth of puts and calls. We extend the intraday models of 
Cho and Engle (1999) by including interval dummy variables to capture time-of-the-day effects as 
have been done in many intraday stock studies, categorize options into three groups based on 
moneyness, add variables to interact the moneyness dummy variables with other variables of 
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interest, and test for the first time the impact of the underlying price level and the overall market 
expected volatility on the spread and the depth. The inclusion of moneyness dummies and 
moneyness interaction terms improved the fitness significantly.  
A unique contribution of this study is examining the impact of the underlying stock price on 
option dollar spread and percentage option spread. We propose that stock price serves as a proxy 
for hedging costs. Option spread and percentage option spread are both positively correlated 
with the level of underlying stock prices, confirming the cost of hedging as a component of option 
spread (Hait, 1999). Previous studies have argued that option spread increases with option price, 
but we further show that the stock price also increases the spread. Our finding applies to both 
dollar option spread and percentage option spread (already accounting for option price). This 
confirms our proposition that options with high stock prices are more expensive to hedge in the 
stock market both in dollar and in percentage, so they have wider spreads. Our result is consistent 
with the findings of Wei and Zheng (2010) that the option volatility, measured as the hedge ratio 
multiplied by the volatility of the underlying, is a significant positive contributor to the spread.  
Another unique contribution of this study is examining the impact of expected market 
volatility on dollar spread, percentage option spread and option depth. Using the Chicago Board 
Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX) as a proxy, we show that high expected market volatility 
significantly increases option dollar spread but it is not significant for percentage spread, possibly 
due to its positive impact on option premiums. Market volatility also depresses option depth 
levels, a reaction consistent with the desire of market makers to avoid market risks through lower 
supply. Overall, the inclusion of the Daily VIX variable in our analysis leads to minimal increase in 
model fitness, which we believe could be ascribed to the fact that option depth may already 
capture most of the effect of market volatility in explaining option spread. 
In addition to the unique contributions, the results confirm several findings of previous 
studies. First, we show that both dollar and percentage option spread is significantly positively 
associated with underlying stock spread, which supports the theory that information flows into 
both stock and option markets simultaneously and is consistent with the arguments of the 
Derivative Hedge Theory proposed by Cho and Engle (1999).  
Second, similar to stocks, the spread and depth for options are two dimensions of liquidity 
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and are imperfectly and reversely related. They are two tools market makers may use to adjust 
their risk exposure at their discretion. Market makers seem to adjust option depth, option spread, 
or both when they expect changes in the company-specific information asymmetry, but they 
seem to change the depth more aggressively when they expect changes in the overall market 
volatility. Nevertheless, the negative relationship is not perfect, for example, they tend to quote 
wide spreads for options that have long time to expiry due to greater risks embedded in those 
options, but at the same time they offer more depth.  
Third, we find that the percentage option spread is positively associated with option depth 
after other factors are controlled, which is different from a negative relationship between option 
dollar spread and option depth. It could be explained by the argument made by Verousis et al. 
(2016) that option market makers sometimes quote large depth, but also set a wide spread to 
compensate some of the risks.  
Fourth, we find strong and consistent supporting evidence for positive relationship between 
option dollar spread and time to expiration, as suggested by Pinter (2003) and Kodippili (2004). 
However, we find that percentage option spread decreases with time to expiration, possibly 
because premiums increase faster than dollar spread as the expiry date moves further into the 
future.  
Fifth, our analysis shows that, generally, ITM call dollar spread is higher than ATM call dollar 
spread and ATM call spread is higher than OTM call spread. This result also applies to put options. 
However, this conclusion is reversed for the percentage call and put spread, as the percentage 
spread increases as an option moves from ITM to ATM and from ATM to OTM. This observation 
is consistent with the argument that both the dollar spread and option premium both increase 
with moneyness but the increase in the premium is much faster than the increase in the spread. 
Sixth, we examine the impact of the intensity of market activities on the dollar spread, 
percentage spread, and the depth. We choose the frequency of quote revision (quote count) as 
the proxy, instead of the traditionally used option volume. Chan et al (2002) argues that quote 
revision is more informative than option volume. Our results suggest that percentage option 
spread and dollar option spread for at-the-money options are negatively related to the quote 
revisions. For percentage spread, in-the-money options are insignificantly different from at-the-
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money options, but out-of-the-money options are more significantly negatively affected by the 
quote count.   
Seventh, our regression results suggest a strong and negative relationship between volatility 
of the underlying asset and the percentage option spread of at the money options. For out-of-
the-money options, this impact is stronger, but for in-the-money options it is significantly weaker. 
The same result applies for both puts and calls. At the same time, we observe that increased 
volatility of the underlying stock increases dollar spread for at-the-money options, but this impact 
is weaker for in-the-money options and stronger for out-of-the-money options. The same result 
applies to both puts and calls. We propose that the driving force for the difference is that 
increased underlying stock volatility boosts the premiums of put and call options, while the 
increase in premiums is much more significant for out-of-the-money options compared to the 
increase in premiums for both at-the-money and out-of-the-money options, because the 
premiums of deep-in-the-money options are less sensitive to volatility changes because the 
intrinsic value is the main component of the premiums.  
In our study, we have found several occasions where option spread and option depth can go 
in the same direction. For example, long-term options are reported to have wider dollar spread 
and higher depth on average. Another example is the observation that high volatility of 
underlying stocks sometimes leads to lower depth level and lower percentage spread as well as 
lower dollar spread. Tannous et al. (2013) argue that market makers in the stock market use a 
dynamic strategy, by which they may utilize the spread and the depth separately or jointly to 
manage their risk. Our findings indicate the same applies to the options market.  
In terms of theoretical framework, we refer extensively to information asymmetry and the 
risk management behaviors of market makers, who are risk-averse and provide liquidity based on 
their perception of risks that include but are not limited to information risk. Our explanations of 
the empirical results assume that market makers adjust their strategies throughout the day in 
reaction to changes in the market. We demonstrate that market makers employ different 
strategies using option spread and option depth to deal with the risks they face. 
This study has some practical implications for market participants. The intraday magnitude 
and patterns of the spread and the depth suggest that option market is inefficient and it may be 
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wise for uninformed investors to avoid trading in early morning sessions, during which 
information asymmetry level and option spread are high. Also, near the end of the day, option 
market movements become unpredictable due to factors that are not included in this study and 
are rarely discussed in the option literature. Chung and Van Ness (2001) point out that there are 
more limit orders at the middle of a typical trading day, suggesting higher liquidity, compared to 
the beginning and the end of the day. Thus, it may be better to avoid trading near market close 
when there is high level of uncertainty while mid-day may be the best time for uninformed 
investors to place trades. However, superior information held by informed investors may still 
justify making trades when spread level is high or when the market is unpredictable. The superior 
information may predict the market with great confidence and have foresight of a price 
movement in the underlying stock and option price greater than the magnitude of the 
corresponding option spread. So informed traders can still use options as leveraged investments 
to capitalize on their superior information. 
This research focuses on the microstructure of the most active equity options. It would be 
rewarding for future research to investigate the intraday spread and depth of less active equity 
options.  
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Appendix 
An Example to Illustrate Illiquidity of Options 
 
This study is partially motivated by the observation that the bid-ask spreads for options are 
much larger than the bid-ask spreads for the stocks underlying those options, which represents 
much higher trading costs associated with option trading. This appendix illustrates this 
observation with an example, contrasting the spreads of options with the spreads of the 
underlying stock. 
Table A.1 presents the market data for options of Apple Inc., a very large and liquid 
technology stock, usually believed to have superior liquidity on options. We selected a random 
time, 02:45:01 PM EST, on a random date, February 14, 2017, to retrieve this data on all options 
available from Toronto Dominion Bank market research webpage. We selected my sample to be 
all call and put options that would expire on Friday March 17 2017, in approximately a month 
from the observation date of February, 14 2017. It is necessary to exclude a large number of 
illiquid valueless out-of-the-money options, whose bid prices equaled to $0.00 and ask prices 
equaled to $0.01. Nobody was willing to even bid for those options, so the spread of $0.01 should 
not be perceived as a narrow spread resulted from high liquidity, instead it is merely a product of 
inactivity of trading for those options. In fact, the volumes for them are usually zero or very 
minimal.  
Table A.1: Option Chain for Apple Inc. stock on Feb 14, 2017 
Call Options (expires March 17, 2017)     
Symbol Bid Ask Last Change Volume Strike 
AAPL $89.75  $90.20  $86.68  $0.00  --- 45 
AAPL $87.25  $87.70  $58.27  $0.00  --- 47.5 
AAPL $84.75  $85.20  $81.67  $0.00  --- 50 
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AAPL $79.70  $80.15  $76.95  $0.00  --- 55 
AAPL $74.75  $75.25  $72.00  $0.00  --- 60 
AAPL $69.75  $70.25  $52.00  $0.00  --- 65 
AAPL $64.75  $65.25  $63.07  $0.00  --- 70 
AAPL $59.75  $60.25  $57.35  $0.00  --- 75 
AAPL $54.75  $55.20  $52.50  $0.00  --- 80 
AAPL $52.25  $52.75  $49.25  $0.00  --- 82.5 
AAPL $49.75  $50.25  $47.50  $0.00  --- 85 
AAPL $47.30  $47.75  $44.88  $0.00  --- 87.5 
AAPL $44.85  $45.10  $45.00  $1.41  7 90 
AAPL $42.30  $42.75  $39.45  $0.00  --- 92.5 
AAPL $39.80  $40.25  $37.50  $0.00  --- 95 
AAPL $37.30  $37.75  $36.31  $0.00  --- 97.5 
AAPL   $35.15  $35.00  $1.63  213 100 
AAPL $29.90  $30.10  $30.02  $1.32  47 105 
AAPL $24.95  $25.15  $24.95  $1.55  33 110 
AAPL $19.95  $20.10  $20.10  $1.39  211 115 
AAPL $15.05  $15.25  $15.15  $1.60  339 120 
AAPL $10.25  $10.40  $10.30  $1.65  1,131 125 
AAPL $5.80  $5.85  $5.84  $1.34  5,763 130 
AAPL $2.50  $2.51  $2.50  $0.86  27,010 135 
AAPL $0.78  $0.79  $0.79  $0.32  4,559 140 
AAPL $0.22  $0.23  $0.24  $0.10  813 145 
AAPL $0.07  $0.08  $0.08  $0.02  1,014 150 
AAPL $0.02  $0.03  $0.03  $0.00  95 155 
AAPL $0.01  $0.02  $0.01  $0.00  --- 160 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.02  $0.01  2 165 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.02  $0.00  --- 170 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.01  $0.00  --- 175 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.01  $0.00  --- 180 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.00  $0.00  --- 185 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.00  $0.00  --- 190 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.00  $0.00  --- 195 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.00  $0.00  --- 200 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.00  $0.00  --- 205 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.01  $0.00  --- 210 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.00  $0.00  --- 220 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.00  $0.00  --- 230 
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AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.00  $0.00  --- 240 
Put Options (expires March 17, 2017)     
Symbol Bid Ask Last Change Volume Strike 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.01  $0.00  --- 45 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.03  $0.00  --- 47.5 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.02  $0.00  --- 50 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.04  $0.00  --- 55 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.02  $0.00  --- 60 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.02  $0.00  --- 65 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.02  $0.00  --- 70 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.01  $0.00  --- 75 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.01  $0.00  --- 80 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.01  $0.00  --- 82.5 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.01  $0.00  --- 85 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.01  $0.00  --- 87.5 
AAPL $0.00  $0.01  $0.01  $0.00  504 90 
AAPL $0.01  $0.02  $0.01  ($0.01) 20 92.5 
AAPL $0.01  $0.02  $0.01  $0.00  --- 95 
AAPL $0.01  $0.02  $0.02  $0.00  --- 97.5 
AAPL $0.02  $0.03  $0.02  ($0.01) 536 100 
AAPL $0.03  $0.04  $0.04  $0.01  45 105 
AAPL $0.05  $0.06  $0.05  ($0.01) 142 110 
AAPL $0.08  $0.09  $0.09  ($0.01) 177 115 
AAPL $0.13  $0.14  $0.14  ($0.01) 4,907 120 
AAPL $0.27  $0.28  $0.27  ($0.06) 1,359 125 
AAPL $0.80  $0.81  $0.81  ($0.26) 8,854 130 
AAPL $2.46  $2.48  $2.46  ($0.81) 14,452 135 
AAPL $5.75  $5.85  $5.80  ($1.07) 140 140 
AAPL $10.15  $10.25  $10.26  ($1.35) 40 145 
AAPL $15.05  $15.25  $16.52  $0.00  --- 150 
AAPL $19.95  $20.30  $21.40  $0.04  4 155 
AAPL $24.85  $25.30  $0.00  $0.00  --- 160 
AAPL $29.85  $30.30  $0.00  $0.00  --- 165 
AAPL $34.85  $35.30  $0.00  $0.00  --- 170 
AAPL $39.85  $40.30  $0.00  $0.00  --- 175 
AAPL $44.85  $45.30  $0.00  $0.00  --- 180 
AAPL $49.85  $50.30  $0.00  $0.00  --- 185 
AAPL $54.85  $55.30  $0.00  $0.00  --- 190 
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AAPL $59.85  $60.30  $0.00  $0.00  --- 195 
AAPL $64.85  $65.30  $0.00  $0.00  --- 200 
AAPL $69.85  $70.30  $0.00  $0.00  --- 205 
AAPL $74.85  $75.30  $0.00  $0.00  --- 210 
AAPL $84.85  $85.30  $0.00  $0.00  --- 220 
AAPL $94.85  $95.30  $0.00  $0.00  --- 230 
AAPL $104.85  $105.30  $0.00  $0.00  --- 240 
 
The spreads for displayed options ranged from $0.01 to $0.50, with a mean of $0.282 and a 
median of $0.40. In contrast, Apple’s stock at the same moment had a best bid price of $134.94 
and a best ask price of $134.95, which displayed bid-ask spread of $0.01. The example here 
showed that Apple’s options had much wider spreads than the spread of its stock on this 
randomly chosen date. The result can be generalized to options and stocks of other companies, 
because Apple’s options have been one of the most liquid among all. Therefore, it is safe to 
conclude that the spreads for options are generally far larger than the spreads for stocks. 
Additionally, for the same company, the prices of options are always cheaper than (in most of the 
cases, much cheaper than) the price of the stock, so the percentage spreads of options are much 
larger compared to the percentage spreads of stocks, when the price levels of options and stocks 
are taken into account. Use the same example in Table A.1. The percentage spreads for those 
options with non-zero quote for Apple range from 0.40% to 66.67% with a median of 0.86% for 
calls, and range from 0.43% to 66.67% with a median of 1.28% for puts. On the contrary, given a 
best bid price of $134.94 and a best ask price of $134.95, the percentage spread for Apple’s stock 
is only 0.0074%, which is significantly lower.  
